Fateful Transitions. Daniel M. Kliman
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Название: Fateful Transitions

Автор: Daniel M. Kliman

Издательство: Ingram

Жанр: Политика, политология

Серия: Haney Foundation Series

isbn: 9780812290295

isbn:

СКАЧАТЬ in tandem with decentralized authority to create access opportunities. Publicly available information enables outsiders to locate sympathetic domestic groups to cultivate. Also, the activities of a free press lay bare foreign policy disagreements that would otherwise go unnoticed. Transparency thus allows outsiders to become intimately familiar with the contours of another country’s internal debates, a prerequisite for access. Last but not least, transparency at home extends to dealings with foreigners. Because a democracy accepts considerable information flows, its citizens can more or less freely engage with the representatives of other states. This high degree of latitude is essential for outsiders to leverage points of access.

      During a power transition, democratic government in the rising state reduces mistrust. Outsiders can draw upon diverse sources speaking to the emerging power’s intentions. They need not conflate ambitions with military forces deployed, a formula guaranteed to generate mistrust because any ascendant state will eventually translate some of its newfound wealth into military power.27 Information about intentions is one source of reassurance; the other is the existence of access opportunities. The ability to shape strategic behavior constitutes the ultimate safeguard against the disruptions accompanying a new power’s emergence. A rising democracy may harbor expansionist ambitions, but leaders in the other democratic power can partner with sympathetic domestic actors and leverage internal divisions to moderate its external objectives over time. Table 2 summarizes how democracy in an ascendant state can function as a source of reassurance.

Institutions Implications
Decentralized authority Clear intentions
Transparency Many access opportunities

      Autocracy and Power Transitions

      A state under autocratic rule lacks the reassurance mechanisms outlined above. Autocracy centralizes power, confining foreign policy decisions to an elite few, or even to a single individual. In addition, to maintain control over the population, an autocracy limits the flow of information.28 Secrecy is pervasive. The government walls off its daily proceedings from public view: policy debates unfold behind closed doors. The need for information control renders a free press intolerable to an autocracy. Whatever media exist operate under state supervision and without meaningful legal protection.

      The institutions central to authoritarian government obscure a state’s intentions. With foreign policy an exclusive domain, the details of internal discussions remain closely held. Add to this sweeping state secrecy laws, and the potential for information leaks is low. Straitjacketed media have little capacity to report on policy deliberations within an autocracy, and because of state controls, outsiders largely discount whatever information the media do convey. Centralized authority and nontransparency thus generate considerable uncertainty about a state’s ambitions.

      The institutions associated with autocratic government also deprive outsiders of opportunities to shape strategic behavior. Centralized authority is inimical to access. Foreign policy decisions at most involve a handful of domestic actors. Business and civil society groups that might become points of access in a democracy are relegated to the sidelines. The concentration of power that underpins autocracy also decreases the probability of internal divisions that outsiders can exploit.

      Nontransparency further restricts opportunities for access. Pervasive secrecy and the consequent lack of a free press prevent outsiders from understanding the landscape of power within an autocracy. It is difficult to determine who to cultivate, who to lobby, and who to manipulate. And obtaining such information would prove of little value because nontransparency applies to how citizens of an autocracy relate to foreigners. A regime that prizes secrecy will regulate interactions with outsiders, particularly on sensitive issues like foreign policy. There are inherent limits to engaging domestic actors within an authoritarian state.

      Autocracy exacerbates the concerns accompanying a powerful state’s emergence. The problem created by a lack of transparency is less the possibility of a surprise attack and more the uncertainty that overhangs a rising autocracy’s ambitions. Outsiders confront an unanswerable question: will the ascendant state be content to peacefully accumulate influence or will it use force to rewrite international rules of the road? The new power’s military capabilities will inevitably loom large as a key indicator of intentions when external observers lack alternative sources of information. Against a backdrop of uncertainty, a rising power’s military buildup will trigger growing mistrust. So will the dearth of access opportunities. When outsiders lack the ability to shape strategic behavior, they become highly vulnerable to the potential downside of another power’s rise. Table 3 encapsulates how authoritarian rule amplifies mistrust of an ascendant state.

      Implications for Democratic Leaders

      The regime type of a rising state sets the broad boundaries for democratic leaders navigating a power transition. Democracy in the ascendant nation reduces risk and bolsters trust by clarifying intentions and opening up opportunities to shape strategic behavior. This removes the need for outsiders to hedge: democratic leaders can forgo enhanced military capabilities and strengthened alliances and pursue a course of accommodation.

Institutions Implications
Centralized authority Unclear intentions
Nontransparency Few access opportunities

      Although integration offers the most favorable tradeoff between resources and outcomes, this strategy can only succeed over a long time horizon. To the extent that international institutions can impose constraints on behavior, these constraints do not emerge overnight. Rather, they strengthen over time as a rising state becomes increasingly invested in a growing array of bilateral agreements and multilateral regimes.29 Likewise, international institutions hold the potential to reshape a rising state’s interests only after an extended period of participation.

      To ensure the time needed for integration to succeed, democratic leaders will tend to favor a course of appeasement at the onset of another democracy’s rise. Appeasement removes points of conflict that could become future impediments to embedding a democracy in international institutions as its rise accelerates. The stability cemented by appeasement creates conditions conducive to long-term integration. In this sense, appeasement is a bridge to the strategy democratic leaders inherently prefer when confronting a new power’s rise.

      By contrast, at the start of an autocracy’s ascendance, a democracy will likely favor a different, less accommodating approach. A rising autocracy’s opaque intentions and lack of access opportunities generate risk and foster mistrust. Democratic leaders will shy away from appeasement, which offers insufficient protection against the possibility that an autocracy will grow into a powerful adversary. Containment will, at least initially, appear to carry an excessive price tag. Democratic leaders will therefore favor a two-pronged approach. They will try to integrate the rising autocracy in the hope that international institutions will constrain its behavior and ultimately transform its interests. At the same time, they will develop military capabilities and alliances to hedge against the uncertainty accompanying the autocracy’s emergence on the world stage.

      This dual strategy is inherently fragile. It will endure so long as the rising autocracy’s behavior demonstrates restraint—a sign to democratic leaders that the combination of integration and hedging СКАЧАТЬ