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СКАЧАТЬ psychological reactance toward multicultural training experience. Cognitive, behavioral, and affective evaluations of the training experience, including course topics, facilitator, and processes, are measured (see Kelly et al., 2019).

      Cognitive Dissonance and Reactance

      To what extent is psychological reactance the same as cognitive dissonance? Do we always experience cognitive dissonance when we experience reactance? There are a number of commonalities between psychological reactance and cognitive dissonance. Both theories are motivational arousal theories emphasizing cognitive evaluation and gravitation toward psychological consistency. Arousal is a noxious state in both cognitive dissonance and psychological reactance theories, and a drive is buildup-directed to achieve a state of equilibrium (consonance or removal of threat to freedom). The importance of the cognition or threatened freedom determines the degree of cognitive dissonance or psychological reactance, respectively.

      Several strategies are used to obtain equilibrium, and these methods vary from cognitive to behavioral to emotional changes. The reevaluation of importance, changing or adding new cognitions, adoption of new behavior, or changing existing behaviors are some of the common strategies of arousal reduction adopted by both theories. Neither theory is set up to be scientifically falsified, and therefore, in that sense, they cannot be considered scientific theories. Also, both theories are parsimonious. The difference in parsimoniousness is one of degree. However, there are some major differences.

      Although both theories state that arousal is unpleasant, in the case of reactance the unpleasantness is always associated with negative emotions, unlike dissonance, in which both positive and negative emotions can be experienced. Sources of arousal are different: reactance involves a threat associated with a freedom, and therefore there is a “victim” and “victimizer” interaction, an externally social threatening factor, which is not the typical cognitive dissonance scenario. Therefore, there is a narrower scope of the application of reactance theory as compared to cognitive dissonance.

Wicklund (1974) was one of the first authors to attempt to address the issue of overlaps between the theories of dissonance and reactance. He argues that as far as decision making is concerned, cognitive dissonance occurs at the postdecisional stage but reactance at the predecisional stage. This sequential effect is a distinguishing difference. That is, prior to the reactant behavior is the motivational drive of psychological reactance. After the behavior, the decision is the postdecisional dissonance and dissonance reduction to justify the committed action. The force compliance studies of dissonance (e.g., Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959) and the barrier studies of reactance research provide a conceptually similar situation. However, Wicklund (1974) advocates that the difference between these groups of studies lies in the pre-decisional making without a behavioral commitment in reactance and the postdecisional dissonance as a result of behavioral commitment. However, dissonance is not only experienced in postdecisional situations. The threat to remove a freedom or the actual removal of a freedom is inherently a dissonant phenomenon. In fact, Wicklund (1974, p. 57) acknowledges this:

      There is a parallel between the two theories when simple statements of preference are made, independent of whether or not those statements constitute absolute commitments. Dissonance theory allows that the statement will produce dissonance and regret (convergence) while reactance theory indicates that the preference statement will threaten freedom and thereby result in convergence.

      Therefore, if there is an overlap between reactance and dissonance the investigation of the neurosocial psychological processes has to be evaluated. However, it should be remembered that reactance theory, from its genesis, had conceptual similarities and was developed as a special case of cognitive dissonance. The literature has still to address a precise demarcation between the two theories.

      Criticisms of Reactance

      The theory of psychological reactance has been criticized on a number of grounds. First, the theory is difficult to falsify. The emphasis of research has been on situational reactance, with experimental conditions set up to create threats to freedom. Inconsistent findings are easily explained by reference to the situation rather than an exploration of the theory to identify theoretical problems. The lack of explicitly stated propositions and hypotheses provides further insulation of the theory from the systematic assaults of science. However, other theories such as Freud’s psychoanalytical theory and Festinger’s cognitive dissonance theory have also been criticized on these grounds.

      Second, the concept of reactance is a scientifically vague concept. There is tremendous latitude left to the interpretation of exactly what behavior is reactance or non-reactance.

Premised on the concept of reactance, the magnitude of reactance is discussed. The concept of magnitude assumes some kind of scale or degree distinction between one level of reactance and another. Exactly how to evaluate the magnitude of reactance is not stated in the theory. Therefore, the concept of magnitude of reactance has two ambiguous terms which have implications for scientific measurement of the concept. Reactance cannot be physically observed but is inferred from measures of indicators of reactance which vary from study to study. Third, the theory is parsimonious and can, therefore, explain a wide range of behavior in a variety of social settings. A theory with such versatility loses its efficacy in explaining and creates a diminishing level of confidence.

      Fourth, reactance theory is not designed to assess the dynamism of social interaction and exchanges in the movement toward reduction of the psychological tension and achievement of equilibrium. Freedom can only be threatened by a powerful other. The exchanges and power dynamics in reasserting one’s freedom are not examined or articulated in the theory. The magnitude of reactance, the persistence of reduction, the kinds of reduction strategies, and the acceptance or removal of threat to freedom can all be better comprehended if an analysis of the power dynamics complements the theory.

      Fifth, the psychological processes involved in internalizing free behaviors are not articulated by the theory (Wicklund, 1997). This is an assumption, a given, at the core of the theory. An elaboration of the dynamics involved in the development of free behaviors will provide a profound understanding of the processes involved in reactance. The cultural contexts and their contribution to one’s sense of freedom need elaboration via cross-cultural research.

      Sixth, is reactance a behavioral attempt to demonstrate and project an impression of autonomy and power to others in the interaction situation? In other words, is there a distinction between impression management and reactance? Heilman and Toffler (1976), for example, argue that reduction of reactance was a direct function of balance of power, or the impression of it, in interaction. Baer et al.’s (1980) findings support the view that there is a greater concern with demonstrating the possession of a freedom than concern about the removal of the freedom. Wright and Brehm (1982, p. 616) in being critical of the impression management explanation of reactance, write:

      In summary, then, the impression management explanation of reactance, in contrast to reactance theory, predicts no effects when (a) threats to freedom are nonsocial or social threats are unintentional, (b) subjects’ responses are private (nobody who has witnessed the threat will see them, or subjects’ responses cannot be traced back to them individually), and (c) freedom restoration occurs without the agent or an observer being aware of it. We believe that it is doubtful that reactance effects can best be understood as a manifestation of impression management.

      Seventh, reactance theory places great emphasis on the cognitive, but minimal emphasis is given to the affect state. The next section proposes the introduction of the affect state into the theory of psychological reactance.

      Toward an Affect Arousal Reactance Theory

      Philip Cowan, in his preface to Piaget’s Intelligence and Affectivity (1981, p. xi), wrote:

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