Constitutional History of England, Henry VII to George II (Vol. 1-3). Hallam Henry

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СКАЧАТЬ parties, which form the basis of a judicial enquiry, commence with the declaration, wherein the plaintiff states, either specially, or in some established form, according to the nature of the case, that he has a debt to demand from or an injury to be redressed by, the defendant. The latter, in return, puts in his plea; which, if it amount to a denial of the facts alleged in the declaration, must conclude to the country, that is, must refer the whole matter to a jury. But if it contain an admission of the fact, along with a legal justification of it, it is said to conclude to the court; the effect of which is to make it necessary for the plaintiff to reply; in which replication he may deny the facts pleaded in justification, and conclude to the country; or allege some new matter in explanation, to show that they do not meet all the circumstances, concluding to the court. Either party also may demur, that is, deny that, although true and complete as a statement of facts, the declaration or plea is sufficient according to law to found or repel the plaintiff's suit. In the last case it becomes an issue in law, and is determined by the judges without the intervention of a jury; it being a principle, that by demurring, the party acknowledges the truth of all matters alleged on the pleadings. But in whatever stage of the proceedings either of the litigants concludes to the country (which he is obliged to do, whenever the question can be deduced to a disputed fact), a jury must be impanelled to decide it by their verdict. These pleadings, together with what is called the postea, that is, an indorsement by the clerk of the court wherein the trial has been, reciting that afterwards the cause was so tried, and such a verdict returned, with the subsequent entry of the judgment itself, form the record.

      This is merely intended to explain the phrase in the text, which common readers might not clearly understand. The theory of special pleading, as it is generally called, could not be further elucidated without lengthening this note beyond all bounds. But it all rests upon the ancient maxim: "De facto respondent juratores, de jure judices." Perhaps it may be well to add one observation—that in many forms of action, and those of most frequent occurrence in modern times, it is not required to state the legal justification on the pleadings, but to give it in evidence on the general issue; that is, upon a bare plea of denial. In this case the whole matter is actually in the power of the jury. But they are generally bound in conscience to defer, as to the operation of any rule of law, to what is laid down on that head by the judge; and when they disregard his directions, it is usual to annul the verdict, and grant a new trial. There seem to be some disadvantages in the annihilation, as it may be called, of written pleadings, by their reduction to an unmeaning form, which has prevailed in three such important and extensive forms of action, as ejectment, general assumpsit, and trover; both as it throws too much power into the hands of the jury, and as it almost nullifies the appellant jurisdiction, which can only be exercised where some error is apparent on the face of the record. But great practical convenience, and almost necessity, has generally been alleged as far more than a compensation for these evils.

7. The population for 1485 is estimated by comparing a sort of census in 1378, when the inhabitants of the realm seem to have amounted to about 2,300,000, with one still more loose under Elizabeth in 1588, which would give about 4,400,000; making some allowance for the more rapid increase in the latter period. Three millions at the accession of Henry VII. is probably not too low an estimate.

8. Rot. Parl. vi. 270. But the pope's bull of dispensation for the king's marriage speaks of the realm of England as "jure hæreditario ad te legitimum in illo prædecessorum tuorum successorem pertinens." Rymer, xii. 294. And all Henry's own instruments claim an hereditary right, of which many proofs appear in Rymer.

9. Stat. 11 H. 7, c. 1.

10. Blackstone (vol. iv. c. 6) has some rather perplexed reasoning on this statute, leaning a little towards the de jure doctrine, and at best confounding moral with legal obligations. In the latter sense, whoever attends to the preamble of the act will see that Hawkins, whose opinion Blackstone calls in question, is right; and that he is himself wrong in pretending that "the statute of Henry VII. does by no means command any opposition to a king de jure, but excuses the obedience paid to a king de facto.

11. For these observations on the statute of Fines, I am principally indebted to Reeves's History of the English Law (iv. 133), a work, especially in the latter volumes, of great research and judgment; a continuation of which, in the same spirit, and with the same qualities (besides some others that are rather too much wanting in it), would be a valuable accession not only to the lawyer's, but philosopher's library. That entails had been defeated by means of a common recovery before the statute, had been remarked by former writers, and is indeed obvious; but the subject was never put in so clear a light as by Mr. Reeves.

      The principle of breaking down the statute de donis was so little established, or consistently acted upon, in this reign, that in 11 H. 7 the judges held that the donor of an estate-tail might restrain the tenant from suffering a recovery. Id. p. 159, from the year-book.

12. It is said by the biographer of Sir Thomas More, that parliament refused the king a subsidy in 1502, which he demanded on account of the marriage of his daughter Margaret, at the advice of More, then but twenty-two years old. "Forthwith Mr. Tyler, one of the privy chamber, that was then present, resorted to the king, declaring that a beardless boy, called More, had done more harm than all the rest, for by his means all the purpose is dashed." This of course displeased Henry, who would not, however, he says, "infringe the ancient liberties of that house, which would have been odiously taken." Wordsworth's Eccles. Biography, ii. 66. This story is also told by Roper.

13. Stat. 11 H. 7, c. 10. Bacon says the benevolence was granted by act of parliament, which Hume shows to be a mistake. The preamble of 11 H. 7 recites it to have been "granted by divers of your subjects severally;" and contains a provision, that no heir shall be charged on account of his ancestor's promise.

14. Hall, 502.

15. Turner's History of England, iii. 628, from a MS. document. A vast number of persons paid fines for their share in the western rebellion of 1497, from £200 down to 20s. Hall, 486. Ellis's Letters illustrative of English History, i. 38.

16. 1 H. 8, c. 8.

17. 2 H. 7, c. 3. Rep. 1 H. 8, c. 6.

18. They were convicted by a jury, and afterwards attainted by parliament, but not executed for more than a year after the king's accession. If we may believe Holingshed, the council at Henry VIII.'s accession made restitution to some who had been wronged by the extortion of the late reign;—a singular contrast to their subsequent proceedings! This, indeed, had been enjoined by Henry VII.'s will. But he had excepted from this restitution "what had been done by the course and order of our laws;" which, as Mr. Astle observes, was the common mode of his oppressions.

19. Lord Hubert inserts an acute speech, which he seems to ascribe to More, arguing more acquaintance with sound principles of political economy than was usual in the supposed speaker's age, or even in that of the writer. But it is more probable that this is of his own invention. He has taken a similar liberty on another occasion, throwing his own broad notions of religion into an imaginary СКАЧАТЬ