From Manassas to Appomattox. James Longstreet

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СКАЧАТЬ line, should reinforce the skirmish line to strong engagement, while the lines of battle turned those obstacles by flank or oblique march when the general advance should be resumed. As the wooded field was not convenient for artillery use, we only held the batteries of Bondurant and Carter ready for call. At eleven o’clock, weary of delay, General Hill asked to let loose his signal-gun and engage, but was ordered to wait for his absent brigade.

      The reports of the hour of opening battle are more conflicting in this than in most battles, owing possibly to the fact that many are fixed by the beginning of the hot battle about the trenched camp, while others are based on the actual firing of the signal-guns. The weight of evidence seems conclusive of the former attack at one P.M., and this would place the firing of the signal-guns back to noon or a little after. As events occurred, however, the hour is not of especial interest, as it is shown that the battle was in time for a finish before night if it had been promptly followed up. I will say, therefore, that General Hill’s second appeal to open the signal-gun was made a little before noon, and that he stated in this appeal that his brigade from the Charles City road was approaching, and would be with him. He was then authorized to march, but to give instructions that the advance should be carefully conducted until all the troops were in place, to give full force to his battle. He had four brigades, and was ordered to advance in columns of brigades, two on each side of the road. Garland’s and G. B. Anderson’s brigades in columns, preceded by skirmishers, advanced on the left of the road at the sound of the guns, and engaged after a short march from the starting. As Rodes’s brigade was not yet in position, some little time elapsed before the columns on the right moved, so that Garland’s column encountered more than its share of early fight, but Rodes, supported by Rains’s brigade, came promptly to his relief, which steadied the advance. The enemy’s front was reinforced and arrested progress of our skirmishers, but a way was found by which the enemy was turned out of position, and by and by the open before the intrenched camp was reached. In the redoubt was a six-gun battery, and on the right another section of two pieces. General Hill ordered Bondurant’s battery to the open into action, and presently the battery of Captain Carter.

      Garland and G. B. Anderson had severe contention at one o’clock, but by pushing front and flank movements got to the enemy’s strong line. R. H. Anderson’s brigade was pushed up in support of their left, when a bold move gave us the section of artillery and that end of the line. At the same time Carter’s battery was in close practice with five guns within four hundred yards of the redoubt, and the enemy was seriously disturbed; but General Hill was disposed to wait a little for Huger, thought to be between him and the swamp, to get farther in; then, fearing that longer wait might be hazardous of his opportunity, he ordered Rains’s brigade past the enemy’s left, when Rodes seized the moment, rushed in, and gained the redoubt and the battery. The officers at the battery made a brave effort to spike their guns, but were killed in the act. So Rodes, who had some artillerists acting as infantry, turned them with some effect upon the troops as they retired.

      When General Hill reported that he must use Rains’s brigade to march around the redoubt, other orders were sent General Wilcox to leave General Huger’s column and march to his position on the right of General Hill’s battle, directing, in case there were serious obstacles to his march by the Charles City road, to march over to and down the Williamsburg road. A slip of paper was sent General Johnston reporting progress and asking co-operation on our left.

      The battle moved bravely on. R. H. Anderson’s brigade was ordered to support its left at Fair Oaks, and Pickett’s, on the railroad, was drawn near. Hill met Casey’s troops rallying, and reinforcements with them coming to recover the lost ground, but they were forced back to the second intrenched line (Couch’s), where severe fighting ensued, but the line was carried at two o’clock, cutting Couch with four regiments and two companies of infantry, and Brady’s six-gun battery, off at Fair Oaks Station. Finding that he could not cut his way back to his command, Couch stood back from the railroad and presently opened his battery fire across our advancing lines. As he was standing directly in front of Smith’s division, we thought that he would soon be attacked and driven off. Nevertheless, it was not prudent to leave that point on our flank unguarded until we found Smith’s division in action. The force was shut off from our view by the thick pine wood, so that we could know nothing of its strength, and only knew of its position from its artillery fire. We could not attack it lest we should fall under the fire of the division in position for that attack. Anderson’s other regiments, under the gallant Colonel M. Jenkins, were ordered into Hill’s forward battle, as his troops were worn. Jenkins soon found himself in the van, and so swiftly led on that the discomfited troops found no opportunity to rally. Reinforcements from the Third Corps came, but in the swampy wood Jenkins was prompt enough to strike their heads as their retreating comrades passed. Right and left and front he applied his beautiful tactics and pushed his battle.

      General Kearny, finding that he could not arrest the march, put Berry’s brigade off to the swamp to flank and strike it, and took part of Jamison’s brigade to follow. They got into the swamp and followed it up to the open near the Couch intrenchment,16 but Jenkins knew that there was some one there to meet them, and pushed his onward battle. General Hill ordered Rains’s brigade to turn this new force, while Rodes attacked, but the latter’s men were worn, and some of them were with the advance. Kemper’s brigade was sent to support the forward battle, but General Hill directed it to his right against Berry, in front of Rains, and it seems that the heavy, swampy ground so obstructed operations on both sides as to limit their work to infantry fusillades until six o’clock.

      Our battle on the Williamsburg road was in a sack. We were strong enough to guard our flanks and push straight on, but the front was growing heavy. It was time for Wilcox’s brigades under his last order, but nothing was heard of them. I asked General Stuart, who had joined me, if there were obstacles to Wilcox’s march between the Charles City and Williamsburg roads. He reported that there was nothing more than swamp lands, hardly knee-deep. He was asked for a guide, who was sent with a courier bearing orders for them to remain with General Wilcox until he reported at my head-quarters.

      Again I reported the cramped condition of our work, owing to the artillery practice from beyond the railroad, and asked General Johnston to have the division that was with him drive that force away and loose our left. This note was ordered to be put into General Johnston’s hands. He gave peremptory commands to that effect, but the movements were so slow that he lost patience and rode with Hood’s leading brigade, pulled it on, and ordered communication opened with my left.

      At one o’clock, General McClellan, at his head-quarters beyond the river, six miles away, heard the noise of battle and ordered Sumner’s (Second) corps under arms to await orders. General Sumner ordered the command under arms, marched the divisions to their separate bridges, and put the columns on the bridges, partly submerged, to hold them to their moorings, anxiously awaiting authority from his chief to march to the relief of his comrades. The bridge where Sedgwick’s division stood was passable, but Richardson’s was under water waist-deep, and the flooding river rising. Richardson waded one brigade through, but thought that he could save time by marching up to the Sedgwick bridge, which so delayed him that he did not reach the field until after night.

      As General Johnston rode with Hood’s brigade, he saw the detachment under General Couch marching north to find at the Adams House the road to Grapevine Bridge, his open way of retreat. Directly he heard firing where Couch was marching, but thought that Smith’s other brigades were equal to work that could open up there, and rode on, ordering Hood to find communication with my left. Smith’s other brigades were: Whiting’s, commanded by Colonel Law; Hampton’s, Pettigrew’s, and Hatton’s; Whiting commanding the division, Smith commanding the left wing. Smith quotes Colonel Frobel, who was with him at the time,—viz.:

      “Whiting’s brigade was gone; it had been ordered forward to charge the batteries which were firing upon us. The brigade was repulsed, and in a few minutes came streaming back through the little skirt of woods to the СКАЧАТЬ