The Formation & Evolution of the American Constitution. Madison James
Чтение книги онлайн.
Читать онлайн книгу The Formation & Evolution of the American Constitution - Madison James страница 33
Название: The Formation & Evolution of the American Constitution
Автор: Madison James
Издательство: Bookwire
Жанр: Юриспруденция, право
isbn: 9788027241019
isbn:
Mr. Williamson illustrated the cases by a comparison of the different States, to Counties of different sizes within the same State; observing that proportional representation was admitted to be just in the latter case, and could not therefore be fairly contested in the former.
The Question being about to be put Mr. Patterson hoped that as so much depended on it, it might be thought best to postpone the decision till tomorrow, which was done, nem. con.
The Committee rose & the House adjourned.
Edward Carrington wrote to Jefferson from New York, June 9, 1787:
"The debates and proceedings of the Convention are kept in profound secrecy — opinions of the probable result of their deliberations can only be formed from the prevailing impressions of men of reflection and understanding — these are reducible to two schemes — the first, a consolidation of the whole Empire into one republic, leaving in the States nothing more than subordinate courts for facilitating the administration of the Laws — the second an investiture of the foederal sovereignty with full and independent authority as to the Trade, Revenues, and forces of the union, and the rights of peace and war, together with a negative upon all the acts of the State legislatures.
The first idea, I apprehend, would be impracticable, and therefore do not suppose it can be adopted — general Laws through a Country embracing so many climates, productions, and manners as the United States, would operate many oppressions & a general legislature would be found incompetent to the formation of local ones, as a majority would in every instance, be ignorant of, and unaffected by the objects of legislation…. Something like the second will probably be formed — indeed I am certain that nothing less than what will give the foederal sovereignty a compleat controul over the state Governments, will be thought worthy of discussion — such a scheme constructed upon well adjusted principles would certainly give us stability and importance as a nation, and if the Executive powers can be sufficiently checked, must be eligible — unless the whole has a decided influence over the parts, the constant effort will be to resume the delegated powers, and there cannot be an inducement in the foederal sovereignty to refuse its assent to an innocent act of a State…. The Eastern opinions are for a total surrender of the state Sovereignties, and indeed some amongst them go to a monarchy at once — they have verged to anarchy, while to the southward we have only felt an inconvenience, and their proportionate disposition to an opposite extreme is a natural consequence." — Jeff. MSS.
2 "Carried against the motion, 10 noes, and Delaware divided." — Yates, Secret Proceedings, etc., 111. The Journal also includes North Carolina among the noes. — Journal of the Federal Convention, 110.
3 "Mr. Brearly is a man of good, rather than of brilliant parts. He is a Judge of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, and is very much in the esteem of the people. As an Orator he has little to boast of, but as a Man he has every virtue to recommend him. Mr. Brearly is about 40 years of age." — Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 327.
Monday, June 11th Mr. Abraham Baldwin From Georgia Took His Seat. In Committee of the Whole
The clause concerning the rule of suffrage in the National Legislature postponed on Saturday was resumed.
Mr. Sherman proposed that the proportion of suffrage in the 1st branch should be according to the respective numbers of free inhabitants; and that in the second branch or Senate, each State should have one vote and no more. He said as the States would remain possessed of certain individual rights, each State ought to be able to protect itself: otherwise a few large States will rule the rest. The House of Lords in England he observed had certain particular rights under the Constitution, and hence they have an equal vote with the House of Commons that they may be able to defend their rights.
Mr. Rutlidge proposed that the proportion of suffrage in the 1st branch should be according to the quotas of contribution. The justice of this rule he said could not be contested. Mr. Butler urged the same idea: adding that money was power; and that the States ought to have weight in the Government in proportion to their wealth.
Mr. King & Mr. Wilson,1 in order to bring the question to a point moved "that the right of suffrage in the first branch of the national Legislature ought not to be according [to] the rule established in the articles of Confederation, but according to some equitable ratio of representation." The clause so far as it related to suffrage in the first branch was postponed in order to consider this motion.
Mr. Dickenson contended for the actual contributions of the States as the rule of their representation & suffrage in the first branch. By thus connecting the interests of the States with their duty, the latter would be sure to be performed.
Mr. King remarked that it was uncertain what mode might be used in levying a National revenue; but that it was probable, imposts would be one source of it. If the actual contributions were to be the rule the non-importing States, as Connecticut & N. Jersey, would be in a bad situation indeed. It might so happen that they would have no representation. This situation of particular States had been always one powerful argument in favor of the 5 Per Cent impost.
The question being about to be put Doctor Franklin said he had thrown his ideas of the matter on a paper which Mr. Wilson read to the Committee in the words following — Mr. Chairman
It has given me great pleasure to observe that till this point, the proportion of representation, came before us, our debates were carried on with great coolness & temper. If any thing of a contrary kind, has on this occasion appeared. I hope it will not be repeated; for we are sent here to consult, not to contend, with each other; and declarations of a fixed opinion, and of determined resolution, never to change it, neither enlighten nor convince us. Positiveness and warmth on one side, naturally beget their like on the other; and tend to create and augment discord & division in a great concern, wherein harmony & Union are extremely necessary to give weight to our Councils, and render them effectual in promoting & securing the common good.
I must own that I was originally of opinion it would be better if every member of Congress, or our national Council, were to consider himself rather as a representative of the whole, than as an Agent for the interests of a particular State; in which case the proportion of members for each State would be of less consequence, & it would not be very material whether they voted by States or individually. But as I find this is not to be expected, I now think the number of Representatives should bear some proportion to the number of the Represented; and that the decisions should be by the majority of members, not by the majority of the States. This is objected to from an apprehension that the greater States would then swallow up the smaller. I do not at present clearly see what advantage the greater States could propose to themselves by swallowing up the smaller, and therefore do not apprehend they would attempt it. I recollect that in the beginning of this Century, When the Union was proposed of the two Kingdoms, England & Scotland, the Scotch Patriots СКАЧАТЬ