Organización industrial. Martin Peitz

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      ³⁶ La única excepción fue el modelo de capacidad-después-precio.

      ³⁷ Ver los capítulos 18 y 19 para un análisis más completo de las patentes y la industria farmacéutica.

      ³⁸ Amir y Grilo (1999) muestran que la concavidad-log de la función de demanda (inversa) (esto es, independientemente de la función de costos) conduce por sí sola al ranking (4.2). Se necesitaría una demanda convexa-log y que la producción no tuviera costos para que al menos una empresa tuviera

      ³⁹ Aquí consideramos productos sustituibles, para los cuales las funciones de mejor respuesta tienen pendientes descendentes bajo competencia en cantidades (sustituibilidad estratégica) y ascendentes bajo competencia en precios (complementariedad estratégica). Recuerde que lo opuesto prevalece si los productos son complementos. En realidad, СКАЧАТЬ