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СКАЧАТЬ toward state control. Political authoritarianism intensified.

      This raised critical questions for the United States. Could it accept China’s rise to a position of global economic leadership while maintaining its own traditional supremacy? Or would its supremacy inevitably give way to a “post-primacy era” in which, at a minimum, it shared global prominence and clout with the new superpower? Even more crucially, did it matter? Was global economic leadership critical for the United States to defend key national interests or would it fare as well, or potentially even better, if China were to move up beside it in the international hierarchy?

The Trump Administration clearly tilted toward hostility toward China’s rise and thus adopted a new policy that could be called partial disengagement (Friedberg 2020) or selective decoupling.⁶ It sought to block further increases in economic interdependence and to selectively undo some past interactions. The chosen tools were tariffs on a wide range of imports from China, acquiescence in retaliatory Chinese tariffs on most US exports to China, a sharp cutback in Chinese direct investment in the United States, and discouragement of American foreign direct investment (FDI) in China (and even an ineffectual Trump “order” to US firms to “come home”). New visa policies cut back on students and other Chinese travelers to the United States. Trade declined and flows of investment, technology, and people were sharply curtailed. The “Asia czar” of the incoming Biden Administration, Kurt Campbell, affirmed in early 2021 that “The period that was broadly described as engagement has come to an end.”

      There are interest groups and political forces in China that also want to decouple. The application of tough US controls against key Chinese firms – such as ZTE and, especially, Huawei – has strengthened the hawks in Beijing who warn that dependence on US suppliers of important inputs (like semiconductors) jeopardizes China’s ability to chart its own course in both economic and security terms. China has always had doubts about relying on the United States for foodstuffs, pointing back to the Nixon embargo of soybean exports in 1973 and the Carter embargo of wheat for the Soviet Union in 1979.

      Dependence on the US market has been highlighted by President Trump’s tariffs. Financial fears are stoked by dependence on the dollar and the aggressive exploitation of its international role by the United States against adversaries such as Iran, Russia, North Korea, and Cuba; China fears that it might be excluded from the SWIFT system of international payments settlement as Iran once was. The sharp cutback in new Chinese FDI in the United States has probably been due more to China’s own controls on capital outflows than to US restrictions. As tensions rise between the countries, and a new Cold War perhaps approached, the costs of interdependence loom much larger, relative to its benefits.

China, as well as the United States, might thus tacitly, or even explicitly, agree to reduce their mutual economic dependencies. Such “managed disengagement” (Rosen 2018) is already under way to some extent. It would discomfit elements in both countries that would lose some or even all of their previous economic benefits, but it might limit tensions at the margin. It would not resolve any of the underlying problems, however, and might even reduce the incentives for the two countries to attempt to address those problems.

      These cutbacks were not sufficient for the hawks, both inside and outside the Trump Administration. They therefore sought the most extreme option, containment or Cold War. It would aim to replicate the economic dimensions of the previous Cold War, isolating the adversary from the world economy and from US ties as much as possible. Carried to its logical “total decoupling” conclusion, this would require restoring Smoot–Hawley tariffs (or even more) to all imports from China; embargoing all exports that carried any national security – or even economic security – overtones; cutting off virtually all direct investment and technology flows in both directions; perhaps restricting flows of people (including students and tourists) in both directions; and seeking to reassemble the anti-Soviet COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls) structure by enlisting as many allies as possible (a feat made more difficult for the Trump Administration by its own attacks on those same allies). The Trump Administration publicly avowed that it was a major policy error to let China join the WTO.

      Mistrust between China and the United States has been deep-seated for some time (Lieberthal and Wang 2012). It has now reached extreme levels and will be hard to reverse. The roughly 100 working groups and task forces that existed between the two countries in the past have reportedly been cut to fewer than 20.

      There are clearly elements within both the national security and economic policy communities in the United States that would welcome, or even seek, a new Cold War between the United States and China. They believe that China wants to exclude the United States from Asia and dominate it on the global stage. They want to use such a framework to further expand the trade war, and broaden it into an investment and technology war, and perhaps a currency war, that would treat China – at least at the margin, going forward – as the United States treated the Soviet Union.

The speech by Vice President Mike Pence at the Hudson Institute on October 4, 2018, laid out the Cold War case without using the term (Pence 2018). It accused China of employing a “whole-of-government approach to advance its influence and benefit its interests. It’s employing this power in provocative and coercive ways to interfere in the domestic policies of this country and to interfere in the politics of the United States.” President Trump supported the Pence pronouncements (Bolton 2020).

      There are similar trains of thought within China. Many there view the United States as an implacable foe whose primary foreign policy goal is to contain or even stop China’s rise. There is thus considerable risk that the overall relationship between the two countries could deteriorate so far (and maybe so fast) that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to make any constructive progress on the economic topics.

      These restrictive deviations from the traditional engagement approach levy increasing costs on the US economy as the gains from trade and investment are curtailed. They pose huge questions concerning the feasibility of unraveling four decades of growing interdependence. For example, what would happen to the trillion-plus dollars of investment in US Government securities by the People’s Bank of China and other Chinese investors? To the supply chains that integrate US and Chinese firms across many industries? To the tens of billions of dollars of FDI that already exist in both directions? The chairman of Foxconn, the Taiwanese company that is one of the world’s largest employers, suggests that global technology supply chains would “split into two camps – one for China and those associated with it and another of the United States and their friends” (Financial Times 2020). Some observers doubt whether extensive decoupling is even possible.

      The even bigger question about the containment option, however, is whether it could succeed in its goal of containing China. Could China’s rise be stopped, or even significantly slowed down? And would the extent be sufficient to make the self-inflicted costs to the United States itself, and the boomerang effects on China and the rest of the world, remotely worthwhile?

The Trump containment effort failed miserably. China’s rise continued. It was the only major economy to maintain positive growth in 2020, while the United States and almost everybody else dropped substantially into negative territory due to the coronavirus pandemic. The gap between China’s growth rate, and that of the United States and its hegemonic coalition, increased during the period of the three shocks (the trade war, the pandemic, and the deep recession spawned by the latter). China’s trade continued to expand much faster than global trade, and its share of world exports rose further (even while its trade with the United States dropped sharply). US growth dropped into sharply negative territory, its global trade deficit kept rising and there was no significant pickup in domestic investment in general, or reshoring in particular. China passed this stress test with flying colors.

      The answer going forward turns heavily on whether the United States could persuade the rest of the world to side with it in isolating China. China is open to trade: fully 20 percent of GDP is exported. That number has declined steadily over the СКАЧАТЬ