Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen. Hazem Kandil

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СКАЧАТЬ claim that Nasser thought be could actually defeat Israel, or at least snatch a substantial political concession from it through a grand military bluff. Western scholars highlight psychological pressures by other Arab states on Egypt to carry the banner of resistance against Israel and to protect neighboring Syria and Jordan, adding that it was Nasser’s virtuoso politics and impulsiveness that made him rush headlong onto the perilous path of war.^* Doubtlessly, there is a kernel of truth in all these claims. But if we move away from trying to explain what brought about the defeat, to considering the more perplexing question of why the military drove the country to the brink of war in June 1967, we can see that none of these interpretations hold. If regime institutions were so incompetent, and Amer knew it (as discussed below), then why rush to war? And if the United States and Israel were out to get Egypt, and both Nasser and Amer were quite aware of this (again as discussed below), then why fall into their trap? And if we blame the escalation on Nasser, then why was he desperately trying to defuse the situation until the last moment? Perhaps the “true” motivation behind this unwarranted escalation will remain forever hidden, but the logic of the intraregime power struggle provides an explanation that best incorporates the available historical evidence. This logic points in only one direction: that the effectiveness of Nasser’s counterbalancing strategy convinced Amer and his associates that if the military did not accomplish something spectacular soon, it would be gradually displaced from the center of power. In other words, the escalation was an attempt to salvage the image and influence of the military.

      Let us first underscore how Amer knew beyond the shadow of a doubt that the army was not equipped for war, even as he pretended he was preparing for one. On December 16, 1966, the field marshal received a report by the military’s high command advising against any military confrontation with Israel in the foreseeable future. The report was based on the disastrous effects that the Yemen War had had on the armed forces. The Egyptian army had sent military instructors to support Yemeni left-leaning nationalists in 1962—an opportunity Amer had embraced to boost the military’s public image in what he believed would be a short and effortless campaign against pro-monarchy bandits. According to Chief of Staff Muhammad Fawzy, Amer’s strategy in Yemen was theatrical, a mere show of force. He encouraged firing excessively into Yemeni mountains for no other purpose than to demonstrate lethal strength back home; he gave out field promotions and military decorations to officers who barely saw combat; and his aides fabricated press releases about the army’s heroic exploits.⁷² Sadat, who was responsible for the political side of the war, also complained how Amer treated the war as “a new theater to strengthen his position and extend his influence.”⁷³ Amer’s plan almost worked, in light of the fact that the United States under John F. Kennedy had initially recognized the republicans in Yemen. Soon, however, Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom, which both supported the Yemeni monarchy, persuaded Lyndon B. Johnson to change sides. Saudis could not live with a Communist regime on their southern borders; the British could not stand losing the strategic port of Aden to Communists; and Johnson was much more hawkish than his predecessor in fighting communism.⁷⁴ Now the army was trapped in an unconventional war against Western-funded guerrillas and European mercenaries. What started out as a simple operation requiring no more than a few hundred officers turned into a quagmire that drew no fewer than 70,000 men by 1965.⁷⁵

      The report submitted by the general command at the end of 1966 assessed the impact of this new reality. It emphasized how military discipline had suffered from the exigencies of guerrilla warfare and policing in Yemen; how soldiers had unlearned all the rules of modern warfare in this unconventional operation; how combat pilots had forgotten the basics of strategic bombing and dogfighting after five years of aimless strikes against a country that had neither an air force nor air defense capabilities; how self-esteem had deteriorated as the army felt outmaneuvered at every turn; and how equipment and ammunition were being thoughtlessly expended by the frustrated troops. Subsequent reports pointed to the fact that budget constraints imposed by the Yemen War forced the military to discharge thousands of reservists in March 1967 and issue a three-month freeze on conscription, and that as a result of these constraints, in May 1967 (the month Amer decided to escalate) the army had been suffering a shortage of 37 percent in manpower, 30 percent in small arms, 24 percent in artillery, 45 percent in tanks, and 70 percent in armored vehicles; trained pilots were fewer than the available aircraft (while the Israeli ratio was 3 pilots to every plane, in Egypt it was 0.8), and not a single fortified hangar had been built in the last five years. Another report on military training described 1966–1967 as the worst training year in the history of the Egyptian army: not a single brigade-level maneuver had been conducted, and only 5.2 percent of the training fuel was used. In terms of munitions, the infantry consumed only 26 percent of its allocated share for military exercises; the armory only 15 percent; and the artillery 18 percent. Still more startling figures revealed that on average each tank fired only 1 shot during that entire training period, each howitzer only 1.5 shots, and each bazooka only 15 shots. Finally, because security considerations advised against the hiring of educated soldiers, only 19 percent of the infantry, 18 percent of the marines, and 21 percent of the air force were literate, which reduced the overall quality of the fighting force. Added to the fact that the last major divisional exercise conducted by the army had been in 1954, the picture was unmistakably bleak.⁷⁶

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