Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Martin Heidegger

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СКАЧАТЬ Or is this Logic, in accord with the matter at issue therein, the remaining second part of the system? Yes and no. Yes, insofar as the complete title of the Logic also indicates a connection with the System of Science. The actual title of this work reads: Science of Logic—unusual and strange, for us as well as for Hegel’s time. But this title loses its strangeness when we recall the complete subtitle of the first part: Science of the Phenomenology of Spirit. The system of the science is thus 1. science of the phenomenology of spirit and 2. science of logic. That is to say: as system of the science it is 1. system as phenomenology and 2. system as logic. Thus, the system appears necessarily in two shapes. Inasmuch as they mutually support each other and are interconnected, the Logic and the Phenomenology together form the entirety of the system in the fullness of its actuality.

      In addition to and apart from the inner, essential relation which the Phenomenology has to the Logic, Hegel refers explicitly to the Logic in many passages of the Phenomenology of Spirit.² Not only do we find anticipatory references to the Logic in the Phenomenology, but also the reverse: references back from the Logic to the Phenomenology.³ But most important, Hegel writes explicitly in the preface to the first volume of the Logic, first edition, 1812: “As regards the external relation {of the Logic to the Phenomenology of Spirit} it was {!} intended that the first part of the System of Science, which contains the Phenomenology, should be followed by a second part, which would contain the logic and the two concrete [realen] sciences of philosophy, the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of spirit, and which would have completed the system of science.”⁴

      Now it is clear that with the appearance of the Phenomenology in 1807, the entire system was originally thought to have two parts. However, the second part was to contain not only the logic, but the logic together with the concrete sciences of philosophy. The entirety of what should be the second part of the system is nothing other than the transformed concept of traditional metaphysics, whose systematic content likewise thoroughly determined the Kantian inquiry: Metaphysica generalis (ontology) and Metaphysica specialis (speculative psychology, speculative cosmology, and speculative theology).

      This second part, which was to follow, would have contained the entirety of general and special metaphysics, that is, traditional metaphysics—transformed, of course, to fit Hegel’s basic position. That transformation can be briefly characterized as follows. Hegel divides the entirety of general and special metaphysics into two parts: I. logic and II. philosophy of the concrete [reale Philosophie]. However, he divides the philosophy of the concrete into philosophy of nature (cosmology) and philosophy of spirit (psychology). Speculative theology (the third part of special metaphysics and for traditional philosophy the decisive part) is missing from the philosophy of the concrete, but not from Hegel’s metaphysics, where we find speculative theology in an original unity with ontology. This unity of speculative theology and ontology is the proper concept of Hegelian logic.

      Speculative theology is not the same as philosophy of religion, nor is it identical with theology in the sense of dogmatics. Rather, speculative theology is the ontology of the ens realissimum, the highest actuality as such. For Hegel this is inseparable from the question of the being of beings. Why this is the case should become clear in the course of the interpretation.

      However, if the second part of the system that Hegel planned was to represent metaphysics, then the first part of the system, the Phenomenology of Spirit, was to be the foundation of metaphysics, its grounding. But this grounding is not an epistemology (which was as foreign to Hegel as it was to Kant), nor does it involve empty reflections on method prior to its actual implementation in the work. It is, rather, the preparation of the basis, the “demonstration of the truth of the standpoint,”⁵ which metaphysics occupies.

      But why did the Science of Logic not appear explicitly under the title of the second part of the system of science? Hegel says: “But the necessary expansion which logic itself has demanded has led me to have this part published separately; it thus forms the first sequel to the Phenomenology of Spirit in an expanded arrangement of the system. It will later be followed by a treatment of the two concrete philosophical sciences mentioned.”⁶

      But does this justify the omission of the main title System of Science? By no means. Precisely when the system is given a larger plan, it becomes more necessary to identify all the detailed parts in their relation to the system. It would not have been contrary to the original or to the enlarged plan of the system if its entirety had been arranged something like this: System of Science: Part I, Science of the Phenomenology of the Spirit; Part II, First Sequel: Science of Logic; Second Sequel: Science of the Philosophy of the Concrete.*

      Why is the title System omitted as early as 1812? Because between 1807 and 1812, a transformation was already underway. The sign of the initial transformation in the idea of the system can be seen in the fact that the Logic not only loses the main heading but also stands separately, by itself—not because it turned out to be too detailed, but because the Phenomenology is to take on a different function and position in the fluctuating arrangement of the system. Because the Phenomenology is no longer the first part of the system, the Logic is no longer its second part. The Logic was separated in order to remain free to assume another place in another arrangement of the system which was then unfolding.

      We gain an insight into the time between the appearance of the Phenomenology in 1807 and the publication of the first volume of the Logic in 1812 (and the second volume in 1816) if we bear in mind, if only in a rough manner, Hegel’s “Philosophical Propaedeutic.”

      When the Phenomenology of Spirit appeared in 1807, Hegel was no longer in Jena, where he had settled in 1801 (having relinquished his tutorship in Frankfurt) in order to qualify for lecturing under Schelling. Hegel indeed became a university lecturer in 1805. But his salary was so insufficient that he did not need the catastrophe which happened in Prussia in 1806 to persuade him to seek support for himself in a different manner and elsewhere. As early as 1805 he applied without success for a professorship in Heidelberg. It was in Bavaria—which was where many others, including Schelling, had moved—that Hegel found employment as the editor of a newspaper in Bamberg. In 1808 he was able to exchange this position for a more appropriate one as headmaster of the secondary school in Nürnberg, where he stayed until 1816, when the second part of the Logic appeared and the call to Heidelberg University came. It was in Heidelberg on October 28, 1816, that Hegel delivered his inaugural lecture,* which is well-known especially for its conclusion, which is characteristic of Hegel’s basic position. That conclusion reads as follows:

      We elders, who have grown to adulthood in the storms of the age, consider you fortunate, because your youth falls in these times in which you may devote yourselves to science and truth with less curtailment. I have dedicated my life to science; and it is a true joy for me to find myself again in this place where I may work to a greater degree with others and with a wider effectiveness, in the interests of the higher sciences, and help to direct your way therein. I hope that I may succeed in earning and gaining your confidence. But at first I wish to make a single request: that you bring with you, above all, a trust in science and a trust in yourselves. The love of truth, faith in the power of spirit, is the first condition for philosophy. Man, because he is spirit, may and should deem himself worthy of the highest; he cannot think too highly of the greatness and the power of his spirit; and with this faith, nothing will be so difficult and hard that it will not reveal itself to him. The essence of the universe, at first hidden and concealed, has no power to offer resistance to the courageous search for knowledge; it must open itself up before the seeker, set its riches and its depths before his eyes to give him pleasure.⁷

      Already at the end of 1817, the offer from the University of Berlin for Fichte’s СКАЧАТЬ