A Treatise of the Laws of Nature. Richard Cumberland

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СКАЧАТЬ nothing to me? If I look upon these Things as nothing to me, he threatneth nothing to me. But, if I fear any of them, he threatneth me. Is thy Son dead? What hath happen’d? Thy Son is dead. Is that all? That is all. That Ill hath happen’d, is thine own additional. If thine Hearing he incommoded, what is that to thee? No ill News can come to thee from Rome, for what Evil can befal thee there, where thou art not? Banishment is but to be elsewhere. Dost thou want Bread? The Door is open, thou may’st go out of a smoaky House.” (But, if these Things be no Evils, what meaneth that sovereign Antidote against them, To die readily?) “But is not Life a Good? No. May we not desire Health? No, by no means, nor any Thing else of the Aliena,⁵ from which the Appetite must be far remov’d; or else thou submittest thy Neck to Servitude, to the Things first, and next to the Men, who have the Disposal of them. Health is not Good, nor Sickness Evil; the Good is, to be Healthful as you ought: In like Manner, be Sick as you ought, and Sickness becometh Good and Profitable. The right Use of the Externals which present themselves, is a MERCURY’s Rod, which turneth every Thing that it toucheth into Gold. Sickness, Death, Penury, Contumely, capital Sentence, touch them with the Rod of MERCURY, and they all become Profitable. Why then should we seek our Good and Evil in Externals, seeing it is in our own Power, to make all Externals Good?” But, in order to rectify their Philosophy of Good and Evil, it ought to be consider’d, That good Things are of two Kinds. For some Things are Good, as constituent Parts of our true Perfection and Happiness of Life, and these we call the End. Other Things are Good, as conducive thereto, and these are call’d the Means. In the first Notion, the good Things, commonly so reputed, (Life, Health, Honour, Plenty, &c.) cannot be Evils, consider’d in the Nature of an End; and the Evils, commonly so reputed, (Death, Sickness, Infamy, Penury, &c.) cannot be Good. In the second Notion of Means, the Evils, commonly so reputed, may be Good, and the good Things, commonly so reputed, may be Evils; and usually are, not helps, but hindrances, to our true Perfection and Happiness in a future State.

      Their regal and happy Estate, and Self-sufficiency.

      §VI. The Stoick’s Wise-Man, according to their Institution, is Noble, Brave, Rich, Prosperous, free from Servitude and Misery; but quite out of the Road, both of civil and religious Society. For they suppose, “That nothing but our intelligent Nature is our-self, and that those Things only, which properly belong thereto, and fall within the Power of our own Wills, do concern us, or are our Good and Evil Things. Discarding, therefore, the many Things, they place their one Thing, and their All, in cultivating their intelligent free-agent Nature; in its being Virtuous, and such as the proper Nature of Man requireth; thus attaining a State of Felicity without Impediment, or danger of Misfortune, never failing of what they desire, nor falling into what they have an Aversion to; living, therefore, in a State of perfect Liberty, which they account the greatest Good. Being obnoxious to no superior Power, they are all Kings. Having dismiss’d the desire and fear of Externals, none can hurt them, they inhabit an impregnable City, none can have access to their Riches, they have no Enemy, they complain of none, criminate no Body. Hearken to me,” (saith Epictetus,) “and you shall never live in Envy, nor be in Anger, Grief, or Fear, never be prohibited, or hinder’d, nor ever Flatter any. To me” (continueth he) “no Evil can happen, to me there is no Thief” (he that stole his Lamp was no Thief to him) “nor any Earthquake; but all Things are full of Peace and Undisturbance. I seek Good and Evil within, only in mine own Things, (i.e. in judging aright of Things, in having my Desires and Aversions right, and in the right Use of Externals,) not giving the Name of Good, or Evil, of Utility, or Damage, or any thing of that Nature, to Things not in my own Power.” Such are the Principles of the Stoicks in their Schools, which they relinquish, or dissemble, when they betake themselves to the management of publick Affairs. For these they manage, (as Plutarch well observes,) as if they accounted Externals (Health, Riches, and Glory,) good Things; for how can they be throughly concern’d, to avert publick Calamities, if they suppose them no Evils, or not their Concern?

      “The Body” (saith the Stoick) “is nothing to me; the Parts of it are nothing to me; Death is nothing to me. This is the State and Character of a Philosopher, he looketh for all his Utility and Damage from himself. If another can hurt me, then I do nothing: If I expect that another help me, then I am nothing. The Mind devoid of Passions is inexpugnable, collected into it self, it is self-content, a Cittadel; a stronger Place, where-unto to make his Refuge, and so to become Impregnable, and better fortify’d than this, hath no Man. So that” (as Plutarch has observ’d) “if he be Imprison’d, he suffereth no Prohibition; if thrown down a Precipice, he suffereth no Constraint; if Tortur’d, he is not Tormented; if Bound, he is not Hurt; if he falleth in Wrestling, yet he cannot be Vanquish’d; if encompass’d by a Wall, yet he cannot be Besieged; and if he be sold by Enemies, yet he cannot be Captivated; he hath Riches and a Kingdom, and is Fortunate and Prosperous, Unindigent and Self-sufficient, without a Penny in his Purse. The Wise-Man” (saith the Stoick) “hath created Peace to himself, by fearing nothing, and Riches, by not desiring any Thing: Altho’ without City, House, or Harbour, yet he wanteth nothing. He can be happy by himself in a State of Solitude, as being happy and sufficient from himself,” without the innumerable and inestimable Benefits of Society. And, because he liveth in the Perfection of Virtue and Happiness, neither publick nor private Calamities do at all diminish the Wise-Man’s Happiness. Not publick Calamities, for “the overturning and ruin of his City, will he count it any great Thing? If he supposeth it a grand Evil, or any Evil at all, he will be ridiculous, and no more Virtuous, accounting Wood and Stone, and the Death of Mortals, some great Matters. Wars, Sedition, the Death of Multitudes of Men, the Overturning and Burning of Cities, are no great Things: As the Death of Multitudes of Cattle, the Overturning and Burning of Birds nests, are no great Matters. Not private Calamities, that befall himself, or his Relations. For, without any title to a future Happiness, the Wise-Man is happy in the midst of Torments; his Happiness receives no addition from Health, Ease, and Pleasures, nor any diminution from their opposites.” Is such an Institution as this fit for human Minds?

      Apathy.

      §VII. Not less extravagant is their Doctrine of Apathy, or being free from animal Affections and Passions, which at once discards all things external, whether Good or Evil, both of this and another World, substituting certain mental Operations, instead of the Passions of the lower or animal Soul; “Will, instead of the Passion of Desire; mental Joy, instead of the Passion of Joy; Caution, instead of the Passion of Fear; but, instead of Grief, or Sorrow, they substitute nothing, because they deny any such Thing in a Wise-Man.” If Ulysses (said Epictetus) in truth lamented for his Wife, was he not unhappy? “But what good Man is unfortunate, or unhappy? Therefore, if he cri’d and lamented, he was not a good Man.” Sorrow for the Death of Friends, they account a very bad Thing, their Philosophy being a contrivance to live in perfect Indolence: Nor alloweth it Sorrow for our Sins and Vices, as Plutarch charges them. But, if this be Philosophy, the old Man had great Reason to tell his Son, “Hear me, my Son! you must Philosophize, but you must have Brains too: These are egregious Fooleries.” As likewise are these their Maxims. “The Wise-Man is never mov’d by Grace, or Favour; never pardoneth the Crimes of any. None commiserate, but the Vain and Foolish. It is not the Property of a Man, to be exorable, or placable.”

      But, doubtless, it would be better for Mankind to be left to the Sentiments of Nature, than to be instituted to such a harden’d Virtue, that is neither possible, nor tolerable, being absolutely Destructive, both of Good-Nature, and of the Exercise of divine and gracious Affections and Passions. For Fear and Desire are truly said to be divine Virtues, if their Objects be Things divine; and to sympathize with others in their Joys and Sorrows, is inseparable from true Benevolence. But the Stoicks admit of no sympathizing Sorrow, but in political Appearance. “If you see a Man” (saith Epictetus) “lamenting his Misfortunes, you may in Words accommodate your-self to him, and, if you be so dispos’d, lament with him: But take care, that you do not internally lament.”

      Arrogance, with respect to the Gods, as well as Men.

      §VIII. СКАЧАТЬ