The Phenomenology of Pain. Saulius Geniusas

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СКАЧАТЬ Apprehension–Content of Apprehension

       Husserl’s Analysis of Pain in the Logical Investigations

       Pain as a Stratified Phenomenon

       Sartre’s Phenomenology of Pain in Being and Nothingness

       3. The Phenomenology of Pain Dissociation Syndromes

       Congenital Insensitivity to Pain

       The Discovery of Pain

       Lobotomy, Cingulotomy, and Morphine

       Threat Hypersymbolia

       Asymbolia for Pain

       Pain Affect without Pain Sensation

       4. Pain and Temporality

       Objective Time and Subjective Temporality

       The Different Senses of Presence: The Fundamental Levels of Time-Constitution

       Implicit and Explicit Presence

       The Field of Presence as the Horizon of Pain Experience

       Memory and Pain

       Anticipation and Pain

       5. The Body in Pain: Leib and Körper

       Pain’s Indubitability and Bodily Localizability

       The Phenomenological Account

       The Lived-Body as the Subject of Pain

       Pain as Empfindnis

       Pain’s Twofold Localizability

       Pain and the Constitution of the Lived-Body

       The Structure of Pain Experience

       6. The Phenomenology of Embodied Personhood: Depersonalization and Repersonalization

       The Phenomenology of Embodied Personhood

       Chronic Pain as Depersonalization

       Chronic Pain as Repersonalization

       Implications for the Phenomenology of Medicine

       Pain as an Expressible Phenomenon: The Basic Elements of a Phenomenology of Listening

       7. Pain and the Life-World: Somatization and Psychologization

       Somatization and Psychologization

       Somatization, Psychologization, and Their Origins in Experience

       The Phenomenology of Somatization and Psychologization

       The Life-World as the Wherefrom, Wherein, and Whereto of Experience

       Between Homeliness and Homelessness: Discordance in the Life-World

       Masochism and Somatization

       Conclusion

       Notes

       Bibliography

       Index

      ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

      Some of the chapters of this book are heavily revised versions of earlier publications. Chapter 2 is a revised version of “Pain and Intentionality” (Geniusas 2017a). Chapter 5 includes material from an earlier study, “The Subject of Pain: Husserl’s Discovery of the Lived-Body” (Geniusas 2014b). Chapter 6 is a revised version of “Phenomenology of Chronic Pain: De-Personalization and Re-Personalization” (Geniusas 2017b).

      I would like to thank Agustín Serrano de Haro, Gary B. Madison, Simon van Rysewyk, Charles Rodger, and John Quintner, who have read through some chapters of this study. I also owe a word of thanks to Jagna Brudzinska, David Carr, Nicolas de Warren, Dalius Jonkus, Claudio Majolino, Dermot Moran, Luis Niel, Dieter Lohmar, Dmitri Nikulin, Witold Plotka, and Dan Zahavi. Finally, I am grateful to the Research Grants Council of the University Grants Committee in Hong Kong for the General Research Fund grant, which enabled me to devote the time needed to prepare this study for publication.

      INTRODUCTION

      PAIN AS EXPERIENCE

      We can say about pain what Augustine (2006, 242) has said about time: “What is pain? If no one asks me, I know what it is. If I wish to explain it to him who asks, I do not know.” Concessions of this kind are common in pain research. For instance, Thomas Lewis begins his Pain with the following admission: “I am so far from being able satisfactorily to define pain . . . that the attempt could serve no useful purpose” (1942, v). So also, Johannes J. Degenaar remarks: “I thought I knew what pain was until I was asked to say what the word ‘pain’ means. Then . . . I realized my ignorance” (1979, 281).

      Such statements might take one by surprise, especially in light of the overabundance of literature on pain that we come across in various sciences. The available literature, however, consists largely of empirical research on various neurological mechanisms as well as other factors that elicit a painful reaction on the part of some organisms. We are flooded with intricate and fascinating details about pain mechanisms, although we know little about the nature of pain experience.

      In the phenomenology of medicine, it is common to draw a distinction between illness and disease and to maintain that while the nature of the disease is determined neurophysiologically, the nature of illness must be fixed phenomenologically (see, for instance, Toombs 1993). We come across СКАЧАТЬ