A Treatise of the Laws of Nature. Richard Cumberland

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СКАЧАТЬ and Punishments, both of divine and human Laws, founded upon them, might be preserv’d inviolated; so on the other Hand Fate, even with respect to human Actions, (as well as to external Events consequent upon them, in which it was absolute and uncontroulable,) was so far to be restrain’d, as that it was to be allow’d, that antecedent Causes were the Motives of acting, or influenc’d the Mind to act, tho’ the principal and efficient Cause of Action was a natural Power and free Exertion of the Mind itself.

      “This Distinction of Fate and Necessity, and middle Opinion founded upon it, prevail’d amongst all sorts of Philosophers, Stoicks as well as Platonicks, &c. (excepting the ignorant Astrologers and Fortune-tellers amongst the Stoicks;) accordingly, we learn from Plutarch, that Plato (the great Assertor of the Freedom of the Mind) ‘admitted Fate with respect to the human Soul and Life; but adds withal, that the Cause (of Action) is in ourselves. The Stoicks, in agreement with Plato, say, that Necessity is an invincible and compulsive Cause; but that Fate is the determin’d Connection of Causes, in which Connection our Power of Action is contain’d: So that some Things are destin’d, and others not.’¹⁸¹

      “And Austin says, ‘That the Stoicks distinguish’d the Causes of Things (into antecedent and efficient, as hath been before observ’d) that they might exempt some from Necessity, and subject others to it: And amongst those which they allow’d, not to be under Necessity, they plac’d our Wills; lest otherwise, if subjected to Necessity, they should not be free.’¹⁸²

      “Hence it appears, that there is no real Difference betwixt the Platonical and Stoical Philosophy, in the Opinion of Fate, and the Freedom of human Actions; and that which hath led Men, thro’ Mistake, to think, that it was the constant and settled Doctrine of the Stoicks, that human Actions were subject to an absolute Fatality, or Necessity, is their asserting in general Terms, that all Things were originally fix’d and determin’d by the Laws, or Decrees of Fate, and are carried on and effected by an immutable Connection and Chain of Causes; whereas this Fatality, or Necessity, with respect to Men, was only understood of external providential Events, which were appointed consequential to the Nature of their Actions, presuppos’d to be free and in their own Power. For the most eminent and rigid Stoicks plainly assert the Freedom of human Actions, as hath been prov’d above; and the Platonicks, who are known to be most zealous for the Cause of Liberty, do yet with the Stoicks constantly maintain Fate, and a determined Order and Series of antecedent Causes.

      “From the preceding Observations, then, we learn what was the true Opinion, in general, both of the Platonicks and Stoicks concerning Fate; namely, that it was no other than the Laws of divine Providence, whereby all Things are govern’d, according to their several Natures; and therefore, particularly in respect of Men, it was understood to be the Rules and Decrees of divine Providence, determining the Events of human Life, and dispensing Rewards and Punishments, according to the Nature of Mens voluntary Actions.

      “They thought, that God govern’d the World by his sovereign Will, which they call’d Providence, by which he made fix’d and unalterable Laws for the Administration of the whole Universe; and that he determin’d Mens Conditions, and their Happiness, or Misery, whether here, or hereafter, according as their Actions freely chosen, and done voluntarily, should be. So that Fate, in reality, was no other than Providence,¹⁸³ or the immutable Law and Rule of God’s Government of the World; and which was call’d Necessity, (not as being suppos’d to effect necessarily, or to be the necessary efficient Cause of human Actions, but) because it was the necessary Law of all Nature; and the external Effects of it, or the Events produc’d by it, by a Series of antecedent Causes, in consequence of Mens voluntary Actions, were unavoidable and necessary.

      “That this is the true antient Notion of Fate and Necessity, I shall further distinctly prove, by a brief and indisputable Deduction of Particulars.

      “Zeno, the Father of the Stoicks, in his Letter to King Antigonus tells him, ‘It is manifest, that you are not only by Nature inclin’d to Greatness of Mind, but by Choice also.’¹⁸⁴ Again; ‘That which is Good is Eligible, as being that which is most worthy to be chosen.’¹⁸⁵

      “Cicero tells us, concerning Chrysippus, (who was a rigid Stoick, and whom his Adversaries charg’d as holding the Necessity of human Actions in consequence of his Assertion, that all Things proceeded from Fate, or a Chain of antecedent Causes) that in order ‘to assail the Argument from whence Necessity was inferred, holding at the same time, that nothing happened without a preceding Cause, he distinguish’d the Kinds of Causes, that he might avoid Necessity, and still hold Fate. Of Causes, saith he, some are perfect and principal,’ (efficient) ‘Causes, others are assistant, and immediately precedent. Wherefore, when we say, that all Things come to pass by the Fatality of antecedent Causes, we do not understand this Fatality to belong to the perfect and principal’ (efficient) ‘Causes, but only to the immediately-precedent assistant Causes; upon which Distinction he thus reasons; If all Things come to pass by Fatality, it doth indeed follow, that they come to pass with antecedent Causes, but these are not the perfect and principal’ (efficient) ‘Causes of the Event, but only the assistant Causes, which are nearest to the other; which assistant Causes, altho’ they are not in our Power, it does not thence follow, that our Affections are not in our Power; but this would follow, if the perfect and principal Causes were not in our Power.’¹⁸⁶

      “Cicero acknowledgeth this Reasoning of Chrysippus to be very much labour’d and obscure; but what he meant, he endeavoured ingeniously to explain by the rolling of a Cylinder and Whipping of a Top, which, tho’ they could not begin to move without being impelled by an external Force, yet, after Motion was given to them, they would continue to move, as it were, of themselves, by the Internal Power of their own Volubility, which belongs to their Nature, and was not given to them by that which was the first and immediate external Cause of their Motion. So in like manner he suppos’d, that external impulsive Causes, which were Subject to Fate, or out of our Power, were the antecedent and first Causes, or Occasions, of the internal Motion of the Mind, i.e. that they set the Mind on Work; but yet, that our Inclinations, Purposes and Actions following, were in our Power, and under the Direction and Government of the Will.¹⁸⁷ From which Explanation it appears, that Chrysippus meant, by the perfect and principal Cause of Action, the internal efficient Cause, or the voluntary Motion or Exertion of the Mind itself into Action; and by the Assistant precedent Cause, he meant the external Cause, or Motive, of Action; and so his Reasoning is just and right.

      “And that Chrysippus really meant, that Mens Actions were in their own Power, (tho’ external Causes out of their Power, which he call’d Fate, concurr’d to the Production of them,) and that they were the Effects of voluntary Choice; Gellius informs us from his own express Words: ‘Wherefore (says Chrysippus in Gellius) it is a Saying of the Pythagoreans; you may know that Men bring Evils voluntarily upon themselves: Mens Calamities proceeding from their own selves; and their Sins and Vices resulting from their own Appetites, Intentions, and Purposes. Wherefore, says Chrysippus, we ought not to endure or hear those wicked, slothful, pernicious and audacious Men, who, when they are convicted of a Fault, or of an Offence, fly to a necessary Fatality for refuge, and attribute their wicked Actions, not to their own Temerity, but to Fate.’¹⁸⁸

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