1 Recce, volume 2. Alexander Strachan

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      Operational security (OPSEC) was maintained, and no one in the unit would know where the group was headed – nor did anyone ask questions. Maj. Wessel Maree, 1 Recce’s logistics officer, remembers OPSEC as follows:

      ‘Due to the operators’ constant training, we as support personnel never knew if the training was for a specific reason (operational) or normal training. Certain operators would be in the unit at morning parade and then vanish for a certain period only to return weeks or months later. 1.1 Commando had their own storage facilities and storeman, and it was possible for them to deploy without the rest of the unit knowing. Nobody ever knew what exactly the operators’ programme and tasking would be from day to day.’

      For security reasons, the movement to Rhodesia mostly took place at night, except for the first deployment, when it happened in daytime. In civilian dress, the groups would move to Durban’s military airport with all their gear. Dakota planes of the SA Air Force were used to fly the groups to Rhodesia. Once the pilots reported that they were in Rhodesian airspace, the operators would remove their Rhodesian combat uniforms from their carry bags and put them on. The civilian clothes would then be stored in the carry bags.

      In the case of the first deployment, 1 RC’s Bravo Group under the command of Capt. Hannes Venter flew during the day in two Dakotas from Durban to the Buffalo Range airfield near Chiredzi in Rhodesia. After crossing the Limpopo River, the planes maintained an altitude of about 90 m above the ground, which was within range of AK-47 fire. The pilots were inexperienced and reckoned they were flying low enough. Moreover, they flew in formation, with the second Dakota flying a plane length diagonally behind the first one.

      This made the planes very vulnerable, and Venter asked the commander of the Dakota, Capt. Jaap du Preez, to rather fly at tree-top level. Du Preez disregarded this request. On the return flight they followed the same route, and just before the Limpopo River they came under heavy AK-47 fire. Du Preez’s Dakota was riddled with bullet holes. Consequently, this was the last time the Dakotas did not fly at tree-top level.

      After deployments the groups were picked up again in Rhodesia at the forward tactical airfield and flown to Durban’s air force base. As soon as the plane entered South African airspace, the operators would swap the Rhodesian uniforms for their civilian clothes. They generally arrived at Durban’s air force base during the night. Before sunrise, the operators would be back at their base on the Bluff – while the rest of the unit had not even reported for the day’s work.

      Sometimes the Recce groups would fly directly from Durban to the forward tactical airfields such as Mabalauta, provided that the runways there were suitable for the Dakotas to land and take off with a heavy load.

      Prior to the 1 Recce deployments, Venter and WO2 MJ (Yogi) Potgieter had visited the SAS, the Selous Scouts and the RLI to learn more about the Rhodesians’ operational methods, equipment, planning, execution and so on. During this three-week information tour they made use of the opportunity to visit the Tac HQs as well. While Venter was with the Selous Scouts, he moved around with their commander, Lt. Col. Ron Reid-Daly. Among other things they visited a Joint Operational Centre (JOC), and Reid-Daly told all and sundry that Venter was his adjutant and that he had recruited him from the reserves. It was an awkward situation, but everyone seemed to accept Reid-Daly’s explanation and no questions were asked.

      From December 1977 to December 1979, groups from 1 Recce were deployed on an almost full-time basis in Mozambique’s Gaza province. Among the operators this region was known as the Russian Front on account of the large number of Russian and East German advisers who were deployed with the enemy forces. Operations were executed in Zambia and elsewhere as well, but on a smaller scale.

      The Russian Front also owed its name to the harshness of the terrain and the aggressive Frelimo follow-up actions. During the Second World War the German soldiers had referred to the Eastern Front as the Russian Front, and it was considered a punishment to be deployed there. Likewise, the Rhodesians called Gaza the Russian Front in tongue-in-cheek fashion.

      In the course of the two-year period, about 143 Recce operators from 1 RC, 2 RC, 4 RC and 5 RC were deployed in Rhodesia. From here they were deployed to Mozambique with a view to disrupting the enemy by means of fighting patrols and also obstructing their logistical support. In Gaza they concentrated mainly on the rail and power lines between Malvernia and Maputo and on the adjacent road. The Recces’ other targets were the armed observation and machine-gun posts that were deployed in an anti-aircraft role to attack Dakota infiltrations.

      Drop zones for parachute landings were unmarked, and the jumpers usually landed in trees – it was actually miraculous how few injuries were sustained. One of the most serious was that suffered by Lt. Douw Steyn who fell through the trees in a sandalwood forest. During the landing, a dry branch penetrated his Waxie boot and stuck into his foot. The injury was of such a nature that he subsequently had to be evacuated.

      During one of the parachute infiltrations in January 1978, Sgt. Jack Greeff landed among stones in the Lebombo Mountains and tore his ankle ligaments. But he held out and accompanied the team to their target, a railway line, and was only flown out later. Other parachuting injuries included that of Cpl. FL (Frik) Gouws, who suffered a branch through his thigh on landing and also had to be evacuated.

      Recce and SAS teams were deployed without support for about seven to fourteen days and sometimes longer. They would then either be withdrawn or relieved by others, or resupplied for another seven to fourteen days. Their tactic was to lay mines on a road and attack the enemy by means of ambushes. It produced the desired results: when the enemy moved by road, their vehicles were protected by at least a company of infantry soldiers on foot. Consequently, the enemy always had to deploy a large number of troops along the road, which limited other deployments.

      As a rule, there were casualties within the ranks of the enemy during contacts. The losses curbed their combativeness and speed, which then gave the Recces the opportunity to withdraw to a safer area. These were invariably high-risk deployments that were largely instrumental in securing south-eastern Rhodesia and the north-eastern border of South Africa.

      During December 1977, members of Bravo Group 1 RC under the leadership of Capt. Hannes Venter commenced intensive training. The group was informed that they were preparing for an Eheke-type19 operation against Swapo in Angola. But that was yet another of the cover stories that were regularly concocted for the sake of secrecy.

      To the group’s great surprise, on their arrival at Durban’s air force base they found two Dakota planes waiting to transport them. Normally, a C-130 or C-160 plane would be used for movement to South West Africa.

      In the case of one deployment, for instance, the cover story was that the group had to go to the Oudtshoorn area for retraining. To lend more credence to the cover story, the big HF-radio antenna on the Bluff was even turned in Oudtshoorn’s direction by the signallers. Much effort went into making the cover stories seem completely credible in order to deflect attention (including that of their own personnel) from the real mission at hand.

      The group took off from Durban’s air force base in the two Dakotas, and in the course of the flight they were ordered to change into other uniforms. Instead of the customary Swapo or Eastern Bloc uniforms, the familiar Rhodesian camouflage uniforms, which had been packed in sealed cardboard boxes, were distributed. For the first time it came home to the group that they were actually headed for Rhodesia. An oversight during the first deployment was that the men had not been issued with Rho­desian dollars, and they had to exchange rands for dollars in Rhodesia. In subsequent deployments, regard was specifically paid to this aspect.

      During the flight Venter informed the group that they were to be deployed with the SAS and from now on had to speak only English for security purposes. Late that afternoon the two Dakotas landed at Buffalo Range, where they were immediately СКАЧАТЬ