The Korean War: History in an Hour. Andrew Mulholland

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СКАЧАТЬ security. Those nations which made such a commitment are recorded in Appendix 3. Less welcome were the many promises of support which came to nothing.

      There was one important offer of immediate military assistance which Truman rejected. Chiang Kai-shek had suggested the despatch of 30,000 Nationalist Chinese troops from Taiwan. For MacArthur, this was potentially a game-changing proposal, which could have a huge impact on the desperate fighting now underway. Chiang’s troops would have quadrupled existing UN ground forces at a stroke. For the President though, this was a double-edged sword. To allow the participation of Nationalist China would be to broaden the conflict and invite Communist Chinese or even Russian intervention. At this time, although Russian equipped, the attackers consisted entirely of North Korean troops. Truman wanted to keep it that way; he did not want a world war. It was an early example of the restraint which was to characterize both sides’ conduct of the war.

      Within a week then, the Korean War had become a United Nations war. This was testimony to the diplomatic skills of the Truman Administration, the stance taken by Russia at the United Nations, and the often underrated internationalism of those states which chose to spend their blood in defence of another. It was equally clear, though, that the UN project in Korea would be led by the USA. It was the Americans who had led the debates at the Security Council and built the coalition. Of necessity, theirs had been the first foreign troops in theatre; and theirs would be the major contribution throughout the conflict. All of these factors, coupled with the overriding sense of emergency in July 1950 and the sheer practicalities involved, pointed to an American overall commander. The UN Secretary General’s proposal of a committee to run the war was swept aside. MacArthur was appointed to command all UN forces by Truman on 7 July and the seeds of some of the United Nations’s most contentious problems thereby sown.

      In theory, MacArthur had four infantry divisions available to him in Japan. These were understrength units, though, and their tactical competence was highly questionable. Furthermore, he had no means of shipping them en masse to the front, as it would take time to assemble the naval transport required. There was also the delicate question of identifying who would take over the occupation role they had undertaken in Japan. In this there was little real choice – and the use of Japanese police and security agencies hastened her return to full normality as a sovereign state.

      As for the infantry, troops were shipped to Korea as the transport became available, during July and August. Most arrived in battalion strength and were committed wherever the latest crisis might be. General Walton Walker commanded in Korea itself, establishing the American 8th Army – in reality a weak army corps. MacArthur, save for a publicity-based visit lasting less than a day, preferred to exercise command from Tokyo.

      At the same time, the US Congress approved a special war budget of $11b and American Army and Marine divisions began assembling across the USA. For the Marines, in particular, Korea was to become a make-or-break campaign. During the period of disarmament which had preceded the war, their numbers had been cut drastically. The idea that the Marine Corps’ role should be confined to small shipboard defence parties had gained currency. Korea might rekindle the concept of the large amphibious operations and expeditionary warfare which the Marines had perfected during the Second World War.

      The Korean War was to spur overall rearmament in the USA, as well as in countries such as Britain. There was a sense that the Russians had been found out – proved guilty – and that the West now needed to be on its guard. Above all, the fear was of a sudden Soviet attack in Europe. This notion, that Western Europe lay vulnerable to Russia’s tank armies massed on the Elbe, was a key factor in Truman’s thinking and an obvious major concern for Britain and France. All of the debate on the UN side about escalation in Korea was coloured by this lurking dread.

       The United Nations Clings On

      Air and Naval Power

      Strategically, the most important assets for the United Nations during those early weeks were air and naval power. Almost all UN air power was provided by the US Air Force, while naval forces included a sizeable British component. It was in these areas that even in July, the Americans and their allies began to exert considerable military influence. By the end of the month the North Korean Air Force had become an irrelevance, as its piston-engined aircraft were blasted on the ground and in the air by American jets. Kim’s air force had experienced no difficulty against the tiny numbers initially fielded by South Korea and, until the arrival of the Americans, provided useful ground support for their advancing columns. But the US Air Force brushed them aside in days.

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