The Fortunes of Feminism. Nancy Fraser

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СКАЧАТЬ this section). In order to avoid repeating Habermas’s equivocation on “communicative action,” I adopt the following terminology: I reserve the expression “communicatively achieved action” for actions coordinated by explicit, reflective, dialogically achieved consensus. I contrast such action, in the first instance, with “normatively secured action,” or actions coordinated by tacit, pre-reflective, pre-given consensus (see below, this section). I take “communicatively achieved” and “normatively secured” actions, so defined, to be subspecies of what I here call “socially integrated action,” or actions coordinated by any form of normed consensus whatsoever. This last category, in turn, contrasts with “system integrated action” or actions coordinated by the functional interlacing of unintended consequences, determined by egocentric calculations in the media of money and power, and involving little or no normed consensus of any sort. These terminological commitments do not so much represent a departure from Habermas’s usage—he does in fact frequently use these terms in the senses I have specified. They represent, rather, a stabilization or rendering consistent of his usage.

      8 TCA I, 341, 357–59; TCA II, 256, 266; McCarthy, “Translator’s Introduction,” xxx.

      9 Here I follow the arguments of Thomas McCarthy. He contended, in “Complexity and Democracy, or the Seducements of Systems Theory,” New German Critique 35, Spring/Summer 1985, 27–55, that state administrative bureaucracies cannot be distinguished from participatory democratic political associations on the basis of functionality, intentionality, and linguisticality since all three of these features are found in both contexts. For McCarthy, functionality, intentionality, and linguisticality are not mutually exclusive. I find these arguments persuasive. I see no reason why they do not hold also for the capitalist workplace and the modern, restricted, nuclear family.

      10 Here, too, I follow McCarthy, ibid. He argues that in modern, state administrative bureaucracies, managers must often deal consensually with their subordinates. I contend that this is also the case for business firms and corporations.

      11 See, for example, the brilliant and influential discussion of gifting by Pierre Bourdieu in Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. Richard Nice, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977. By recovering the dimension of time, Bourdieu substantially revises the classical account by Marcel Mauss in The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies, trans. Ian Cunnison, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1967. For a discussion of some recent revisionist work in cultural economic anthropology, see Arjun Appadurai, The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, especially the chapter titled “Commodities and the Politics of Value.”

      12 TCA II, 348–9; McCarthy, “Translator’s Introduction,” xxvi–xxvii. The expressions “pragmatic-contextual” and “natural kinds” are mine, not Habermas’s.

      13 TCA I, 94–5, 101; TCAII, 348–9; “A Reply to My Critics,” 227, 237, 266–8; Legitimation Crisis, 10; McCarthy, “Translator’s Introduction,” xxvi–xxvii. The expressions “absolute differences” and “difference of degree” are mine, not Habermas’s.

      14 TCA I, 72, 341–2, 359–60; TCA II, 179; “A Reply to my Critics,” 268, 279–80; Legitimation Crisis, 20–1; McCarthy, “Translator’s Introduction,” xxviii–xxix. Thompson, “Rationality,” 285, 287. It should be noted that in TCA, Habermas draws the contrast between system and lifeworld in two distinct senses. On the one hand, he contrasts them as two different methodological perspectives on the study of societies. The system perspective is objectivating and “externalist,” while the lifeworld perspective is hermeneutical and “internalist.” In principle, either can be applied to the study of any given set of societal phenomena. Habermas argues that neither alone is adequate. So he seeks to develop a methodology that combines both. On the other hand, Habermas also contrasts system and lifeworld in another way, namely, as two different kinds of institutions. It is this second system lifeworld contrast that I am concerned with here. I do not explicitly treat the first one in this essay. I am sympathetic to Habermas’s general methodological intention of combining or linking structural (in the sense of objectivating) and interpretive approaches to the study of societies. I do not, however, believe that this can be done by assigning structural properties to one set of institutions (the official economy and the state) and interpretive ones to another set (the family and the “public sphere”). I maintain, rather, that all of these institutions have both structural and interpretive dimensions and that all should be studied both structurally and hermeneutically. I have tried to develop an approach that meets these desiderata in Chapter 2 of the present volume, “Struggle over Needs.”

      15 See, for example, Rethinking the Family: Some Feminist Questions, ed. Barrie Thorne and Marilyn Yalom, New York and London: Longman, 1982, and Michele Barrett and Mary McIntosh, The Anti-Social Family, London: Verso, 1982.

      16 TCA I, 85–6, 88–90, 101, 104–5; TCA II, 179; McCarthy, “Translator’s Introduction,” ix, xxx. In presenting the distinction between normatively secured and communicatively achieved action, I am again modifying, or rather stabilizing, the variable usage in Theory of Communicative Action. See note 7 above.

      17 Pamela Fishman, “Interaction: The Work Women Do,” Social Problems 25:4, 1978, 397–406.

      18 Nancy Henley, Body Politics, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977.

      19 TCA II, 523–4, 547; “A Reply to my Critics,” 237; Thompson, “Rationality,” 288, 292.

      20 McCarthy pursues some of the normative implications of this for the differentiation of the administrative state system from the public sphere in “Complexity and Democracy.”

      21 McCarthy makes this point with respect to the dedifferentiation of the state administrative system and the public sphere. Ibid.

      22 TCA I, 341–2, 359–60; TCA II, 256, 473; “A Reply to my Critics,” 280; McCarthy, “Translator’s Introduction,” xxxii; Thompson, “Rationality,” 286–8.

      23 The following account of the masculine gender subtext of the worker role draws on Carole Pateman, “The Personal and the Political: Can Citizenship Be Democratic?,” Lecture 3 of her “Women and Democratic Citizenship” series, The Jefferson Memorial Lectures, delivered at the University of California, Berkeley, February 1985.

      24 Ibid., 5.

      25 Barbara Ehrenreich, The Hearts of Men: American Dreams and the Flight from Commitment, Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1984.

      26 The following account of the masculine gender subtext of the citizen role draws on Carole Pateman, “The Personal and the Political.”

      27 Ibid., 8.

      28 Judith Hicks Stiehm, “The Protected, the Protector, the Defender,” in Women and Men’s Wars, ed. Judith Hicks Stiehm, New York: Pergamon Press, 1983.

      29 Pateman, “The Personal and the Political,” 10.

      30 Insofar as the foregoing analysis of the gender subtext of Habermas’s role theory deploys categories in which gender and political economy are internally integrated, it represents a contribution to the overcoming of “dual systems theory” (see note 6 above). It is also a contribution to the development of a more satisfactory way of linking structural (in the sense of objectivating) and interpretive approaches to the study of societies than that proposed by Habermas. For I am suggesting here that the domestic sphere has a structural as well as an interpretive dimension and that the official economic and state spheres have an interpretive as well as a structural dimension.

      31 TCA II, 505ff; Legitimation Crisis, 33–6, 53–5; McCarthy, “Translator’s Introduction,” xxxiii.

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