The Hour Between Dog and Wolf: Risk-taking, Gut Feelings and the Biology of Boom and Bust. John Coates

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СКАЧАТЬ right that the market was due for a dreadful day of reckoning, but they also fully understood a point made by the great economist John Maynard Keynes back in the 1930s: that the markets could remain irrational longer than they, the investors, could remain solvent. So Robertson retired from the field, his reputation and capital largely intact. Then, early in 2000, the Nasdaq collapsed, giving back over 3,000 points in little more than a year, eventually bottoming out at the 1,000 level where it had begun a few short years before. Volatility of this magnitude normally makes a few people rich, but I know of no one who made money calling the top of this market’s explosive trajectory.

      Besides the scale of the run-up and subsequent crash, another feature of the Bubble was noteworthy, and reminiscent of the 1920s, at least the 1920s I knew from novels, black-and-white movies and grainy documentaries – that was how its energy and excitement overflowed the stock exchange, permeated the culture and intoxicated people. For the fact is, while they last, bubbles are fun; and the widespread silliness attending them is often remembered with a certain amount of humour and fondness. I imagine anyone who lived through the bull market of the Roaring Twenties retained an abiding nostalgia for that heroic and madcap time, when futuristic technology, blithe spirits and easy wealth seemed to herald a new era of boundless possibility. Of course, life in its aftermath must have been even more formative, and those born and raised during the Great Depression are said to carry, even into old age, what the historian Caroline Bird calls an ‘invisible scar’, a pathological distrust of banks and stock markets, and a morbid fear of unemployment.

      My recollections of the 1990s are of a decade every bit as hopeful and every bit as screwball as the 1920s. During the nineties we were entertained by middle-aged CEOs in black poloneck sweaters trying to ‘think outside the box’; by kids in their twenties wearing toques and yellow sunglasses, backed by apparently limitless amounts of capital, throwing lavish parties in midtown lofts and talking wacky internet schemes few of us could understand – and even fewer questioned. To do so meant you ‘just didn’t get it’, one of the worst insults of the time, indicating that you were a dinosaur incapable of lateral thought. One thing I definitely didn’t get was how the internet was supposed to overcome the constraints of time and space. Sure, ordering online was easy, but then delivery took place in the real world of rising oil prices and road congestion. The internet company that made the most heroic attempt to defy this brute fact was Kozmo.com, a New York-based start-up that promised free delivery within Manhattan and about a dozen other cities within an hour. The people who paid the price for this act of folly, besides the investors, were the scores of bicycle messengers breathlessly running red lights to meet a deadline. You would see groups of these haggard youngsters outside coffee bars (with appropriate names like Jet Fuel) catching their breath. Not surprisingly the company went bankrupt, leaving behind a question asked about this and countless similar ventures: what on earth were the investors thinking?

      Perhaps the right question should have been, were they thinking at all? Were investors engaged in a rational assessment of information, as many economists might – and did – argue? If not, then were they perhaps engaged in a different form of reasoning, something closer to a game theoretic calculation: ‘I know this thing is a bubble,’ they may have schemed, ‘but I’ll buy on the way up and then sell before everyone else.’ Yet when talking to people who were investing their savings in newly listed internet shares I found little evidence for either of these thought processes. Most investors I spoke to had difficulty employing anything like linear and disciplined reasoning, the excitement and boundless potential of the markets apparently being enough to validate their harebrained ideas. It was almost impossible to engage them in a reasoned discussion: history was irrelevant, statistics counted for little, and when pressed they shot off starbursts of trendy concepts like ‘convergence’, the exact meaning of which I never discerned, although I think it had something to do with everything in the world becoming the same – TVs turning into phones, cars into offices, Greek bonds yielding the same as German, and so on.

      If investors who had bought into this runaway market displayed little of the thought processes described by either rational choice or game theory, they also displayed little of the behaviour implied by a more common and clichéd account – the fear and greed account of investor folly. According to this piece of folk wisdom a bull market, as it picks up steam, churns out extraordinary profits, and these cause the better judgement of investors to become warped by the distemper of greed. The implication is that investors know full well that the market is a bubble, yet greed, rather than cunning, causes them to linger before selling.

      Greed certainly can and does cause investors to run with their profits too long. By itself, though, the account misses something important about bubbles like the dot.com era and perhaps the Roaring Twenties – that investors naïvely and fervently believe they are buying into the future. Cynicism and cunning are not on display. Furthermore, as a bull market starts to validate investors’ beliefs, the profits they make translate into a lot more than mere greed: they bring on powerful feelings of euphoria and omnipotence. It is at this point that traders and investors feel the bonds of terrestrial life slip from their shoulders and they begin to flex their muscles like a newborn superhero. Assessment of risk is replaced by judgements of certainty – they just know what is going to happen: extreme sports seem like child’s play, sex becomes a competitive activity. They even walk differently: more erect, more purposeful, their very bearing carrying a hint of danger: ‘Don’t mess with me,’ their bodies seem to say. ‘I can handle anything.’ Tom Wolfe nailed this delusional behaviour when he described the stars of Wall Street as ‘Masters of the Universe’.

      It was this behaviour more than anything else that struck me during the dot.com era. For the undeniable fact was, people were changing. The change showed itself not only among the untrained public but also, perhaps even more, among professional traders all along Wall Street. Normally a sober and prudent lot, these traders were becoming by small steps euphoric and delusional. Their minds were frequently troubled by racing thoughts, and their personal habits were changing: they were making do with less sleep – clubbing till 4 a.m. – and seemed to be horny all the time, more than usual at any rate, judging by their lewd comments and the increased amount of porn on their computer screens. More troubling still, they were becoming overconfident in their risk-taking, placing bets of ever-increasing size and with ever worsening risk–reward trade-offs. I was later to learn that the behaviour I was witnessing showed all the symptoms of a clinical condition known as mania (but now I am getting ahead of the story).

      These symptoms are not unique to Wall Street: other worlds also manifest them, politics for example. One particularly insightful account of political mania has been provided by David Owen, now Lord Owen. Owen, a former Foreign Secretary and one of the founders of the Social Democratic Party, has spent most of his life at the very top of British politics. But he is by training a neurologist, and has lately taken to writing about a personality disorder he has observed among political and business leaders, a disorder he calls the Hubris Syndrome. This syndrome is characterised by recklessness, an inattention to detail, overwhelming self-confidence and contempt for others; all of which, he observes, ‘can result in disastrous leadership and cause damage on a large scale’. The syndrome, he continues, ‘is a disorder of the possession of power, particularly power which has been associated with overwhelming success, held for a period of years and with minimal constraint on the leader’. The symptoms Owen describes sound strikingly similar to those I observed on Wall Street, and his account further suggests an important point – that the manic behaviour displayed by many traders when on a winning streak comes from more than their newly acquired wealth. It comes equally, perhaps more, from a feeling of consummate power.

      During the dot.com years I was in a good position to observe this manic behaviour among traders. On the one hand I was immune to the siren call of both Silicon Valley and Silicon Alley. I never had a deep understanding of high tech, so I did not invest in it, and could watch the comedy with a sceptical eye. On the other, I understood the traders’ feelings because I had in previous years been completely caught up in one or two bull markets myself, ones you probably did not hear about unless you read the financial pages, as they were isolated in either the bond or the currency market. And during these periods СКАЧАТЬ