SOE Manual: How to be an Agent in Occupied Europe. Special Executive Operations

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СКАЧАТЬ we do not intend to attack the better. If we can get whole police battalions diverted to certain areas it is better still.

      How do we set about undermining the morale of enemy troops? Well, there are several methods of political subversion about which you will get details during the next few weeks. It is no good trying to plant downright falsehoods on enemy troops, you have no right to expect them to swallow them, but you can work on grievances which they already have. You can fan their dissatisfaction with their conditions, and also the anxiety they must feel for their relations in North German towns which have been heavily blitzed by the R.A.F. You can play on the feeling of loneliness some of their troops must experience in remote stations, and on the terror they must feel at the chance of being stabbed in the back by the foreign population they are holding in check when “the day” arrives. And you can make them almost sob at the thought of all they are being deprived of.

      Lastly, you can raise the morale of the population of the occupied countries by various forms of propaganda which are being used at this moment in every German-Occupied country every day of the year. The object of this propaganda is to unify the population in a common hatred of the Boche. Arising out of this there should come the sort of non-co-operation with him which is so important to us. One can implant in them a conviction amounting to certainty that the Allies will win – from that should spring an active desire to help that victory forward.

      These, then, are the objects which we seek to attain by subversion, and I have just detailed some of the methods by which they can be achieved. It is obvious, however, that all these effects will be haphazard, and therefore largely wasted, if they are not all bound up in a general plan, which covers all activities and times them all to fit in, like a railway schedule. Each single act of sabotage, of propaganda, or of political subversion ought to be part of a definite plan of attack.

      The plan naturally varies with each country and there are several factors which govern it. There is first of all, naturally, military strategy, for all our subversive efforts are governed by what the main plan of attack may be – and subversion is only one part of a very large whole. It is no use, for instance, laying on an ambitious plan of sabotage for a country which the High Command has decided at the last moment not to attack – unless it is a deliberate plan of diversion.

      It is naturally also influenced by the German economic situation. For instance, one of the main German weaknesses at the moment is communications, and that is why they are so constantly attacked both by the R.A.F. and saboteurs. Then there is the question of the political situation. The relations between the Allies and some so-called neutral countries are so delicate that no subversive operations can be contemplated in those countries for the time being, even though it is apparent that they may be the next on the list for attack by the Germans. There is also the nature of the country to be considered – the density of its population, and the degree of industrialisation. It is obvious that the plan for small densely populated and highly industrialised countries, such as Belgium and Holland, would be different from that for the deserts of Libya – if there is one.

      Lastly the attitude of the civil population may make a considerable difference to the plan. In some countries secret organisations already exist in fairly large numbers and they may have to be taken into consideration. The attitude of some Occupied countries is far more virile than that of others, who are inclined to lie down and do nothing about it. In some parts of the country there may even be an active pro-Nazi element. All these factors have to be weighed.

      The general policy in whatever country you may be sent to can be divided into two phases – the pre-invasion phase and the invasion phase. Let us take the pre-invasion phase first.

      The first essential is to organise each country, area by area. Naturally the organisation in each country will vary enormously according to factors of geography, population and Industry, so that no two countries will be entirely alike. For the same reasons the organisation inside each area may be extremely simple, or, on the other hand, it may be a fairly complex organisation, closely knit together. In addition to the factors I have already mentioned, there is the dominating factor of the German counter espionage control. It is their activities which mostly dictate what kind of organisation one can stage. Then there is the question of the native organisations already working inside the country – the so-called secret armies. Here again the policy varies so much from country to country and according to the run of the war, that it is impossible to lay down any universal principle. In some countries organisers may be asked to go out as pioneers and organise some guerrilla bands, with various objectives to be attacked when the “day” comes. In other countries agents are sent out regularly to form part of the powerful secret organisations already existing, and to fill niches in those organisations, such as arms instructors, sub-area organisers, W/T operators, etc. Yet in other countries, the organisation of which you form a part functions entirely separately from these organisations, which are probably too well known to the Boche. But even in these cases some attempt must be made to take note of these local societies and to assess their value.

      Naturally most of your activities will form a preparation for the great day when your countries come to be liberated, and the invasion phase should, therefore, see your activities at maximum stretch. Everything depends on the secrecy and efficiency with which these preparations are made. The more that each separate operation can be prepared, and even possibly rehearsed, the better it is likely to go off when the day comes.

      Here again the operational orders naturally vary considerably for each country, so that it is impossible to lay down any universal plan to apply to all countries. Nevertheless the activities, some part of which you will probably be asked to prepare for, will include such things as:–

      a). A whole series of combined attacks on the enemy’s rail, road and telecommunications. If, for instance, it were possible to isolate completely, for even 48 hours, a vital strategic centre 50 miles behind the enemy’s lines just at the moment when the Allies were landing, just think what a gift this would be to the Allied commander. If it were impossible for the enemy to get his troops up to the threatened spot at the right moment because his communications were temporarily sabotaged, it might make all the difference to the success or failure of the operations – in that sector at all events.

      b). Demolishing important river bridges which are vital to the enemy’s communications. Or, conversely, preventing the enemy from doing so when he wishes to prevent the Allies from advancing. The campaign of 1940 in the Low Countries showed what tragic results to the defence can result from a single important bridge failing to be demolished. And it is about time that the Germans had some of their own medicine.

      c). Attacks on enemy H.Q.’s, telephone installations, wireless vans, etc. A small gang of disciplined men can very soon deal with even an important enemy H.Q. if the operation is thoroughly studied and planned beforehand. If the sentries are attacked at exactly the right moment and the men in the guard-room overwhelmed, one can very soon over-run a whole H.Q. building by running down the corridors and throwing bombs or grenades in each room. They are fairly effective weapons in those conditions.

      d). Blocking roads which must be used by the enemy’s transport, but care must be taken not to block roads which may be required by the advancing Allies. It has been rightly pointed out that it is impossible to block any road for more than a certain time. Nevertheless if the enemy had to vacate a town at a moment’s notice, with a large amount of transport, and then have to deal with road blocks, or possibly road craters, it might make all the difference to them, more especially if the sky was then filled with bombing aeroplanes which left them no respite.

      e). The question of the civil population is a very important one, for it was their action in pouring out on to all the roads before the advancing Germans in 1940 that seriously handicapped the Allies in their attempts to deal with the German invasion. Here again detailed plans will be worked out in due course to tell the civil population what they can do to help, and especially what they can avoid doing to hinder. No doubt the B.B.C. will play a large part in this, but one cannot СКАЧАТЬ