The Formation & Evolution of the American Constitution. Madison James
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Название: The Formation & Evolution of the American Constitution

Автор: Madison James

Издательство: Bookwire

Жанр: Юриспруденция, право

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isbn: 9788027241019

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СКАЧАТЬ in the Executive, to fix the extent of the Executive authority; that as certain powers were in their nature Executive, and must be given to that department whether administered by one or more persons, a definition of their extent would assist the judgment in determining how far they might be safely entrusted to a single officer. He accordingly moved that so much of the clause before the Committee as related to the powers of the Executive should be struck out & that after the words "that a national Executive ought to be instituted" there be inserted the words following viz. "with power to carry into effect the national laws, to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for, and to execute such other powers "not Legislative nor Judiciary in their nature," as may from time to time be delegated by the national Legislature." The words "not legislative nor judiciary in their nature" were added to the proposed amendment, in consequence of a suggestion by General Pinkney that improper powers might otherwise be delegated.

      Mr. Wilson seconded this motion.

      Mr. Pinkney moved to amend the amendment by striking out the last member of it; viz: "and to execute such other powers not Legislative nor Judiciary in their nature as may from time to time be delegated." He said they were unnecessary, the object of them being included in the "power to carry into effect the national laws."

      Mr. Randolph seconded the motion.

      Mr. Madison did not know that the words were absolutely necessary, or even the preceding words, "to appoint to offices &c. the whole being perhaps included in the first member of the proposition. He did not however see any inconveniency in retaining them, and cases might happen in which they might serve to prevent doubts and misconstructions.

      In consequence of the motion of Mr. Pinkney, the question on Mr. Madison's motion was divided; and the words objected to by Mr. Pinkney struck out; by the votes of Connecticut, N. Y., N. J., Pennsylvania, Del., N. C., & Geo. against Mass., Virginia & S. Carolina the preceding part of the motion being first agreed to; Connecticut divided all the other States in the affirmative.

      The next clause in Resolution 7, relating to the mode of appointing, & the duration of, the Executive being under consideration,

      Mr. Wilson said he was almost unwilling to declare the mode which he wished to take place, being apprehensive that it might appear chimerical. He would say however at least that in theory he was for an election by the people. Experience, particularly in N. York & Massachusetts, shewed that an election of the first magistrate by the people at large, was both a convenient & successful mode. The objects of choice in such cases must be persons whose merits have general notoriety.

      Mr. Sherman was for the appointment by the Legislature, and for making him absolutely dependent on that body, as it was the will of that which was to be executed. An independence of the Executive on the supreme Legislature, was in his opinion the very essence of tyranny if there was any such thing.

      Mr. Wilson moves that the blank for the term of duration should be filled with three years, observing at the same time that he preferred this short period, on the supposition that a re-eligibility would be provided for.

      Mr. Pinkney moves for seven years.

      Mr. Sherman was for three years, and against the doctrine of rotation as throwing out of office the men best qualified to execute its duties.

      Mr. Mason was for seven years at least, and for prohibiting a re-eligibility as the best expedient both for preventing the effect of a false complaisance on the side of the Legislature towards unfit characters; and a temptation on the side of the Executive to intrigue with the Legislature for a re-appointment.

      On the question for seven years,

      Massachusetts dividd. Connecticut no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pennsylvania ay. Del. ay. Virginia ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geor. no.

      There being 5 ays, 4 noes, & 1 divd, a question was asked whether a majority had voted in the Affirmative? The President decided that it was an affirmative vote.

      The mode of appointing the Executive was the next question.

      Mr. Wilson renewed his declarations in favor of an appointment by the people. He wished to derive not only both branches of the Legislature from the people, without the intervention of the State Legislatures but the Executive also; in order to make them as independent as possible of each other, as well as of the States;

      Col. Mason favors the idea, but thinks it impracticable. He wishes however that Mr. Wilson might have time to digest it into his own form. — the clause, "to be chosen by the National Legislature" — was accordingly postponed. —

      Mr. Rutlidge suggests an election of the Executive by the second branch only of the national Legislature.

      The Committee then rose and the House

      Adjourned.

      According to King, Madison followed Wilson: "Madison agreed with Wilson in the Definition of Executive power. Ex vi termini. Executive power does not include the Power of War and Peace. Executive Power shd. be limited and defined. If large, we shall have the Evils of Elective Monarchies. Perhaps the best plan will be a single Executive of long duration, with a Council and with Liberty to dissent on his personal Responsibility." — King's Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, i., 588.

      According to Pierce:

      "Mr. Madison was of opinion that an Executive formed of one Man would answer the purpose when aided by a Council, who should have the right to advise and record their proceedings, but not to control his authority." — Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 320.

      King gives Gerry's remarks: "Gerry. I am in favor of a Council to advise the Executive: they will be organs of information respecting Persons qualified for various offices. Their opinions may be recorded, so as to be liable to be called to account & impeached — in this way, their Responsibility will be certain, and for misconduct their Punishment sure."

      Dickinson followed Gerry: "Dickinson. A limited yet vigorous Executive is not republican, but peculiar to monarchy СКАЧАТЬ