The Works of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. Volume 10. Samuel Johnson

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СКАЧАТЬ whether from the pretender, the Spaniards, the French, or any other power, it is of no great importance. An invasion is a formidable sound; the sack of towns, the destruction of villages, the captivity of our children, the ruin of our fortunes, and the desolation of our country, are frightful images, and may, therefore, be successfully produced, on this occasion, to perplex our thoughts, and embarrass our inquiries.

      To remove, therefore, this panick, and to dissipate, for ever, the phantoms of invasion, I will lay before the house the opinion of the great commander whose name has already been introduced in this debate. In the late reign, on a day when the great officers of the crown, and many of the council, were at a publick feast in the city, a report was suddenly spread that the duke of Ormond had landed in the west, with two thousand men. This account was, in appearance, well attested, and universally believed; all jollity was, therefore, at an end, the company departed, the council was summoned, and every man offered such expedients as his present thoughts, confused and oppressed with the proximity of the danger, suggested to him. One proposed, that a body of troops should be sent to a distant part of the kingdom, to restrain the seditions of the populace; another apprehended more danger from a different quarter, and advised that the inhabitants should be awed by another detachment sent thither; the most experienced easily saw the unprofitableness of the measures proposed, but could not so easily strike out more efficacious expedients, and therefore sat in great perplexity. Lord Somers, particularly, shook his head, and seemed to consider the kingdom as in the hands of the invaders, and the dreadful pretender as seated on the throne.

      At last, the duke of MARLBOROUGH, who had hitherto sat silent, asked calmly, whether they were certain that any forces were really landed, and was answered, that though it might not be absolutely certain, yet they were to consult and send orders upon that supposition. Then, says he, I will lay down this great rule to be observed invariably, whenever you are invaded. Attend only to one point, nor have any other purpose in view than that of destroying the regular forces that shall be landed in the kingdom, without any regard to petty insurrections, which may be always easily quelled, and which will probably cease of themselves, when the army by which they were excited is cut off. For this end, let it be your rule, to keep your army undivided, and to make no motion but towards the enemies; fight them with the utmost expedition before they can fortify themselves, or receive reinforcements from the continent. By the observation of this plain method of operation, continued he, I will engage, without any other force than the regiments generally stationed about the capital, to put a stop to any troops that shall be landed on the coast of Britain.

      So far was this great officer, who was acquainted with the whole art of war, from sinking into astonishment at the sound of an invasion, and so far from thinking it necessary that the nation should be harassed by standing troops, to preserve it from being plundered by a foreign army.

      But though our troops, sir, should not be necessary to prevent an invasion, they may be useful in services of equal importance; the ministry may think the suffrages of the officers more serviceable than their swords, and may be more afraid of exposing themselves than the nation by any detachment of their forces.

      Such is, at present, sir, the state of this unhappy country, that neither in peace nor war are any measures taken, but with a view of increasing or confirming the power of the ministry; for this purpose those troops whose officers have seats here, are to be retained at home, and the fate of our American settlements to be committed to new-levied forces, without military skill.

      For this reason is an army to be raised without necessity, and raised in a manner that may furnish the court with an opportunity of extending its influence, by the disposal of great numbers of new commissions. By this plan every family that is burdened with a relation whose vices have ruined his fortune, or whose stupidity disqualifies him for employment, will have an opportunity of selling, for a commission, its interest at the approaching election; dependence will be propagated, and the troublesome spirit of liberty be depressed.

      To little purpose will it be objected, that soldiers and officers will be equally ignorant, that discipline is not infused instantaneously, that a military dress will not make a soldier, that men can only know their duty by instruction, and that nothing is to be hoped from ploughmen and manufacturers, commanded by schoolboys. The success of the expedition is not so much considered by those who have the direction of the levies, as that of the election, and while they keep their posts, they are very little concerned about the affairs of America.

      In defence of this method, it has, indeed, been affirmed, that it was preferred by the duke of MARLBOROUGH; but we are not informed to whom, or upon what occasion he declared his opinion, and, therefore, are left at liberty to doubt, whether his authority is not produced for a method which he did not approve, or approved only at some particular time for some extraordinary service.

      It is urged, that he recommended it by his practice, and that his success is a sufficient proof that his practice was founded upon right maxims. But if it be remembered what was, in that time, the method of obtaining commissions, and who it was that had the disposal of them, it will appear not absolutely certain, that his practice ought to be produced as a decisive proof of his opinion.

      If the success of troops be properly urged as an argument for the form of their establishment, may not the victories of prince Eugene afford a proof, equally convincing, that a few officers are sufficient? And if the arguments which arise from success are equal on both sides, ought not the necessity of saving the publick money to turn the balance?

      War, sir, is in its own nature a calamity very grievous to the most powerful and flourishing people, and to a trading nation is particularly destructive, as it at once exhausts our wealth, and interrupts our commerce, at once drinks up the stream and chokes up the fountain. In those countries whose affairs are wholly transacted within their own frontiers, where there is either very little money, or where their wealth is dug out of their own mines, they are only weakened by the loss of men, or by the diminution of their dominions, and, in general, can only suffer by being overcome.

      But the state of Britain is far different; it is not necessary to our ruin that an enemy should be stronger than ourselves, that he should be able to pour armies into our country, to cover the sea with fleets, to burn our villages by incursions, or destroy our fortresses with bombs; for he that can secure his own dominions from our attacks, to which nothing but distance and some advantages of situation are necessary, may support a war against us, and he that can fit out privateers to interrupt our trade, may, without obtaining a victory, reduce us to distress.

      Our situation, sir, as it preserves us from the danger of an invasion, except from that powerful monarch, the pretender, who is, indeed, always to be dreaded, has, likewise, the effect of securing other nations from being invaded by us; for it is very difficult to transport in one fleet, and to land at one time, a number sufficient to force their way into a country where the ports are fortified, and the inhabitants in arms.

      Our wars, sir, are, therefore, to be determined by naval battles, and those nations have very little to fear from us who have no trade to be disturbed, and no navies to be destroyed; if they can only fit out cruisers, which may always be done by granting commissions to foreign adventurers, they may ruin our merchants by captures, exhaust the nation by the necessity of convoys, and give neutral traders an opportunity of establishing their credit at those markets which have been, hitherto, supplied by our manufactures.

      This is, indeed, far from being at present an exact account of the state of Spain, whose wide-extended dominions are liable to insults, and from whom many of her most wealthy provinces may be torn without great hazard or difficulty. The particular state of her commerce, which, being only carried on from one part of her dominions to another, can only be for a time interrupted, but is in no danger of being invaded by any rival, or lost by disuse, at least requires our consideration, and we ought to make war with the utmost frugality, against a people whom no hostilities can really impoverish, whose commerce may be said to lie at rest rather than to be shackled, as it will rise into greater vigour at the end of the war, and whose treasures, though the want СКАЧАТЬ