СКАЧАТЬ
uses effective date as event date.Dodd (1980)–1.09%*601970–1977(–1,0)N/AMergers only. Daily data.successful–1.24%*unsuccessful66Asquith, Bruner, Mullins (1987)–0.85%*3431973–1983(–1,0)41%Varaiya, Ferris (1987)–2.15%* –3.9%*96 961974–1983 1974–1983(–1,0) (–20,80)N/A 42%Morck, Shleifer, Vishny (1990)–0.70%3261975–1987(–1,1)41.4%Measured return by comparing change in bidder market value to market value of target’s equity.Franks, Harris, Titman (1991)–1.45%3991975–1984(–5,5)N/AMergers and tenders offers; segment data available on means of payment and competition.Servaes (1991)–1.07%*3841972–1987(–1,close)N/AMergers and tender offers; segment data by payment method.Jennings, Mazzeo (1991)–0.8%*3521979–1985(–1,0)37%Bannerjee, Owers (1992)–3.3%*571978–1987(–1,0)21%White knight bids.Byrd, Hickman (1992)–1.2%**1281980–1987(–1,0)33%Healy, Palepu, Ruback (1992)–2.2%501979–1984(–5,5)N/A50 largest U.S. mergers during period.Kaplan, Weisbach (1992)–1.49%*2711971–1982(–5,5)38%Mergers and tender offers.Berkovitch, Narayanan (1993)–$10 MM3301963–1988(–5,5)49.4%Tender offers.Sirower (1994)–2.3%*1681979–1990(–1,1)35%Eckbo, Thorburn (2000)–0.30%3901964–1983(–40,0)N/AU.S. acquirers of Canadian targets.Mulherin, Boone (2000)–0.37%2811990–1999(–1,+1)N/AMitchell, Stafford (2000)–0.14%*† –0.07%366 3661961–1993(–1,0)N/AFama and French three–factor model, applied to monthly returns.Walker (2000)–0.84%*‡ –0.77%278 2781980–1996(–2,+2)41.4% 46.4%DeLong (2001)–1.68%*280(1988–1995)(–10,1)33.6%Deals in which at least one party is a bank.Houston et al. (2001)–4.64%* (1985–1990)27(1985–1996)(–4,1)N/ADeals in which both parties are banks.–2.61% (1991–1996)37–3.47%* (all)64Ghosh (2002)–0.96%1,190(1985–1999)(–5,0)N/AKuipers, Miller, Patel (2003)–0.92%*138(1982–1991)(–1,0)N/AForeign acquirers of U.S. targets.Unless otherwise noted, event date is announcement date of merger/bid.*Significant at the 0.95 confidence level or better.†Top return is based on an equal-weighted benchmark portfolio. Bottom return is based on a value-weighted benchmark portfolio.‡Top return is a return adjusted for market average returns. Bottom return is adjusted for return on a matched firm.EXHIBIT 3.5 Studies Reporting Positive Returns to AcquirersStudyCumulative Abnormal ReturnsSample SizeSample PeriodEvent Window (Days)% Positive ReturnsNotesDodd, Ruback (1977)+2.83%* successful1241958–1978(0,0)N/ATender offers only. Monthly data.+0.58% unsuccessful48Kummer, Hoffmeister (1978)+5.20%*successful171956–1970(0,0)N/ATender offers only. Monthly data.Bradley (1980)+4.36%* successful881962–1977(–20,+20)N/ATender offers only. Daily data.–2.96% unsuccessful46Jarrell, Bradley (1980)+6.66%*881962–1977(–40,+20)N/ATender offers only. Daily data.Bradley, Desai, Kim (1982)+2.35* successful1611962–1980(–10,+10)N/ATender offers only. Daily data.Asquith (1983)+0.20% successful1961962–1976(–1,0)N/AMergers only. Daily data.+0.50% unsuccessful89Asquith, Bruner, Mullins (1983)+3.48%* successful1701963–1979(–20,+1)N/AMergers only. Daily data.+0.70% unsuccessful41Eckbo (1983)+0.07% successful1021963–1978(–1,0)N/AMergers only. Daily data.+1.20%* unsuccessful57Malatesta (1983)+0.90% successful2561969–1974(0,0)N/AMergers only. Monthly data.Wier (1983)+3.99% unsuccessful161962–1979(–10, cancellation date)N/AUnsuccessful mergers only. Daily data.Dennis, McConnell (1986)–0.12% (–1,0)901962–1980(–1,0)52%+3.24% (–6,+6)*Jarrell, Brickley, Netter (1987)+1.14%*4401962–1985(–10,5)N/ATender offers only; subperiod data available for 1962–69, 70–79, 80–85; acquirer returns have decreased from +4% to –l%Sicherman, Pettway (1987)+4.026%* related +0.047% unrelated49 981983–1985(–10,+10)N/ACompared returns to buyers of divested assets in related and unrelated industries.Bradley, Desai, Kim (1988)+ 1%*2361963–1984(–5,5)47%Tender offers only; subperiod data available for 7/63–6/68, 7/68–12/80, 1/81–12/84; acquirer returns have decreased from +4% to –3% over time.Jarrell, Poulsen (1989)+0.92%*4611963–1986(–5,5)N/ATender offers only.Lang, Stulz, Walkling (1989)0%871968–1986(–5,5)N/ATender offers only.Loderer, Martin (1990)+1.72%* 1966–1968 +0.57%* 1968–1980970 3,4011966–1984(–5,0)N/AMergers and tenders offers; segment data available on size of acquisition.–0.07% 1981–1984801Smith, Kim (1994)+0.50% –0.23%1771980–1986(–5,5) (–1,0)49.2% 76.2%Successful and unsuccessful tender offers.Schwert (1996)+1.4%6661975–1991(–42,126)N/AMergers, tenders offers; segment data available for various transaction attributes.Maquieira et al. (1998)+6.14%* nonconglomerate deals551963–1996(–60,60)61.8% 36.2%Study of returns in conglomerate and nonconglomerate stock-for-stock deals.–4.79% conglomerate47Lyroudi, Lazardis, Subeniotis (1999)0%501989–1991(–5,5)N/AInternational acquisitions by European and Japanese firms.Eckbo, Thorburn (2000)+1.71%*1,2611964–1983(–40,0)N/ACanadian acquirers of Canadian targets.Leeth, Borg (2000)+3.12%*4661919–1930(–40,0)N/AKohers, Kohers (2000)1.37%* cash deals 1.09%* stock961 6731987–1996(0,1)N/ASample of mergers among high-tech firms.1.26% whole sample1,634Mulherin (2000)+0.85%*1611962–1997(–1,0)49%Sample of incomplete acquisitions.Floreani, Rigamonti (2001)+2.63%*561996–2000(–5,+5)N/ASample of European insurance company mergers.Kohers, Kohers (2001)+0.92%*3041984–1995(–1,0)N/ASample
СКАЧАТЬ