The Nuremberg Trials (Vol.9). International Military Tribunal

Чтение книги онлайн.

СКАЧАТЬ It was my duty in the Führer’s headquarters to report on special events, special matters, inquiries, and desires of the Reich Marshal if he were absent, and to transmit them. I also had to transmit inquiries from the Führer’s headquarters direct to Hermann Göring. Then I had to inform Hermann Göring early, that is, not through official channels, regarding all that took place in the Führer’s headquarters insofar as it was of interest to him in his capacity as Reich Marshal.

      DR. STAHMER: Did you take part regularly in the conferences?

      BODENSCHATZ: I was a listener at these conferences.

      DR. STAHMER: From what time onwards did Reich Marshal Göring lose his influence with Hitler?

      BODENSCHATZ: According to my personal opinion and conviction, Hermann Göring began to lose influence with Hitler in the spring of 1943.

      DR. STAHMER: And what were the reasons?

      BODENSCHATZ: That was the beginning of large-scale air attacks by night by the R.A.F. on German towns, and from that moment there were differences of opinion between Hitler and Göring which became more serious as time went on. Even though Göring made tremendous efforts, he could not recapture his influence with the Führer to the same extent as before. The outward symptoms of this waning influence were the following:

      First, the Führer criticized Göring most severely. Secondly, the eternal conversations between Adolf Hitler and Hermann Göring became shorter, less frequent, and finally ceased altogether. Thirdly, as far as important conferences were concerned, the Reich Marshal was not called in. Fourthly, during the last months and weeks the tension between Adolf Hitler and Hermann Göring increased to such a degree that he was finally arrested.

      DR. STAHMER: Do you know anything about this arrest? What was the cause?

      BODENSCHATZ: I have no exact information about it. I can only tell you what I heard. I was at that time in Bad Reichenhall in the military hospital. I merely heard that Reich Marshal Göring had sent a telegram to the Führer, and in this telegram Göring requested that, since the Führer no longer had freedom of action, he might act himself. As the result of this telegram, which was sent by wireless to Berlin, the arrest took place. I would like to emphasize that I only heard that. I have no proof of any of these statements.

      DR. STAHMER: And who made the arrest?

      BODENSCHATZ: I cannot tell you about that because I know nothing. I heard, however, that a Kommando of the SS from Obersalzberg made the arrest.

      DR. STAHMER: Did Field Marshal Göring have any previous knowledge of the incidents against the Jews which took place during the night of 9 to 10 November 1938?

      BODENSCHATZ: Göring had no previous knowledge of these incidents. I inferred that from his demeanor—how he acted towards me with regard to these incidents. He acted in the following manner: When he heard of these happenings he was dismayed and condemned them. A few days later he went with proof to the Führer and complained about the people who had instigated these incidents. Captain Wiedemann, the adjutant of the Führer, can give you further particulars on the subject on oath.

      Several weeks later, Hermann Göring called all the Gauleiter to Berlin, in order to make clear his attitude regarding the incidents of the 9th and 10th. He was violently opposed to these individual acts of barbarism. He criticized them severely as unjust, as economically unreasonable and harmful to our prestige in foreign countries. The former Gauleiter, Dr. Uiberreither, who took part in this conference of Gauleiter, has already given further particulars on oath.

      DR. STAHMER: Were you present at a conference which took place in the beginning of August 1939 at Soenke Nissen Koog near Husum?

      BODENSCHATZ: Yes. I personally took part in that conference.

      DR. STAHMER: Who was present there?

      BODENSCHATZ: As far as I remember the following were present: Hermann Göring; Herr Dahlerus, from Stockholm; six to eight English economic experts, whose names I do not recall; I was present, and there was an interpreter, Ministerialrat Dr. Böcker.

      DR. STAHMER: Can you tell us about the subject of this conference?

      BODENSCHATZ: I cannot remember it word for word, but as far as I can tell you Hermann Göring made the following statements . . .

      THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, did the witness say where this conference took place?

      DR. STAHMER: Yes.

      THE PRESIDENT: Would you tell us where it was?

      DR. STAHMER: [To the witness.] Please repeat where this conference took place.

      BODENSCHATZ: The conference took place at the beginning of August at Soenke Nissen Koog near Husum, Schleswig-Holstein.

      DR. STAHMER: Please continue. You were going to tell us about the subject of this conference.

      BODENSCHATZ: I repeat, in substance, Göring made the following statement: At that moment relations between England and Germany were very tense. Under no circumstances should this tension be increased or peace be endangered. The welfare and the trade of our two countries could only flourish and prosper in peace. It was to the greatest interest of Germany and Europe that the British Empire should continue to exist. Göring emphasized that he himself would do his utmost for the maintenance of peace. He requested the British business leaders, on their return home, to use their influence in authoritative circles for that purpose.

      DR. STAHMER: Did Göring give you his opinion on how the foreign policy of the Reich should be carried out? When and on what occasions did conversations take place?

      BODENSCHATZ: Hermann Göring often discussed these topics with me, in 1938 and 1939, especially during the period following the Munich agreement. These conversations would take place perhaps in connection with a report, or perhaps in his special train. Hermann Göring was always of the opinion that the policy of the Reich must be directed in such a way as to avoid war if possible. Hermann Göring dealt with this topic at particularly great length in a conference with the Gauleiter in the summer of 1938 in Karinhall. Dr. Uiberreither, whom I have previously mentioned, has already given further sworn testimony to this effect.

      DR. STAHMER: Did Field Marshal Göring speak to you before leaving for Munich in September 1938?

      BODENSCHATZ: Before Hermann Göring left for Munich, he told me he would do everything within his power to effect a peaceful settlement. He said, “We cannot have war.” He exerted his influence on the Führer to this effect, and during the negotiations in Munich, he worked decisively for the preservation of peace. When he left the conference hall after the conference at Munich he said to us spontaneously, “That means peace.”

      DR. STAHMER: Did he often discuss with you for what reason he was against a war, and on what occasions?

      BODENSCHATZ: We talked about this topic very frequently. He always said to me:

      “In the first World War as an infantry officer and as an air force officer I was constantly at the front. I know the horrors of a war, and, therefore, my attitude is to preserve the German people from these horrors if possible. My ambition is to solve conflicts peacefully.”

      In general, his opinion was that war is always a risky and unsure business. Even if you win a war, the advantages are in no relation whatsoever СКАЧАТЬ