Military Art of People's War. Vo Nguyen Giap

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СКАЧАТЬ groups which were the nuclei of the revolutionary movement in every locality took more feverishly to training themselves militarily and to raising their political understanding. Regular armed sections, some of platoon size, were organized in the districts. These local armed platoons carried out propaganda work, annihilated the most reactionary elements, or ambushed enemy patrols. The Southward March group, for their part, re-established the mass road links interrupted by the enemy terrorist operations. Thus the large-scale terrorist campaign launched by the imperialists, though creating difficulties for us, steeled further the fighting spirit of both cadres and people, once we had stood the test. That spirit was the essential condition for our advance toward armed insurrection.

      In June 1944 the terrorist campaign still raged.

      But the general situation became more and more unfavorable for the fascists. In Europe, the German fascists suffered telling blows at Stalingrad. The Red Army launched repeated offensives. The second front was opened. In the Pacific area, a number of important naval bases around the Japanese territorial waters changed hands. In July 1944, the French reactionary government under Pétain collapsed. General de Gaulle returned to France at the heels of the United States and British troops and set up a new government. This situation sharpened the contradictions between the Japanese fascists and the French colonialists in Indochina. The Party foresaw an inevitable coup d’état staged by the Japanese fascists in order to destroy the French power. Throughout the country the revolutionary movement was spreading, and Vietminh organizations sprang up.

      Under these circumstances, the Cao-Bac-Lang Inter-Provincial Committee convened a conference at the end of July 1944, to discuss the question of armed insurrection. Many district groups attended the conference and at the same time carried out guard duty. Boundless was our joy, of all of us, to meet together to discuss a subject which we had so much longed for, after months of arduous struggle against the terrorist campaign. The political report to the conference concluded as follows: “On the basis of the situation in the world and in the country and the revolutionary movement in Cao-Bac-Lang provinces, it can be said that conditions are ripe for starting guerrilla warfare in these provinces.” Seething debate at the conference led directly to the decision that the insurrection be launched to keep pace with the general situation which was favorably developing. That explained why the debate was most animated though the solution could not yet be found for many important and concrete tasks such as how to defend those liberated areas against the enemy’s counterattack. What measures should be adopted, and tasks done, to carry out a drawn-out fight? Nevertheless, the cadres were most enthusiastic, all burning with the desire to bring back this important decision to their respective localities as soon as possible.

      The Cao-Bac-Lang Inter-Provincial Committee planned to hold another conference together with us with a view to finding a solution to these pending questions and to decide when to start guerrilla warfare.

      In the meantime, we learned that Uncle had just returned to the country.

      I was sent to Pac Bo together with Vu Anh and some other comrades to report to him on the situation and to ask for his instructions.

      As usual, he let us know his opinion immediately after we had finished our report. He criticized our decision saying that to start guerrilla warfare in Cao-Bac-Lang provinces was only to act on the basis of the local situation and not on the concrete situation of the whole country.

      Under present conditions, he said, if guerrilla warfare is to be waged at once throughout the country on the scale and scope mentioned in the decision, great and numerous will be the difficulties we will have to face. They will be greater still than those we had already undergone during the last terror campaign. For not a single locality outside Cao-Bac-Lang is yet sufficiently prepared for armed struggle to be able to rise up in response to the decision even though the movement is mounting throughout the country. The imperialists will rapidly concentrate their forces to cope with the situation. As for the Cao-Bac-Lang area itself, we could not yet, as far as the military viewpoint was concerned, concentrate our forces, while our cadres and arms were still scattered, and we still lacked the nucleus forces.

      His analysis was as follows: “Now, the period of peaceful development of the revolution is over, but that of nationwide uprising has not yet begun. To limit ourselves now solely to carrying out our work under political form is not sufficient to speed up the movement. But if we start armed insurrection right now, our forces will be destroyed by the enemy. The present struggle must necessarily proceed from the political form to the military form. But for the time being more importance must still be given to the political form. We must, therefore, adopt a more appropriate form in order to bring the movement forward.”

      Also at that meeting, Uncle put forth the question of organizing the National Liberation Army. Turning to me, he said in conclusion, “This you should carry out. Can you do that? We are still weak, the enemy is strong. But we must not let them annihilate us, must we?”

      I answered, “Yes, I’ll do it.”

      Thus the Vietnam Liberation Unit came into being. Uncle thought it over and the next day proposed to add the word “propaganda” to its name in view of its present task. The Vietnam Liberation Unit then became the Vietnam Propaganda and Liberation Unit. It had the task of using armed struggle to mobilize and arouse the population, but our guiding principle was to consist in attaching more importance to political activities, to propaganda than to armed attack. From the depth of the forest, he wrote instructions for the formation of regular units, the backbone of the military forces. These instructions became the main line of our army not only during that period but also during the hard and protracted war of resistance waged by our army and people.

      We stayed on another day to assess the situation and draw up an all-sided plan for the formation of the future army. We reviewed the situation of the enemy, our own situation, the strength of our cadres, the problem of food supply, the regions in which our guerrilla bases were to be expanded first, and so on. In the cold and lightless hut, we rested our heads on wooden pillows and talked until far into the night. After listening to Uncle we impatiently looked to the forthcoming activities of the units. He insisted again and again, “There must be military activity within a month, the unit must launch a sudden attack and the first battle must be successful. This first military success will provide us with the best content for our propaganda work.”

      The next day, just before we left, he again said, “Be secret, rapid, active, now in the East now in the West, arriving unexpectedly and leaving unnoticed.” On my way back, I thought out and wrote the ten-clause oath for the Propaganda Unit.

      When we came to the Cao-Bac-Lang Inter-Provincial Committee to report Uncle’s decision, all were overjoyed. The Propaganda Unit immediately came into being. Cadres and arms were called for. The thirty-four comrades who originally composed the first unit were chosen from section leaders, platoon commanders, or from outstanding members of local armed groups. In addition, there were also a number of cadres who had just returned to the country after their military training in China. Thus, in the Cao-Bac-Lang area, there took shape three kinds of armed groups: the Vietnam Propaganda and Liberation Unit which was the main armed force, the district armed groups, and the village self-defense semiarmed units. These three forces closely coordinated their activities. I had asked Uncle previously, “Now that the Propaganda Unit operates according to the plan of the Inter-Provincial Committee, what will be its obligations and rights as regards the local armed groups in the localities where it will be carrying out its activities?” His answer was, “There must be unified command.” This was put into execution right away. During the hard and drawn-out war of resistance carried out by our people as a whole, this combat watchword was thoroughly applied and its effect remained extremely powerful.

      By mid-December 1944, on the eve of the founding of the Propaganda and Liberation Unit, I received Uncle’s instructions written on a small piece of paper inserted into a packet of cigarettes. The instructions read as follows: “The Vietnam Propaganda Unit for National СКАЧАТЬ