Choreographies of Landscape. Sally Ann Ness

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СКАЧАТЬ permeate living beings (human and nonhuman) as they harness it” (2013: 20). For a detailed discussion of how the Form of the Sign can be understood processually as it relates to “Information,” see Fuhrman (2010).

22. Lepecki, following Aristotle, has employed the term energeia as “energy that energizes,” or “movement that in moving, triggers action.” “Energeia,” Lepecki elaborates, “qualifies movement (kinesis) not only as something that moves, but as motion that acts” (2012c: 32). The source of a semeiotic sign’s capacity to perform as such, in this regard, is a particular intensification of energy originating in its distinctively triadic moving “signature” rather than in any content or material it might also possess or “carry.”

23. The use of “thing” here to indicate an object that has acquired the character of a Sign is intended to invoke Latour’s Actor-Network-Theory definition of “thing” (an object that has acquired performativity and becomes an actant in an assemblage) as well as that utilized by André Lepecki in his inter-subjective movement/action-constituted conceptualization of the “political thing” (2012b, 2012c). Lepecki’s notion of the “political thing,” in particular, parallels closely the definition of a semeiotic symbol (of certain political kind). Lepecki writes, “The political thing is a difficult, ever-evolving commitment, it is less an object and a subject than a movement defined by inter-subjective action—one that, moreover, must be learned, rehearsed, nurtured, and above all experimented with, practiced and experienced” (2012b: 3; emphasis in text). It should be noted that Lepecki’s definition of a political thing corresponds specifically to what is termed a Symbol’s Qualisign in Peircean sign theory, that aspect that conveys its qualitative “essence.” On Latour’s definition, see Jane Bennett’s discussion of “thing power” as it relates to Actor-Network-Theory (2010).

24. The close alignment of Bateson’s cybernetic theory of mind with Peirce’s semeiotic has been recognized and explicated in greater detail by Gary Furhman (2010), Jesper Hoffmeyer (2008), and myself (Ness 2007, 2008a, 2008b). As Hoffmeyer notes, Bateson’s definition of information as differences that make a difference “comes so close to a genuine triadic Peircean sign as to be nearly indistinguishable” (2008: 42; cited in Furhman 2010: 188).

25. See, for example, Peirce’s 1897 essay “Division of Signs” (CP 1.228), which gives the often cited definition “A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity.” See also Peirce’s 1899 note on his 1867 landmark essay “On a New List of Categories” (CP 1.564–65). He writes, “A representation is that character of a thing by virtue of which, for the production of a certain mental effect, it may stand in place of another thing.” He goes on, however, to acknowledge that his conception of such a “representation” was not general enough to cover all of the classes included in his idea of the sign. Likewise, in his 1902 definition of “Represent” for the Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, Peirce wrote that to represent was “to stand for, that is, to be in such a relation to another that for certain purposes it is treated by some mind as if it were that other” (CP 2.273). Here the notion of “being in relation” gains prevalence over the relatively specific trope of “standing for.” Likewise, in his 1902 definition of “Sign” for the same dictionary, Peirce specified that a sign was “anything which determines something else (its interpretant) to refer to an object to which itself refers (its object) in the same way, the interpretant becoming in turn a sign, and so on ad infinitum” (CP 2.303). Here the idea of “standing for” has been completely omitted from the definition in favor of the idea of “determining”—which I modify for rhetorical purposes to the idea of “agentively moving into a relationship with.”

26. The editors of The Essential Peirce note that “the conception of a sign as a medium of communication becomes very prominent in Peirce’s 1906 writings” (EP2: 544n22). Colapietro notes that Peirce’s comment quoted above was made in reference to his category of “Thirdness.” However, Colapietro also asserts that the comment could have been made “with equal justice” about semiosis, which is how it is interpreted here, in accordance with the categorial definition that grounds the rhetorical one here employed.

27. In 1902, Peirce defined a Symbol similarly as a Sign whose character “consists precisely in its being a rule” and gave as examples “words, sentences, books, and other conventional signs” (CP 2.292). He elaborated, “A Symbol is a law, or regularity of the indefinite future” (CP 2.293).

28. The manuscript that contains this passage (#517) is titled “New Elements” and is dated to 1904. It is considered by some to be one of the most important statements of Peirce’s later conceptualization of his semeiotic (EP2: 300–24).

29. For an overview of the history of the Yosemite Firefall tradition, see Huell Houser’s documentary California’s Gold with Huell Howser #706:Yosemite Firefall.

30. To view images from the Yosemite in Time project, visit the website: http://www.klettandwolfe.com/2009/10/yosemite-in-time.html. In the technical terminology of Peirce’s semeiotic, the kind of symbolic process created by the photographers was one that entailed both Sumisigns—simple substitutive signs (so that a later retaken image could be recognized as substitutable for an earlier one)—and Dicisigns or quasi-propositions—informational signs (so that a later image could be appreciated as presenting contrasting information to an earlier one). See Frederik Stjernfelt’s investigations of “diagrammatology” for a more detailed discussion of the latter in relation to visual imagery more generally (2007, 2014). If the process of retaking were in actuality to be continued, and if the accumulated imagery were to show predictable patterns of change in the landscape location that was rephotographed (or a clear lack thereof), the continuum could then be said to have a persuasive (rhetorical and rational) character that would be identifiable as that of a Suadisign, or Argument Symbol type. Given the incipient stage of the symbol formation, however, this last character is still vague. The particular orientation of the project’s rephotography, focusing as it did on the duplication of particular instances of renowned photographic performance and particular famous images, would also be characterized in semeiotic terminology as directed toward the creation of Singular Symbols, as each continuum of recurring photography was developed in relation to individual, existent photographs (EP2: 275). Singular symbols may originate, in Peirce’s observations, in “either an image of the idea signified, or a reminiscence of some individual occurrence, person, or thing, connected with its meaning, or is a metaphor” (EP2: 264). The rephotographing project originates in both the images and the occurrences of original photographic performances.

31. With regard to the Symbol’s first correlate or representamen, as well, which Peirce identified as being of the class he termed Legisigns, Peirce wrote, “Every conventional sign is a legisign [but not conversely]” (CP 2.246).

32. While it is unambiguously prominent in Peirce’s later writings, the post-humanist character of Peirce’s concept of the Symbol is not one typically recognized in research on cultural performance. Eduardo Kohn’s study of Runa semeiotics is perhaps the most recent example СКАЧАТЬ