All Necessary Measures. Carrie Booth Walling

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СКАЧАТЬ the presidency and the territory that included Mogadishu. The conflict between them resulted in an estimated fourteen thousand deaths and thirty thousand wounded in Mogadishu alone.¹¹

      The factional fighting in Mogadishu was replicated throughout the country—scorched earth tactics, looting, and violent attacks against members of rival clans, including the rape of women and the killing of the elderly and children. Civilians were at risk of death from two primary sources: the hostilities and the food scarcity that resulted from a combination of years of fighting, the destruction of farmland, and drought. In March 1992, Africa Watch and Physicians for Human Rights issued a report that described the character of the conflict and its human cost:

      Mogadishu has become a place of unpredictable death, with no one in authority and no one capable of enforcing a social commitment to order. Everyone appears armed. Whoever draws first carries the day, since there is no civil authority to punish someone who robs or kills. Many people are short-tempered, stressed by hunger and fear and many men—and boys—are consuming too much qat (a widely used mild stimulant that comes as a chewable green leaf) which is more powerful when eaten on a hungry stomach. In this climate of marginally contained chaos, the ICRC and NGO community working in Mogadishu are stretched to the limits of their own endurance and institutional integrity.¹²

      The World Food Program described the situation in Somalia as “an unparalleled disaster” and estimated that half of the population of the south central region had died by mid-1992.¹³ In July of that year, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali warned, based on figures provided by the UN high commissioner for refugees, that one million Somali children were at immediate risk of starving to death.¹⁴ The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) estimated that 95 percent of Somalia’s population suffered from malnutrition and almost 70 percent suffered from severe malnutrition and disease.¹⁵ Although international humanitarian relief organizations were on the ground working to alleviate the hunger, warlords restricted their movement and armed gangs regularly looted food and relief supplies intended for Somali civilians. Violence interfered with the distribution of humanitarian aid—by December 1992 it was estimated the half of all Somali children under the age of five had already died.¹⁶

      Security Council Involvement in Somalia, 1992–1995

      The character of the Security Council response to Somalia can be described as having three distinct phases: the use of nonmilitary enforcement measures (January–November 1992), forcible military humanitarian intervention (December 1992–January 1994), and reversal of enforcement measures and UN withdrawal (February 1994–March 1995). The first phase began in January 1992 when the Security Council passed Resolution 733 establishing an arms embargo. Then in April 1992, Resolution 751 established the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)—a traditional peacekeeping operation with primarily humanitarian ends. The Security Council response changed from a traditional peacekeeping mandate to a forcible military intervention in December 1992 when Resolution 794 established the U.S.-led United Task Force (UNITAF). UNITAF was authorized to use “all necessary means” to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations. Resolution 814 transferred authority back to the UN in March 1993, and also expanded the size of the force and the scope of mandate denoted by the revised name of the UN mission, UNOSOM II. The use of forcible measures continued under UNOSOM II with an emphasis on the coercive disarmament of Somali factions. The third phase of UN involvement was characterized by a dramatic reversal in policy when in February 1994 the Security Council revised the UNOSOM II mandate, reducing its military functions and transitioning back to a more traditional peacekeeping operation. In March 1995 UN forces completely withdrew from Somalia, despite the persistence of war.

      Three causal stories emerged during Security Council deliberations, but they did not coincide neatly with the three phases of council action in Somalia. The inadvertent story described an internecine civil war in which all parties to the conflict were causing harm to civilians. The complex story identified multiple clans, characterized by fragmenting interclan rivalries, warlords, armed thugs, and criminal gangs, as responsible for inflicting terror on the civilian population. The intentional story characterized the violence as deliberate and planned—naming perpetrators including the Somali National Assembly (SNA), General Aideed, and the United Somali Congress who were deliberately inflicting violence on UN peacekeeping personnel and the civilian population of Mogadishu. Initially, Security Council members were split between those who articulated an inadvertent story about civil war in which all parties were called upon to cease hostilities and a complex story about fighting between multiple factions accompanied by vigilantism and armed banditry. Despite this division, the language of early Security Council resolutions articulated the inadvertent story. By December 1992, however, the complex story dominated the Security Council until June 1993 when the intentional story emerged to compete with it. The use of military force by UN troops qualitatively changed as the intentional story gained traction in the Security Council, evolving from the forcible but largely neutral protection of humanitarian aid to the highly punitive and aggressive use of military force against specific parties to the conflict. Regardless of the story, all the resolutions passed by the UNSC expressed concern with the unfolding humanitarian tragedy and characterized its own action (both military and nonmilitary) as a humanitarian response. Security Council members devoted significantly more time debating the appropriate humanitarian response to the crisis in Somalia than to understanding its underlying cause and character—its causal story.

      Non-Military Enforcement Measures and Contestation Between Inadvertent and Complex Stories

      In January 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution 733, which urged “all parties” to the conflict to cease hostilities and agree to a cease-fire and imposed an arms embargo against Somalia. The resolution was passed in absence of formal deliberation but the text reflected an inadvertent story and the moral equivalence between parties that this implied. In March, only three members articulated the inadvertent story (Morocco, Nigeria, and the United States); they described the conflict as “fratricidal” and mutually destructive to the parties that were described as unwilling to create the conditions necessary for the delivery of humanitarian relief to their own peoples.¹⁷ In contrast, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and five members of the Security Council (Belgium, Japan, Hungary, India, and Zimbabwe) described the conflict as tragic and complex. The remaining council members declined to comment publicly on the cause and character of the conflict but joined the others in expressing concern about the plight of suffering civilians and linking the humanitarian crisis to international security. Security Council members pressed for an active UN presence in Somalia despite the failure of the Somali parties to abide by a cease-fire and in the absence of formal consent. The four reasons articulated in March 1992 were the magnitude of the humanitarian tragedy, the implications of continued fighting and famine for neighboring states, the unconventional nature of the conflict, and an appeal for equity in UN dealings with Africa in comparison to other regions.¹⁸

      Unlike in Iraq, members of the Security Council were more concerned with the humanitarian tragedy unfolding within the borders of Somalia than its implications for neighboring states, and public comments emphasized the human suffering of the Somali people. For example, the United States described the situation as “a tragedy of heartbreaking magnitude” with Belgium, Zimbabwe, and Ecuador similarly noting its “tragic” character.¹⁹ Belgium described the increasing numbers of dead, injured, and displaced persons: “All the information emanating from Somalia coincides on one point: the humanitarian situation there is a tragic one. The number of dead, injured and displaced persons continues to increase, and famine is taking firm hold.”²⁰ Its ambassador warned that the complex political and military situation was impeding the provision of humanitarian relief and that widespread famine was impending, necessitating an international response.²¹ Hungary noted its concern over “the magnitude of the human suffering brought about by the conflict” and asserted that “the continuation of this tragic and alarming situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security.”²² The Kenyan representative, speaking on behalf of the African group, called attention to “the vicious coexistence СКАЧАТЬ