Political Argument in a Polarized Age. Scott F. Aikin

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Hence the problem of political disagreement: how can we engage in real disagreement in ways that nevertheless manifest due respect for one another’s political equality? In order to address this problem, we need to devise an ethos that could govern political disagreements among citizens. To repeat, the rules of this ethos must permit real disagreement among citizens; we make no progress by simply stipulating that democratic citizens must always show deference to the majority, or decline to criticize those in power. Yet, as the function of this ethos is to preserve and manifest respect for the political equality of all citizens amidst real political disagreements, it must take the form of a moral requirement. That is, the norms governing political disagreement among democratic citizens must be such that, when someone violates them, she not only fails at appropriate engagement, she also fails at citizenship. We also can say that when a citizen exhibits a stable disposition to abide by democratic ethos in contexts of political disagreement, she thereby manifests civic virtue, the kind of virtue appropriate for a democratic citizen.

Civility in Political Disagreement

      Our aim in this book is to identify the nature of proper political disagreement among democratic citizens. For simplicity’s sake, we will refer to the dispositions appropriate for democratic citizens engaged in political disagreement as the virtues of civility. Often, we will talk about civil political disagreement; sometimes we refer simply to civility. We will occasionally talk of a citizen’s duty of civility, which is the duty to cultivate and exhibit civility in contexts of political disagreement. We employ the term civility with some degree of trepidation, as it is freighted with associations that we reject. So a few preliminary marks about the term are in order.

As commonly used in talking about politics, the term civility denotes a mild or accommodating mode of behavior, and this includes a posture of politeness and a pacifying or gentle tone of voice. Civility in this sense is inconsistent with heated and exercised argumentation, loud speech, and expressions of antagonism of any kind. Accordingly, civility has been subjected to a good deal of forceful criticism among political thinkers. Taken in its usual sense, civility unduly favors the status quo by placing heavy burdens on those who feel most aggrieved by the way things are, and then privileges those who are already advantaged by the kind of upbringing and education that enables them to sustain a calm demeanor and tone of voice amidst conflict. Indeed, it is common among feminist political theorists to reject appeals to civility as inherently patriarchal, as condemning the excitability and emotionality that traditionally has been associated with women.

      These objections to civility strike us as correct. And yet our view is that democratic citizens have a duty of civility when engaging in political disagreement. The apparent contradiction is dispelled by the fact that we use the term civility in a different sense than the one that is targeted in these criticisms. We do not contend that proper democratic disagreement requires citizens to always maintain a posture of calmness or politeness, or a pacifying and gentle tone of voice. Civil political disagreement is, after all, real disagreement. And so the heat and passion of disputes over things that matter are consistent with the kind of civility we are calling for. Citizens can be civil and yet raise their voices, engage in sharp or biting rhetoric, and adopt an antagonist posture toward others. Civility is a set of dispositions we bring to contexts of disagreement; it is not a requirement for resignation or conciliation. It’s not about being nice, it’s about disagreeing and arguing properly.

To be sure, the central aim of this book is to present a workable conception of civility. But to put things very roughly, civility is that set of dispositions that enable citizens to manifest their commitment to the political equality of their political opponents amidst political disagreement over matters in which they are invested. In part, civility is set of attitudes associated with engaging earnestly and fairly with the arguments and perspectives presented by one’s opponents. In political argument, civility involves engaging with one’s interlocutor’s actual views rather than with convenient distortions of them, honestly addressing their reasons, declining to take cheap shots, and so on. Civility is also readiness to offer to one’s interlocutors in political disagreement reasons and arguments that one sincerely believes they could appreciate the force of. That is, when disagreeing civilly, interlocutors actually address each other; they do not use the argumentative interaction as merely a tactical contest to stump or “own” a critic. Finally, when political disagreement is civil, interlocutors aspire not only to convince others of the correctness of their own position, they also seek to deepen everyone’s comprehension of the matter in dispute. This means that when arguing civilly, disputants do not seek merely to win converts, and they do not use the exchange as an occasion simply to mug to an audience of sympathetic onlookers.

      In short, civility in the sense we will use it here names the collection of tendencies that are necessary for political disagreement to yield enhanced understanding of the point in dispute, even if not agreement. Again, civility in this sense is obviously consistent with raising one’s voice, offering sharp rebuttals to one’s critics, and adopting a combative tone. In order to be civil, one needn’t be soft-spoken, calm, or resigning; one needs rather to argue honestly.

The Demands of Civility

      Civility is nonetheless demanding. It may seem to be so demanding that no actual democratic citizen would even try to adhere to its requirements. And even if some democratic citizens do take up the challenge of civil political disagreement, it’s obvious that many more will not, and civility has value for democracy only if it is widespread among political disputants. So why bother?

      This is a serious challenge, and this entire book is an attempt to meet it. However, we can bring this chapter to a close with the following preliminary response.

An intriguing phenomenon in contemporary political discourse supplies the basis for much of our inquiry. Political communication is almost exclusively conducted by means of purported debate among people with different views; cable news is dominated by programming that features panel discussion among experts who disagree; and politics online largely consists of threads, comments boards, and pile-ons, in which participants constantly present themselves as devoted to facts, reason, and logic. In short, our political discourse is almost entirely argument-based, and the vast majority of participants explicitly extoll the virtue of honest and earnest engagement that we have identified as civility.

      Yet here’s the intrigue. Although the dominant images of our politics are more dressed in the attire of civility (in the sense depicted above), our actual politics has become increasingly tribal – devoted to circle-the-wagons campaigns, celebrity spokespersons, and the on-point messaging of carefully curated and audience-tested party lines. Citizens seem increasingly unable to grasp the perspectives of those with whom they politically disagree, and yet they are fervently convinced that they need to be engaged in argument all the time. In short, as appeals to reason, argument, and evidence become more common in political communication, our capacity to actually disagree and argue – to respond to criticisms and objections, to address considerations that countervail our views, and to identify precisely where we think our opponents have erred – has significantly deteriorated. And here’s a notable irony: everyone seems to know this and bemoan it.

We draw from this the hypothesis that democratic citizens are already committed to what we have called civility. They indeed embrace the ideals of proper political argumentation among political equals. And, moreover, they are devoted to trying to participate civilly in the kind of political disagreement that is called for by democracy. Yet their efforts are being somehow thwarted. This book argues that clever simulations of civil disagreement are misdirecting our democratic aspirations. Citizens already embrace the proper ethos, and they are prepared to put in the effort required for civil political disagreement. However, they are surrounded by distortions of civility: sites of market-tested and targeted pantomimes of democratic engagement. Accordingly, citizens tend to get their view of their political opposition СКАЧАТЬ