A Race So Different. Joshua Chambers-Letson
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Название: A Race So Different

Автор: Joshua Chambers-Letson

Издательство: Ingram

Жанр: Социология

Серия: Postmillennial Pop

isbn: 9780814771617

isbn:

СКАЧАТЬ it that compels the subject to perform submission to the hail of the law? In Lidless, the law’s misrecognition of Bashir as an “enemy combatant” because of his racial and religious difference tautologically results in a situation in which Alice (and, by extension, US law) treats him as if he were an enemy combatant. Fifteen years after leaving Guantánamo, the only way for him to become recognizable to Alice is by playing the role of the enemy combatant—that is, the torture victim. And, as he admits, this is a role that he has come to love in order to keep “from going crazy.” Bashir’s case exemplifies the ways in which legal interpellation can be perversely seductive. As Judith Butler remarks, in her assessment of the Althusserian scene, “This turning toward the voice of the law is a sign of a certain desire to be beheld by and perhaps also to behold the face of authority. . . . [It is] a mirror stage . . . that permits the misrecognition without which the sociality of the subject cannot be achieved.”59 In Bashir and Alice’s twisted exchange, the Lidless audience is privy to Cowhig’s restaging of this “theoretical scene.” We watch as Bashir is made a subject for the law after his dominated body is seduced into performing the very subject position for which he was misrecognized in the first place.

      Bashir describes the simultaneously seductive and coercive process of his interpellation as an “enemy combatant” by Alice thus: “When you were hard—when you screamed, ordered boards and chains—that was simple. I could go somewhere else. But when you were soft—when you touched my ears, my neck—my body had a will of its own. My own flesh, my own muscle, betrayed me.”60 Unwilling to hear more, Alice begs him, “Stop. No more. Please.” Demonstrating the way in which the language of domination often finds its way into the mouth of the dominated, Bashir repeats her phrase but echoes it back to her with the urgency of a Guantánamo detainee during the act of torture: “Stop. No more. Please. I swear I’m an innocent man. I don’t know Osama or Saddam or Khalid. I was studying at a mosque. I just wanted to be a good Muslim. Please, I beg you. Believe me.”61 He throws a bag onto the floor before asking once more, “Please.” There is a long silence and then, as if something triggers a switch inside of her, she grabs him and wrenches his arms behind his back. She orders him, “Drop to your hands and knees. Now crawl. Go! There’s a plastic bag by your feet. Pull the bag over your head and bend forward at the waist.”62 Bashir knows the choreography and positions his body into a stress position, waiting expectantly for the next order.

      Alice only recognizes Bashir after he returns to the role scripted for him in the Bush administration memo. In other words, Bashir becomes a subject by performing a role for which he was cast by way of misrecognition. His subjectivity is brought into being through a performance of coercive mimeticism, a practice that Rey Chow describes by way of a revision to Althusser’s scène théoretique:

      It is to say, “Yes, that’s me” to a call and a vocation—“Hey, Asian!” “Hey, Indian!” “Hey, gay man!”—as if it were a crime with which one has been charged; it is to admit and submit to the allegations (of otherness) that society at large has made against one. Such acts of confession may now be further described as a socially endorsed, coercive mimeticism, which stipulates that the thing to imitate, resemble, and become is none other than the ethnic or sexual minority herself.63

      In acts of coercive mimeticism, the minoritarian subject believes that by responding to the hail of minority status through self-referential performances, she is “liberating” herself from subordination. But while she may achieve some modicum of recognition and relief, she is inadvertently contributing to the maintenance of the dominant structures of ideology, interpellation, and racialization. This is particularly dangerous when the law is involved because, as Antonio Viego observes, “If misrecognition is a serious harm, then we must be concerned that legal recognition may go wrong, misrecognizing already subordinated groups and codifying that misrecognition with the force of law and the intractability of stare decisis, . . . [whereby] the price of protection is incarceration.”64 If Bashir demands recognition from Alice for his time in Guantánamo, the price extracted in the preceding scene is his figurative return to the interrogation chamber. In other words, when we perform as properly situated subjects in order to be recognizable as such by the law, we run the risk of transforming our bodies into prisons.

      Between Performance and Law

      That subjection occurs through the enactment of protocols that are theatrical in nature is unsurprising given that the law and dramatic performance both radically blur the space between law and the aesthetics of performance. My understanding of the law as a living entity, one that is realized through legal habitus and interpretive performances, is indebted to a progressive strand of US jurisprudence that conceives of the law as, in the words of a young lawyer who later became Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, a “living law.”65 But it is equally influenced by Schmitt’s argument that “all law is situational law.”66 If legal positivism conceives of the law as a system of closed norms, a legal realist and/or critical race theory approach submits that the law is messy, imprecise, imperfect, and always relational to the situation or context in which it is enacted and applied. Because “the legal idea cannot translate itself independently,” writes Schmitt, it requires an intermediary (in the form of the judge, lawyer, or law enforcement officer), which amplifies the always already political nature of legal determination.67 In this way, the legal functionary’s job has a familiar resemblance to that of an actor.

      Because the law is an embodied art, theatricality is a constitutive component of the law. Judges and legal functionaries interpret the law in much the same way as an actor interprets (and necessarily improvises) a script or character. In some ways, constitutional and statutory law, as well as administrative policy, is not unlike a dramatic text. Just as Lidless does not become a performance until the script is given a production, the executive memo “straight from the top” only becomes law in its fullest sense when an agent of the law (Alice) enacts it. As Hobbes wrote, “law is a command, and a command consisteth in declaration, or manifestation of the will of him that commandeth, by voice, writing, or some other sufficient argumentation of the same.”68 The law should thus be properly understood as the union of performance and performativity.

      The law has become no less theatrical in the transition from monarchial sovereignty to popular democracy. This is primarily because democracy retains and even amplifies the representational aspects of monarchism. Hobbes provides us with a particularly useful explanation of the theatrical nature of representative politics by describing two forms of persons: the “natural” person (someone “considered as his own”) and the “feigned or artificial person.”69 He notes that the term person is rooted in the Latin persona, which “signifies the disguise, or outward appearance of a man, counterfeited on the stage.”70 Hobbes surprisingly declines the antitheatrical sentiment common to Western political thought (paradigmatically modeled in Plato’s Republic), as neither the terms “counterfeited” nor “outward appearances” are used in a pejorative fashion.71 Instead, he draws a clear equivalence between the mode of artificial personage that occurs in a legal setting and that which occurs on the stage:

      And from the stage, [person] hath been translated to any representer of speech and action, as well in tribunals, as theaters. So that a person, is the same that an actor is, both on the stage and in common conversation; and to personate, is to act or represent himself, or another; and he that acteth another is said to bear his person, or act in his name; (in which sense Cicero useth it where he says, Unus sustineo tres personas; mei, adversarii, et judicis, I bear three persons; my own, my adversary’s, and the judge’s;) and is called in divers occasions, diversely; as a representer, or representative, . . . an actor, and the like.72

      Whether the representative is monarch or a member of the House of Representatives, this political figure realizes the unity of the state through the representative practice of acting on behalf of the state’s subjects: “A multitude of men, are made one person, when they СКАЧАТЬ