The Making of a Mediterranean Emirate. Ramzi Rouighi

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СКАЧАТЬ they collected for Tunis, and raised strong enough armies to maintain themselves in power. The second process, which will be the focus of Chapter 4, was the gradual emergence of Emirism, an ideology that became dominant under the “regional” rule of Abū Fāris.

      Conceiving of the political history in terms of an oscillation between regional and local domination generates a periodization with four important moments: (1) the foundation and consolidation of the dynasty; (2) the independence of Bijāya (and other cities); (3) the popular rebellion and non-dynastic rule of a group whom the sources refer to as the ghawghā’, or mob; and (4) the reunification of Ifrīqiyā under Abū Fāris. These moments, which form the basis for the four sections of this chapter, are not arbitrary. They mark major political realignments within the elite in support of a particular agenda and, in the case of the popular rebellion, the failure of the elites to reach a compromise with each other. In other words, each configuration of Ḥafṣid domination came about because of the victory of specific coalitions over others, not because of the fluctuation of the power of an impersonal state.⁵ Rather than presenting a state-centric view, this perspective, and by extension the organization of this chapter, imagines politics as the process by which a particular group comes to rule, a process that the references to the “Ḥafṣid state” tend to leave unexamined, or worse, to take for granted.

      Like the state, the notion of a “tribe” presents the historian with a series of challenges. First, it generally acts to mask rather than illuminate politics, mainly by casting very different circumstances under the same, generally unfavorable, label. For even if the sources describe tribes (qabā’il) as static and unchanging, they were not always the same, but represented different political groups, orientations, and agendas. Second, the tribes that appear in the sources are merely those that gained significance in relation to dynastic politics. They were not necessarily the only tribes around. Their activities both for and against the Ḥafṣids explain their depiction in the sources. Third, and as for the Bedouins’ self-representation, there are hints that they produced written narratives about the past. But these were mostly tales about the feats of hero ancestors and pious teachers.⁶ The few extant lines of poetry and hagiographic narratives clearly demonstrate the involvement of tribes in political struggles but do not offer details sufficient for an analysis of political history. Last, and while they present us with facts of a different order, dynastic sources are no less problematic. For instance, they tend to represent relations between tribes and the Ḥafṣids within the framework of pledges of allegiance and tribute, which creates a sense of their neutralization and pacification. But the pledges of tribal leaders were not everlasting. They did not prevent them from forming alliances with others, including enemies of the dynasty, and even from openly rebelling against it. While it is important to account for these aspects of the perspective of our sources, it is most prudent not to fall prey to a romantic view of Bedouins and imagine, as some continue to do, the existence of egalitarian and democratic tribes.⁷

      Our ability, then, to determine whether the Ḥafṣid dynasty truly ruled over all of Ifrīqiyā, and so whether Ifrīqiyā was politically unified under their rule, is determined by the perspective of the sources. The sources do make it clear that during the period of local emirates, no Ḥafṣid emir ruled over a unified Ifrīqiyā or exerted effective control over areas beyond the city or cities he controlled. At least during that time, Ifrīqiyā was not a homogeneous political region, and there can be little doubt about that. But this lack of political unification did not prevent historians in the fifteenth century such as Ibn al-Shammā‘ (fl. 1457) from thinking of the Ḥafṣids as the “kings of Ifrīqiyā,” and not only of some areas of Ifrīqiyā or only part of the time.⁸

      In addition to the Ḥafṣid dynasty and powerful Bedouin groups, a third group in the political configuration of Ifrīqiyā were the Almohad sheikhs (shuyūkh).⁹ These generals led the Almohad military occupation of Ifrīqiyā and enforced the expropriation of lands, the imposition of heavy taxation, and the transfer of wealth from the eastern Maghrib to their capital in Marrakech (Marrākush). The sheikhs belonged to the coalition that first conquered the western Maghrib and were then dispatched to the east to lead the Almohad military. The Almohads (1130–1269) built fortified neighborhoods or Kasbahs (qaṣabāt, sing. qaṣaba) inside the cities they ruled, and these became the centers of their military-fiscal-judicial domination. The Ḥafṣids had originally been Almohad sheikhs, and they now had to contend with their former peers who decided to remain in Ifrīqiyā. Bringing these sheikhs under control was a long and arduous political process that the Ḥafṣids commenced at the beginning of their rule. To counter the power of the Almohads, the Ḥafṣids encouraged the immigration of elite Andalusis to Ifrīqiyā, at first with the backing of an Andalusi militia. Conflicts between the Andalusis, who were favored by the Ḥafṣids, the Almohads, and members of the urban elite became a common feature of politics. These conflicts often involved alliances with Bedouins. Lastly, as is evident from the Crusade led against Tunis by Louis IX, Mediterranean powers had an impact on regional politics—if only because they forced the Ḥafṣid rulers to mobilize their resources and organize defenses. Generally, however, they played a secondary role, because they were not able to shape the terms of political change or bring about outcomes that could put them in a position of leadership in Ifrīqiyā. Though their military raids and their occupation of coastal areas in Ifrīqiyā, in some cases for extended periods, appear further to demonstrate Ifrīqiyā’s lack of territorial integrity, by themselves these actions did not constitute a threat to the Ḥafṣid order. Their impact on the development of Emirism, the political ideology that became dominant at the end of the fourteenth century and shaped the region’s subsequent history and historiography, was at best indirect and secondary.

      The Foundation and Consolidation of the Dynasty: The First Regional Emirate (1220–77)

       The Last Years of Almohad Rule in Ifrīqiyā

      Almohad rule in the Maghrib and al-Andalus stretched over the largest area to come under the rule of a single political entity since Roman times. In the first years of the thirteenth century, the Almohads experienced difficulties holding it together.¹⁰ In the provinces, rebellions multiplied, as did conspiracies and bloody purges at the court in Marrakech. Worse, the local military commanders on whose shoulders the integrity of Almohad domination rested were no longer satisfied with the great wealth they derived from their posts. The central government tried to stay a step ahead of its generals’ discontent by accelerating their rotations, but that policy further undermined the stability of the regime.

      Ifrīqiyā was even less stable: the anti-Almohad ruler of Majorca, a member of the Almoravid Banū Ghāniya clan, controlled a large portion of the central Maghrib (al-Maghrib al-awsaṭ) with the support of a number of powerful Bedouins. The Banū Ghāniya would emerge as a persistent threat to the Almohads and, ultimately, as an opportunity for those seeking automony from them: the Ḥafṣids declared independence from the Almohads in the process of eliminating the Banū Ghāniya from Ifrīqiyā.

      The way this came about was as follows. At the turn of the thirteenth century, a Bedouin chief rebelled against the Almohads and declared independence in his native city of al-Mahdiya (Mahdia). He took on the caliphal title of al-Mutawakkil ‘alā Allāh and led his troops on a raid against the city of Tunis. Emboldened by the success he had there, he attacked the Majorcan emir Yaḥyā b. Ghāniya. Ibn Ghāniya’s reaction was swift and decisive.

      First, Ibn Ghāniya invaded al-Mahdiya and forced the rebel caliph to capitulate and recognize his rule. Then, taking advantage of this victory, he led his troops on to other cities. Bāja fell when Ibn Ghāniya defeated an Almohad army sent there from Bijāya. He then took Biskra, Tabassa (Tebessa), and al-Qayrawān (Kairouan). Without putting up a fight, Būna (Annaba) sent its capitulation in 1203 and a besieged Tunis surrendered, agreeing to a very heavy tribute. Yaḥyā b. Ghāniya became the ruler of Ifrīqiyā. Though his rule was short-lived, it was significant for the СКАЧАТЬ