Plato: The Complete Works (31 Books). Plato

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СКАЧАТЬ agree, he said.

      Then to act foolishly is the opposite of acting temperately?

      He assented.

      And foolish actions are done by folly, and temperate actions by temperance?

      He agreed.

      And that is done strongly which is done by strength, and that which is weakly done, by weakness?

      He assented.

      And that which is done with swiftness is done swiftly, and that which is done with slowness, slowly?

      He assented again.

      And that which is done in the same manner, is done by the same; and that which is done in an opposite manner by the opposite?

      He agreed.

      Once more, I said, is there anything beautiful?

      Yes.

      To which the only opposite is the ugly?

      There is no other.

      And is there anything good?

      There is.

      To which the only opposite is the evil?

      There is no other.

      And there is the acute in sound?

      True.

      To which the only opposite is the grave?

      There is no other, he said, but that.

      Then every opposite has one opposite only and no more?

      He assented.

      Then now, I said, let us recapitulate our admissions. First of all we admitted that everything has one opposite and not more than one?

      We did so.

      And we admitted also that what was done in opposite ways was done by opposites?

      Yes.

      And that which was done foolishly, as we further admitted, was done in the opposite way to that which was done temperately?

      Yes.

      And that which was done temperately was done by temperance, and that which was done foolishly by folly?

      He agreed.

      And that which is done in opposite ways is done by opposites?

      Yes.

      And one thing is done by temperance, and quite another thing by folly?

      Yes.

      And in opposite ways?

      Certainly.

      And therefore by opposites:—then folly is the opposite of temperance?

      Clearly.

      And do you remember that folly has already been acknowledged by us to be the opposite of wisdom?

      He assented.

      And we said that everything has only one opposite?

      Yes.

      Then, Protagoras, which of the two assertions shall we renounce? One says that everything has but one opposite; the other that wisdom is distinct from temperance, and that both of them are parts of virtue; and that they are not only distinct, but dissimilar, both in themselves and in their functions, like the parts of a face. Which of these two assertions shall we renounce? For both of them together are certainly not in harmony; they do not accord or agree: for how can they be said to agree if everything is assumed to have only one opposite and not more than one, and yet folly, which is one, has clearly the two opposites—wisdom and temperance? Is not that true, Protagoras? What else would you say?

      He assented, but with great reluctance.

      Then temperance and wisdom are the same, as before justice and holiness appeared to us to be nearly the same. And now, Protagoras, I said, we must finish the enquiry, and not faint. Do you think that an unjust man can be temperate in his injustice?

      I should be ashamed, Socrates, he said, to acknowledge this, which nevertheless many may be found to assert.

      And shall I argue with them or with you? I replied.

      I would rather, he said, that you should argue with the many first, if you will.

      Whichever you please, if you will only answer me and say whether you are of their opinion or not. My object is to test the validity of the argument; and yet the result may be that I who ask and you who answer may both be put on our trial.

      Protagoras at first made a show of refusing, as he said that the argument was not encouraging; at length, he consented to answer.

      Now then, I said, begin at the beginning and answer me. You think that some men are temperate, and yet unjust?

      Yes, he said; let that be admitted.

      And temperance is good sense?

      Yes.

      And good sense is good counsel in doing injustice?

      Granted.

      If they succeed, I said, or if they do not succeed?

      If they succeed.

      And you would admit the existence of goods?

      Yes.

      And is the good that which is expedient for man?

      Yes, indeed, he said: and there are some things which may be inexpedient, and yet I call them good.

      I thought that Protagoras was getting ruffled and excited; he seemed to be setting himself in an attitude of war. Seeing this, I minded my business, and gently said:—

      When you say, Protagoras, that things inexpedient are good, do you mean inexpedient for man only, or inexpedient altogether? and do you call the latter good?

      Certainly not the last, he replied; for I know of many things—meats, drinks, medicines, and ten thousand other things, which are inexpedient for man, and some which are expedient; and some which are neither expedient nor inexpedient for man, but only for horses; and some for oxen only, and some for dogs; and some for no animals, but only for trees; and some for the roots of trees and not for their branches, as for example, manure, which is a good thing when laid about the roots of a tree, but utterly destructive if thrown upon the shoots and young branches; or I may instance olive oil, which is mischievous to all plants, and generally most injurious to the hair of every animal with the exception of man, but beneficial to human hair and to the human body generally; and even in this application (so various and changeable is the nature of the benefit), that which is the greatest good СКАЧАТЬ