The Guilt of William Hohenzollern. Karl Johann Kautsky

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СКАЧАТЬ sides it is an inestimable advantage that the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina soon gave rise to so intense an international resentment, not only against Austria, but against Germany too. It was precisely this resentment which made the bond of relation of the two allies wholly indissoluble.” (II., p. 6.)

      Truly an ingenious policy, which saw, in the kindling of an intense international resentment against oneself, an inestimable advantage, for the precise reason that it bound Germany fast to the inwardly bankrupt State of Austria! ​

      The “German sword” in 1908 and 1909 kept the peace of the world, because Russia at that time had to swallow quietly the insult levelled at Serbia, and through Serbia at itself. It was still bleeding from the wounds inflicted by the war with Japan and by the Revolution.

      Serbia was on March 31st, 1909, obliged, in a humble Note, to promise better behaviour, and to abandon its protest against the annexation.

      But Russia naturally did not accept final defeat in the Balkans. Serbia, in her isolation, had to retreat before Austria. Russian statecraft now succeeded in forming an alliance among the Balkan States. A federation of the Balkan peoples in one common Republic had been for years the demand of the Yugo-Slav socialists. It offered to the Balkan peoples the best conditions for maintaining their independence, both as against Turkey and Austria, as well as Russia.

      Such a formation was not, of course, acceptable to Russian policy. Quite the contrary. As often before, however, Russia knew how to use for her own ends the force springing from an idea that worked along the inevitable lines of development. She formed an association not among the Balkan peoples, but among the Balkan princes, with the object of putting an end to the dominion of the Turks in Europe.

      In October, 1912, war broke out between the allied States of Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro against Turkey. The latter was easily defeated, and the European Powers accepted the situation with the watchword: The Balkans for the Balkan peoples.

      And so, in spite of the storm brewing in the south-eastern corner, the peace of the world seemed to be maintained. But Austria now comes on the scene again and endangers it by giving the hated Serbia another ​kick. Serbia is obliged to relinquish the outlet on the Adriatic which it had fought for and had won.

      This time it is more serious than in 1908.

      Austria, like Russia, mobilizes in February, 1913. But mobilization means preparation for war, not war itself. England mediates, and Russia yields once more. Mobilization is annulled in March. Peace is preserved, but at the cost of Serbia, and, through Serbia, of her protector, Russia. Serbia must surrender her outlet on the Adriatic.

      And thus a new and dangerous tension is created. Serbia endeavours to obtain compensation at the expense of Bulgaria in Macedonia. She finds allies in Greece and Rumania. Their combined forces overthrow Bulgaria and reduce her territory.

      Yet this time also the peace of the world is preserved. Europe holds aloof from intervention. So it comes on August 10th, 1913, to the Peace of Bucharest. It is hoped that the Balkans will now be at peace, and that the peace of the world may be ensured for a long period—just one year before the outbreak of the world-war.

Austria, indeed, was not pleased with the Peace of Bucharest. She requested the approval of Italy for a “preventive defensive action” against Serbia. Italy nipped the idea in the bud. We may suppose, with Prince Lichnowsky, that the Marquis San Giuliano who described the plan as a “pericolosissima aventura”—a most dangerous adventure—prevented us from being entangled in a world-war in the summer of 1913. But even in Germany, Austria found on this occasion no friendly response. It must not be forgotten that a Hohenzollern reigned in Rumania. Germany was, therefore, primarily concerned to maintain the Peace ​of Bucharest. To this must refer the remark about “the leaning of this lofty personage (William) towards Serbia” in the memorandum handed by Tisza to the Austrian Emperor on July 1st, 1914.^[1]

      But the rulers of Austria would not be content. They tilted incessantly at the conditions established by the Peace of Bucharest, and at last succeeded in bringing Germany round to their side.

      While the two Allies thus shaped the policy which was to end in the world-war, they succeeded most admirably in preluding it not only by alienating the sympathies of the other Governments, but also of the peoples. There were movements towards greater freedom in Croatia and in Bosnia. Austria combated them not merely with a reign of terror, but with prosecutions and with a propaganda which were not only so unscrupulous, but so ineffably stupid in their execution, that she had to submit to have it proved against her (especially in the Friedjung prosecution, 1909) that she was working with forged documents, forged, moreover, in the Austrian Embassy in Belgrade under the ægis of Count Forgach—the same man who in 1914 was to be fatally concerned in the Ultimatum to Serbia, and the unloosing of the world-war. Even worse were the “moral conquests” made in the world by Germany, in the Zabern affair of November, 1913, immediately before the world-war; an affair which showed that in the German Empire the civilian population are outlaws in relation to the military, and that the latter completely dominate the civil Government.

      At the close of the previous century, the Dreyfus affair in France had shown that the French military ​were also capable of remarkable achievements in the way of thoughtlessness and arrogance. But this affair had ended, after a severe struggle, in the victory of the civil Government, while in Germany the result was the overthrow of the civil authority before the military.

      Apart from this, the Zabern affair had the effect of tearing open in France the wound of Alsace-Lorraine, which had begun to heal. And thus Germany and Austria went into the world-war, loaded before all the world with the reputation of falsehood, forgery, violence, the dictatorship of the sword, the denial of civil rights to the annexed provinces.

      1 ↑ “Austrian Red Book on the Events that led up to the War,” 1919, I., p. 18.

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CHAPTER VI

      THE SITUATION BEFORE THE WAR

       Table of Contents

      The defenders of the old régime urge that in the investigation of the question of guilt we must not have regard merely to the few weeks before the war broke out, but also consider the years which preceded them. We have seen that their position is in no way improved by this consideration.

      Already, for years before the war, the policy pursued by the Central Powers was such that peace was preserved, not by them but in spite of them. This policy first took definite shape under Prince Bülow. It was continued by Bethmann-Hollweg, under whom it led to the catastrophe. We need not inquire how far these men were themselves springs of action, or how far they were mere agents of their master, who himself was set in motion by those around him, however he flattered himself with the idea that the whole huge mass of the Empire was moved by his hand.

      This definite connection is not to be invalidated by pointing to the general imperialistic tendencies then shared by all States. On the other hand, we must not enlarge this definite connection into a generalized statement that to strain after world-dominion, and to seek its goal by brute force, are natural characteristics inherent in the German people.

      Imperialistic tendencies are to be found in all the ​capitalistic governments of the Great Powers. Whether they cause one or other of these Powers to go to war or not depends on the occasion, the international situation, the resources available (its own and those СКАЧАТЬ