The Great World War 1914–1945: 1. Lightning Strikes Twice. John Bourne

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СКАЧАТЬ wedded to the doctrine of the offensive. The policy was designed to ensure that the RFC’s army co-operation machines could operate without interference from the enemy; the safest means of doing this was to keep the enemy well behind the front lines. The disparity in losses between fighters and army co-operation machines suggests that the offensive policy worked, but it was extremely costly. Additionally, there were instances of patrols sent out over enemy lines and not meeting any opposition, but suffering losses as a result of mechanical failure or anti-aircraft fire.¹⁸

      Arthur Gould Lee, an RFC veteran, felt that Trenchard viewed the offensive in terms of gaining territory:

      ‘…for a British plane to be one mile across the trenches was offensive: for it to be ten miles across was more offensive… While we thus dissipated our strength, more often than not merely beating the empty air, the Germans… concentrated forces superior in numbers or equipment and engaged our scattered line patrols in turn, and our Distant Offensive Patrols as and when it suited them. The result was that in 1917, British air losses were at times nearly four times as great as the German.’¹⁹

      The Germans appeared to remain content to engage the RFC over their own lines, and never adopted offensive operations on the same scale. Of Manfred Von Richthofen’s 80 credited victories, 62 were destroyed over German lines or No Man’s Land. RFC ‘aces’ obtained most, if not all, of their ‘kills’ well over enemy territory.

      The Great War first demonstrated a point that remained true in the Second World War, namely that the defensive fighter force had a number of advantages when compared to an air force pursuing an offensive. Pilots who were shot down on the defending side were able to crash land or (in the later conflict) parachute to safety on friendly territory, while the pilot from the attacking side who was forced down could look forward only to captivity or attempts to evade – which were rarely successful. In addition, the attacking force was compelled to consider its fuel state. In the case of the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe’s efforts were greatly hampered by the fact that the Me109 was unable to remain over Britain for long because of lack of fuel reserves. British fighters, notably the Spitfire and the Hurricane, were similarly ‘short-legged’. Nonetheless, this did not prevent the British from employing the fighter offensive after the threat of a German invasion of Britain had reduced. ‘Johnnie’ Johnson, as has been mentioned, was emphatic upon the value of offensive action, but he was talking about air combat. His views on the RAF’s offensive against German-occupied territory in 1941 and 1942 were less than enthusiastic:

      ‘We began to carry out low-level flights over France. These operations were known by the code name Rhubarb. The idea was to take full advantage of low cloud and poor visibility and slip sections of Spitfires across the coast and then let down below the cloud to search for opportunity targets, rolling stock, locomotives, aircraft on the ground, staff cars, enemy troops and the like…

      …I loathed these Rhubarbs with a dark hatred. Apart from the flak, the hazards of making a let-down over unknown territory and with no accurate knowledge of the cloud base seemed far too great a risk for the damage we inflicted.’²⁰

      It is hard to disagree with Johnson, since the effect of the operations was relatively small, and did nothing to compensate for the losses of experienced pilots. The famed Robert Stanford Tuck and Douglas Bader were both shot down and captured during the course of the offensive, while slightly less well-known ‘aces’ such as Howard Blatchford, John Gillan, Eric Lock and Paddy Finucane were all killed.²¹ This is not to say that the use of fighters in an offensive role was without any value. Once the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) was equipped with long-range fighter aircraft, it was able to carry the war deep into Germany itself, escorting bombers and inflicting attrition upon the enemy fighter force. Among other things, this prevented the Luftwaffe from opposing the D-Day landings in great force, and began to remove experienced pilots from the fray. Indeed, Noble Frankland suggests that the use of long-range fighters over Germany was vital in winning the air war in Europe.²²

      Even though such strategic developments were of obvious importance, the tactical application of fighters in attempting to achieve these aims remained vital. Although the RAF had learned much about the use of the ‘finger four’ from encountering the Germans, this only applied to small groups of aircraft. Again, in a direct parallel with the First World War (although on a larger scale), pilots found that they were engaged in air battles involving increasing numbers of machines. The RAF had made attempts to use large formations during the Battle of Britain, most notably the famous ‘Big Wing’ led by Douglas Bader. This was a novelty for the RAF, for it had never previously attempted to use large formations of aircraft in a defensive situation. Although the German Spring Offensives of March-June 1918 had suffered greatly from air attack, actual air combat operations had been a secondary concern for the defenders. A further difference was the manner in which defensive air-to-air operations were conducted: in the Great War, the majority of combats were over enemy lines. During the Battle of Britain, then later the Battle for Malta, fighters worked almost exclusively over their own territory, without attempting to carry the war to the enemy.

      While the gaining of air superiority was crucial, once won, the fighter force could have found itself with little to do. This was not the case, as fighter pilots found themselves engaged in ground-attack operations. The qualities of the fighter aircraft – speed, manoeuvrability and firepower – made it admirably suitable for the risky work of attacking ground forces. The RFC was arguably the first air service to make major use of its fighter aircraft for ground-attack, preferring them to developing machines specifically designed for such a role. Initially, pilots indulged in freelance operations as they were returning from patrols, but at the Battle of Arras in April 1917 the first co-ordinated operational orders for air support were issued. A combination of bad weather and inexperience meant that the missions did not achieve all that they might have done, but they showed great promise. At Third Ypres in July, the concept was proven to be effective, and came to the fore at the Battle of Cambrai at the end of the year. This had implications for a number of fighter pilots, who found themselves training for operations quite unlike any they had conducted before. Notable amongst them was Arthur Gould Lee of Number 46 Squadron. On 9 November, Gould Lee recorded his flying for that day:

      ‘My other flying was a low cross-country and bomb-dropping practice. We were actually ordered to do the low-level flight, which normally is officially frowned on. Our machines have been fitted with racks under the fuselage to carry four 20lb bombs, and a target has been laid out… I wonder what’s afoot?’²³

      This practice continued, until on 17 November he wrote home:

      ‘Over the past four days we’ve been hard at it practising bomb-dropping… I found it surprisingly easy to get close results [with bombs], in fact mine were the best in the squadron… I hope this unexpected skill doesn’t land me any awkward jobs!’

      This cheerfulness masked his real concerns:

      ‘Something unpleasant is certainly brewing. We all feel it. First 3 and 46 [Squadrons] both getting Camels in such a hurry. Then this intensive practice in low bombing and low… flying… Another squadron, 84, with SE 5a’s under Major [Sholto] Douglas has arrived at the other end of the aerodrome… Every village in the forward zone is crowded with troops… obviously a big push is coming any time now.’²⁴

      The attack at Cambrai was launched on 20 November. Gould Lee was sent to attack enemy artillery batteries in Lateau Wood. His recollections of the incident were understandably vivid:

      ‘The batteries below are firing producing more smoke… there we are, the three of us whirling blindly around at 50–100 feet, all but colliding, being shot at from below and trying to place bombs accurately… In a sharp turn, I saw a bunch of guns right in line for attack, so dived at 45 degrees and released all four bombs… One fell between two guns, the rest a few yards away… I dive at СКАЧАТЬ