The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. 4 (of 9). Томас Джефферсон

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СКАЧАТЬ and it may still be re-established. I mentioned to you in my last that a French consul at Boston had rescued a vessel out of the hands of a Marshal by military force. Genet has, at New York, forbidden a Marshal to arrest a vessel, and given orders to the French squadron to protect her by force. Was there ever an instance before of a diplomatic man overawing and obstructing the course of the law in a country by an armed force? The yellow fever increases. The week before last about three a day died. This last week about eleven a day have died; consequently, from known data about thirty-three a day are taken, and there are about three hundred and thirty patients under it. They are much scattered through the town, and it is the opinion of the physicians that there is no possibility of stopping it. They agree it is a nondescript disease, and no two agree in any one part of their process of cure. The President goes off the day after to-morrow, as he had always intended. Knox then takes flight. Hamilton is ill of the fever, as is said. He had two physicians out at his house the night before last.

      TO MR. HAMMOND

Philadelphia, September 9, 1793.

      Sir,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your two memorials of the 4th and 6th instant, which have been duly laid before the President of the United States.

      You cannot be uninformed of the circumstances which have occasioned the French squadron now in New York to seek asylum in the ports of the United States. Driven from those where they were on duty, by the superiority of the adverse party in the civil war which has so unhappily afflicted the colonies of France, filled with the wretched fugitives from the same scenes of distress and desolation, without water or provisions for the shortest voyage, their vessels scarcely in a condition to keep the sea at all, they were forced to seek the nearest ports in which they could be received and supplied with necessaries. That they have ever been out again to cruise, is a fact we have never learned, and which we believe to be impossible, from the information received of their wants and other impediments to active service. This case has been noted specially, to show that no inconvenience can have been produced to the trade of the other belligerent powers, by the presence of this fleet in our harbors. I shall now proceed to more general ground.

      France, England and all other nations have a right to cruise on our coasts; a right not derived from our permission, but from the law of nature. To render this more advantageous, France has secured to herself, by a treaty with us, (as she has done also by a treaty with Great Britain, in the event of a war with us or any other nation) two special rights. 1. Admission for her prizes and privateers into our ports. This, by the seventeenth and twenty-second articles, is secured to her exclusively of her enemies, as is done for her in the like case by Great Britain, were her present war with us instead of Great Britain. 2. Admission for her public vessels of war into our ports, in cases of stress of weather, pirates, enemies, or other urgent necessity, to refresh, victual, repair, &c. This is not exclusive. As then we are bound by treaty to receive the public armed vessels of France, and are not bound to exclude those of her enemies, the executive has never denied the same right of asylum in our ports to the public armed vessels of your nation. They, as well as the French, are free to come into them in all cases of weather, piracies, enemies, or other urgent necessity, and to refresh, victual, repair, &c. And so many are these urgent necessities, to vessels far from their own ports, that we have thought inquiries into the nature as well as the degree of the necessities which drive them hither, as endless as they would be fruitless, and therefore have not made them. And the rather, because there is a third right, secured to neither by treaty, but due to both on the principles of hospitality between friendly nations, that of coming into our ports, not under the pressure of urgent necessity, but whenever their comfort or convenience induces them. On this ground, also, the two nations are on a footing.

      As it has never been conceived that either would detain their ships of war in our ports when they were in a condition for action, we have never conceived it necessary to prescribe any limits to the time of their stay. Nor can it be viewed as an injury to either party, to let their enemies lie still in our ports from year's end to year's end, if they choose it. Thus, then, the public ships of war of both nations enjoy a perfect equality in our ports; first, in cases of urgent necessity; secondly, in cases of comfort or convenience; and thirdly, in the time they choose to continue; and all a friendly power can ask from another is, to extend to her the same indulgences which she extends to other friendly powers. And though the admission of the prizes and privateers of France is exclusive, yet it is the effect of treaty made long ago, for valuable considerations, not with a view to the present circumstances, nor against any nation in particular, but all in general, and may, therefore, be faithfully observed without offence to any; and we mean faithfully to observe it. The same exclusive article has been stipulated, as was before observed, by Great Britain in her treaty with France, and indeed is to be found in the treaties between most nations.

      With respect to the usurpation of admiralty jurisdiction by the consuls of France, within these States, the honor and rights of the States themselves were sufficient motives for the executive to take measures to prevent its continuance, as soon as they were apprized of it. They have been led by particular considerations to await the effect of these measures, believing they would be sufficient; but finding at length they were not, such others have been lately taken as can no longer fail to suppress this irregularity completely.

      The President is duly sensible of the character of the act of opposition made to the serving of legal process on the brig William Tell, and he presumes the representations made on that subject to the minister of France, will have the effect of opening a free access to the officer of justice, when he shall again present himself with the precept of his court.

      I have the honor to be, with great respect, Sir, your most obedient, and most humble servant.

      TO MR. GENET

Philadelphia, September 9, 1793.

      Sir,—In my letter of June the 25th, on the subject of the ship William, and generally of vessels suggested to be taken within the limits of the protection of the United States by the armed vessels of your nation, I undertook to assure you it would be more agreeable to the President, that such vessels should be detained under the orders of yourself or the consul of France, than by a military guard, until the government of the United States should be able to inquire into and decide on the fact. In two separate letters of the 29th of the same month, I had the honor to inform you of the claims lodged with the executive for the same ship William and the brig Fanny, to enclose you the evidence on which they were founded, and to desire that if you found it just, you would order the vessels to be delivered to the owners; or, if overweighed in your judgment by any contradictory evidence which you might have or acquire, you would do me the favor to communicate that evidence; and that the consuls of France might retain the vessels in their custody, in the meantime, until the executive of the United States should consider and decide finally on the subject.

      When that mode of proceeding was consented to for your satisfaction, it was by no means imagined it would have occasioned such delays of justice to the individuals interested. The President is still without information, either that the vessels are restored, or that you have any evidence to offer as to the place of capture. I am, therefore, Sir, to repeat the request of early information on this subject, in order that if any injury has been done those interested, it may be no longer aggravated by delay.

      The intention of the letter of June the 25th having been to permit such vessels to remain in the custody of the consuls, instead of that of a military guard (which, in the case of the ship William, appeared to have been disagreeable to you), the indulgence was of course to be understood as going only to cases which the executive might take, or keep possession of, with a military guard, and not to interfere with the authority of the courts of justice in any case wherein they should undertake to act. My letter of June the 29th, accordingly, in the same case of the ship William, informed you that no power in this country could take a vessel out of the custody of the courts, and that it was only because they decided not to take cognizance of that case, that it resulted to the executive to interfere in it. Consequently, this alone put it in their power to leave the vessel in the СКАЧАТЬ