The Making of a Mediterranean Emirate. Ramzi Rouighi

Чтение книги онлайн.

      Map 3. The western Mediterranean.

      Whether their work is a history in or of the Mediterranean, however, Mediterraneanists have tended to reinforce the idea that North Africa was a single region by framing their research in terms of relations between a European city, kingdom, or region, and all of North Africa or the Maghrib.⁴⁴ This routine act of lumping and generalizing has weakened the degree of specificity and nuance that some Mediterraneanists want to enshrine. By challenging the habit of assuming that Ifrīqiyā, and by extension North Africa or the Maghrib, should be understood as regions, this book hopes to contribute to the development of new habits based on the ongoing rethinking of historical knowledge about the Mediterranean.

      Another common scholarly shorthand that requires some attention is the “Islamic Mediterranean” which, as far as one is able to tell, stands for the “lands of Islam” that have a Mediterranean coast.⁴⁵ Although it is rarely meant as a serious analytical category, this epithet lends credence to the practice of understanding history through the prism of religion. Merely stating that some societies were Islamic does little to illuminate why understanding them as such improves our interpretation of their histories. Unfortunately, this practice is as common as it is problematic. It is thus necessary to resist the sirens that call for a greater inclusion of the “Islamic Mediterranean” into the Mediterranean field—at least under this rubric.

      Al-Andalus and the Role of Andalusis in Ifrīqiyā

      In the first half of the thirteenth century, the rulers of al-Andalus lost control of a great number of cities to Aragon and Castile. The defeat of the Almohad armies, which controlled most of al-Andalus, at the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa (mawqi‘at al-‘uqāb) in 1212 accelerated the process of reorganizing politics in both al-Andalus and the Maghrib. In the following decades, the Andalusis lost a number of major cities: Cordoba in 1236, Valencia in 1238, and Játiva in 1248, followed soon after by Seville. In 1268 Murcia fell. Andalusis left their towns and cities in droves. Andalusi exiles sought refuge and livelihood in nearby cities still under Muslim control or else crossed the sea and settled in the larger cities of the Maghrib, Tunis and Bijāya prominent among them.

      The Ḥafṣids (1229–1574) saw in the plight of al-Andalus a political opportunity. They encouraged elite Andalusis to join their court and appointed them to prominent official positions. New to Ifrīqiyā, these Andalusis had no attachments to any other group but the Ḥafṣid dynasty on whom they relied for their livelihood. As they became an important component of the elite, Andalusis participated fully in politics, playing an active role in bringing about the independence of Bijāya and other local Ḥafṣid emirates. However, by the end of the fourteenth century, prominent Andalusis grumbled that their local emirs lacked power and became ardent supporters of the regional emirate.

      When they first joined the Ḥafṣid court in the thirteenth century, elite Andalusis brought with them a particular form of political expertise and cultural refinement.⁴⁶ They also used their forced exile to elicit the sympathy of the Ḥafṣids and others. The great number of learned Andalusis sponsored by the Ḥafṣids overwhelmed, by their very presence, the intellectual scene. As it happens, their writings have also shaped modern historical interpretations of the period. The expertise and sophistication of Andalusis and their victimization at the hands of Christians were ideas full of political significance, and were neither arbitrary nor neutral. The notion of al-Andalus’s greatness has had an exceptionally long half-life in historiography, and modern scholars have tended to interpret the sources as accurate representations of the civilizing mission that elite Andalusis took up in Ifrīqiyā. These preconceptions relayed familiar sentiments about Europe’s relations with Africa. As one historian put it,

      As the long-standing struggle between Islam and Christian Spain drew to a close, the successful intensification of Christian militance gave increasing impetus to the emigration of Spanish Muslims. It did, in fact, mark the beginning of what was to prove a veritable diaspora, of which Africa experienced appreciable effects.⁴⁷

      A focus on the politics of regionalization better situates the articulation of ideas such as the greatness of al-Andalus by relating them to particular political agendas. It eschews the difficulties inherent in deploying modern racial ideology and the burden of civilizing Africa without having to dwell on their problematic character. That said, the migration of elite Andalusis from Iberia to Ifrīqiyā is not itself the primary focus of this book. Instead of analyzing the causes or workings of this trans-Mediterranean migration, the book seeks to assess its effects on elite politics and the articulation of Emirist ideology.

      Ibn Khaldūn

      Historical chronicles (tawārīkh) are an important source of information in establishing a chronology of political events and identifying the individuals and groups involved. Most of the information we have about thirteenth-and fourteenth-century politics in Ifrīqiyā comes from dynastic histories by four authors: Ibn Khaldūn, Ibn Qunfudh, al-Zarkashī (fl. 1482), and Ibn al-Shammā‘ (fl. 1457).⁴⁸ These men’s backgrounds, experiences, and trajectories were dissimilar in many ways, but their chronicles share a basic dynastic vision of politics, one that shaped the stories they saw fit to tell, retell, or omit. Since all were involved, directly or not, in the very processes their chronicles describe, it is important to situate their political views in relation to the politics of regionalization.

      Ibn Khaldūn’s Book of Examples (Kitāb al-‘ibar) is not as concise as the other three and includes information not found in any of them. It is our sole source on a number of critical events such as the rule of the non-elite in Bijāya in the 1360s.⁴⁹ This makes it a very important source for the types of arguments this book makes about regionalization. Moreover, this author’s theoretical reflections about politics in the introductory volume (muqaddima) of that work make it special in yet another respect. He argued that a new science of civilization (‘ilm al-‘umrān) was necessary to make sense of history. This theoretical move and the way he implemented it have gained him fame as father of sociology and the Muslim Machiavelli.⁵⁰

      But Ibn Khaldūn’s concerns were firmly grounded in the politics of his time.⁵¹ His ideas were steeped in the intellectual traditions that formed the basis of political strategy in Ifrīqiyā, and need to be analyzed in relation to the emergence of Emirism. However, since he was far more consistent than other authors in his attempt to make sense of politics, his views require even greater attention. This is not to say that the other authors were less political or intellectually deficient. Rather, they described politics as they saw them but did not try to formulate a theory about the rise and fall of dynasties.

      Ibn Khaldūn was an enormously original thinker. Many have asked to what extent his originality was specific to him, to his historical context, or to Islamic civilization.⁵² This line of questioning explains, at least in part, Ibn Khaldūn’s immense popularity beyond the relatively small field of Maghrib studies and the fourteenth century. The availability of translations of his works in a number of languages has meant that scholars with little or no familiarity with either the Maghrib or the fourteenth century can use him to support all sorts of arguments. In a similar vein, interpretations of Ibn Khaldūn’s work exhibit an oddly consistent confidence in the very few, and often dated, historical studies that support their understanding of the context in which the author lived.

      In this book, Ibn Khaldūn’s ideas are used to identify and characterize a specific political ideology—Emirism. This does not mean СКАЧАТЬ