From Jail to Jail. Tan Malaka

Чтение книги онлайн.

СКАЧАТЬ It resulted from provocation by our enemies and did not correspond to our own strength;

      3. It could not be defended either to the masses or to the Comintern;

      4. It did not correspond to communist strategy and tactics, that is, mass action;

      5. It would result in great harm being done to the movement in Indonesia.

      [144] I showed the letter to Alimin, asking: “Is it true or not that the masses are ready?” He answered: “At most only the masses of Bekasi will come out.” That was indeed the case. Alimin himself had just witnessed the failure of the Semarang strike, which—apart from spreading for a brief moment to the ironworks in Surabaya—had been limited to the printing workers, the ferry-boat operators, and the nurses in Semarang.⁷¹ As for the half million sugar workers and peasants, the workers at the tea, coffee, quinine, rubber, fiber, and other plantations, the coal, cement, tin, and oil workers as well as those in the railways, tramways, shipping, and auto transport, they were all as yet unorganized and still quiescent. In terms of organization, discipline, and politics, they had no weight at all.

      From Manila I proposed that the Prambanan decision be rediscussed in Singapore by a more complete group of leaders. I considered that I had to do this, because of my responsibilities to the Comintern. If the decision were reaffirmed, then at least I had discharged my obligations and, as a section of the Comintern, the PKI could not simply ignore my proposal.⁷²

      Singapore apparently did not really understand me and sent several more letters asking me to come. Finally, in the printing workers’ building in Manila, Alimin proposed that he be authorized to go to Singapore to make the arrangements for a conference such as I had proposed.⁷³ He believed that he would be able to call together the responsible comrades while I continued my treatment in Manila. When everything was ready, he would send word from Singapore for me to come.

      We worked out a code: what he would say if they agreed with the proposal, if they disagreed, or if they were undecided. In addition I wrote a short sketch of what I considered the situation in Indonesia to be and the strategy and tactics I proposed. Alimin himself typed it all—the code, the analysis, and my proposals.

      My analysis was in accordance with what I had written in Thesis.⁷⁴ Briefly, it included such points as the following:

      1. The party was not yet disciplined;

      2. The workers and peasants were insufficiently organized;

      3. The masses and the other parties (Budi Utomo, NIP, Sarekat Islam, Perserikatan Minahasa, etc.) were not yet close to the PKI;⁷⁵

      4. The imperialist world outside Indonesia (Britain, France, and America) was still strong and united.

      My proposals were in line with what I had written two years earlier (1923) in Naar de ‘Republiek Indonesia’ [Towards the Republic of Indonesia], with what I had recently written in Semangat moeda [Young spirit], and with what I was to write and have printed hurriedly in Singapore under the title of Massa actie [Mass action].

      In brief, I proposed to achieve an independent Indonesia through mass action. And the development of this mass action, if all conditions were right, would be approximately along the following lines:

      1. General strike with economic demands;

      2. Strikes and demonstrations with economic and political demands;

      3. General strike and demonstrations employing arms to oppose provocation;

      4. General strike and demonstrations demanding the transfer of power;

      5. Establishment of a National Assembly;

      6. Proclamation of independence and the establishment of a provisional government;

      7. Drawing up of a constitution;

      8. Ratification of the government, ratification or alteration of the constitution, and establishment of the outlines of political policy;

      9. Establishment of a popular legislature to make laws. (Of course in practice the course taken may vary from this pattern.)

      From the general strike to the establishment of the popular legislature many different demands have to be posed and actions staged. Only when it is clear that every single demand has been achieved by the murba can the final blow be struck.

      Is it not clear that all this requires a superior and disciplined party with members in sufficient quantity and quality to give leadership to the seventy million people who are scattered throughout hundreds of islands and who will be opposed by the three largest imperialist powers in the region? Is it not demonstrable that in 1926 the Indonesian workers and peasants were not even ready to stage a general strike? How many of the PKI leaders in 1926 really understood the meaning of the demands and program to be put forward at each stage of the struggle waged by a real proletarian party?⁷⁶

      Of course in 1926, and even in 1917, I was ready to welcome the Indonesian revolution.⁷⁷ The question is, were the masses and proletariat of Indonesia also ready? This is the most crucial question. Where they are not yet ready, the only course open to a courageous leader responsible to him- or herself and to the masses is to prepare them for mass action. If it cannot be done openly, then the underground road must be taken. When the people are ready, it is the mass action course that a Communist party must take.

      [146] If there are other parties, or members of other parties who follow another course, certainly I have no objections. But I, feeling responsible to the PKI, to the people of Indonesia, and to the International, could not approve the Prambanan decision: neither back then in 1926 nor here and now in 1947. No. Even now I will not diverge from my analysis laid out in the books mentioned above, which I had outlined prior to the [proposed] Singapore conference and which was agreed to, typed up, and taken by Alimin from Manila to Singapore at the beginning of 1926.

      For over a month in Manila I awaited the cable that Alimin was to send with the results of the discussions. Not even a letter came, let alone a cable. Then I began to wonder if my proposal had been presented. Only then did I send to the Comintern a report of the Prambanan decision and my attitude opposing it. From a reliable source I later heard that my position was approved in its entirety and that the Comintern later proposed a program to the PKI that did not differ from my own.⁷⁸

      After Alimin had been gone nearly two months, a letter finally arrived. In it he reported that the discussion could not be held in Singapore. Perhaps he would join the group going to Moscow, if there were sufficient money. He said he could not write any further since there was always a comrade at his side (whose name I cannot yet disclose).⁷⁹ Apparently Alimin did not trust this comrade. Only then did I begin to be aware of what sort of honesty he had shown me. I had always thought of him as honest and respected him, but now he would no longer be a comrade-in-arms for me. If he did not trust his lifelong friend in Singapore, how could he trust me, whom he had known barely a year? This feeling was strengthened when I recalled Alimin’s testimony against his former leader Tjokroaminoto in the Afdeling B case.⁸⁰ Since this affair, I have continued to regard Alimin as a friend but as a comrade-in-arms I have doubted his honesty.

      [147] When I later arrived in Singapore, Subakat came across a sealed letter that had never been opened. Inside it were my analysis and proposals. The late Subakat and the late Sugono had heard nothing of either my analysis or my proposals brought by Alimin. Alimin had already left Singapore. Sugono, then head of the VSTP, said to Subakat that the VSTP СКАЧАТЬ