A History of Germany 1918 - 2020. Mary Fulbrook
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Название: A History of Germany 1918 - 2020

Автор: Mary Fulbrook

Издательство: John Wiley & Sons Limited

Жанр: Историческая литература

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isbn: 9781119574248

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СКАЧАТЬ to pressure from the party ranks for more radical action and a ‘second revolution’.

      It is clear that Hitler’s overriding interest lay in the preparation for the conquest of additional ‘living space’ (Lebensraum) and not primarily in the transformation of the economy. In his view, everything must be directed towards the ultimate goal of rearmament. As Hitler put it in a speech to his cabinet only a week after becoming Chancellor, on 8 February 1933: ‘The next five years in Germany had to be devoted to rendering the German people again capable of bearing arms. Every publicly sponsored measure to create employment had to be considered from the point of view of whether it was necessary with respect to rendering the German people again capable of bearing arms for military service. This had to be the dominant thought, always and everywhere’.12 Insofar as there was a coherent, specifically Nazi economic programme, it had two main features: the notion of self-sufficiency, or ‘autarky’; and the notion of expanded living space in central Europe, encompassing particularly lands to the southeast and east of Germany. These notions were, of course, integrally related to the development of a self-sufficient war economy sustained by territorial expansion and exploitation of the raw materials and labour of conquered territories. At the same time as giving priority to rearmament, however, the Nazis were concerned to retain popular support, which meant paying attention to consumer pressures and not imposing severe levels of austerity on the people. These different objectives were not entirely compatible, and periodic strains and crises resulted from attempts to pursue mutually contradictory strands of policy. Such crises also had effects on, for example, the timing of certain foreign policy moves, such as the remilitarization of the Left bank of the Rhine in 1936.

      By 1935, however, it was becoming clear that, despite the return towards full employment, Germany’s economic problems were by no means resolved. With a shortage of foreign exchange reserves, a choice had to be made between the import of raw materials for the rearmament programme or of foodstuffs for consumers. Moreover, there were splits within industry: while some industries, most notably the great chemical combine I. G. Farben, supported the manufacture of synthetic materials and an economy of autarky, others, more export-oriented, were opposed to such policies. In August 1936 Hitler issued a key memorandum stating that Germany must be ready for war within four years and that economic activity must be geared towards this primary end. On 18 October 1936 the Four Year Plan was announced, with Goering in charge. Yet despite the precarious economic condition of Germany, and the overriding priority given to rearmament, there was to be no drop in the standard of living of consumers. From then on, in attempting to pursue both these objectives, economic policy became less and less orthodox and increasingly unbalanced.

      The Four Year Plan involved close collaboration between members of certain industries – again, particularly I. G. Farben – and Nazis in high positions. It represented to some extent a clear illustration of the proliferation of spheres of competence and institutional rivalries in the Nazi state, as the powers of Goering conflicted with those of the ministers of labour (Seldte), agriculture (Darré) and economics (Schacht). Schacht in fact resigned his post as Minister of Economics in November 1937, partly because of these conflicts (and was dismissed as President of the Reichsbank a little over a year later, in January 1939). There were both party–state conflicts and conflicts between different sections of the party. There were, for example, conflicts between party agencies concerned with rearmament, and those more concerned with aspects of consumer satisfaction or popular opinion, such as the DAF.

      It is clear СКАЧАТЬ