The Russian Totalitarianism. Freedom here and now. Dmitrii Shusharin

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      For eight years, the government has implemented a degrading model of the transformation of society, the state, and the economy. The national consciousness was deformed. Ahead was the creation of a new quasi-state entity. All these were, however, words, words, words. But Putin was not and is not the sole ruler who does not need any contracts and agreements with the elites. Therefore, Putin’s plan assumed a further consolidation of the elites, not a war with them. Proposals of the authors from Zavtra and Victor Cherkesov, who lost the status of a person close to the sovereign, did not pass at that time. There was no third term. instead a scheme was invented with tandemocracy and a gambit called Medvedev’s thaw.

      Another thing was the outside world. In November 2007, I came up with a conclusion:

      “Serious, heavy, large-scale conflict with the whole world is inevitable. The beginning of this conflict may be the aggression of Russia against one of the countries of the post-Soviet space.”49

      Waht

      The antique word “thaw” has entered the current political vocabulary and did not repel anyone by its archaic origin. Yes, indeed, a new thaw, just like that, you know, somehow, we expect to get some new little liberties, in hope of fame and bliss to come… Anatolyevich’s days were a wonderful beginning. Such sentiments surfaced with Medvedev’s ascent to the presidency.

      It was just not clear what was to be unfrozen and for what purpose. Under Khrushchev, everything was clear. With a second thaw, when the frozen was melted again, and it naturally turned out to be unsuitable for consumption, no one really suffered from misunderstanding. And in 2008 – what? Why the situation in 2008 had to be described in terms of a completely different era, even epochs, because the word “thaw” in its political significance is more than fifty years old, and “Gorbachevism” is not even twenty-five? And why no one wanted to recall perestroika with glasnost? Those words are much younger.

      I can clearly see why. “Thaw” did not compel anyone to anything, it was not officially proclaimed, Khrushchev did not use that word. This phenomenon was something incomprehensible, a historical something that was, but it was not. It didn’t look like a historical event, which had a creator, an actor and passive objects of its impact, but rather a natural occurrence. The wind was blowing, now it’s calm… it’s been warm, and now it’s freezing. The Lord giveth, the Lord taketh away. Thaw, a remarkably convenient word. But Gorbachev articulated “perestroika”, “glasnost” and “new thinking” all by himself. As for the word “thaw” … Well, Ilya Ehrenburg coined it. Reading his novel with this title makes you wonder how could that happen. But the word caught on. It turned out to be rather vague, so it caught on.

      Although, of course, there is a similarity between the thaw and perestroika, yes, indeed, there is. In some important circumstances, but not in the results. The circumstances are as follows:

      • expansion of publicly discussed topics and socio-political lexicon;

      • changing the status of the first person of the state (party);

      • Significant changes in the external positioning of the country.

      Expansion of publicly discussed topics and socio-political lexicon. That is true to both Khrushchev and Gorbachev times. But what there was to be expanded under Medvedev? There was no unified, clichéd, openly or unofficially sanctioned language for describing reality.

      Changing the status of the first person of the state (party). Dmitry Medvedev had only one way to gain real power: decisive political and economic liberalization and democratization. But there were no grounds for speculating about Dmitry Medvedev’s dissatisfaction with anything. That he wanted more and sought to get rid of the influential surrounding. That he was interested in the fate of the Russian statehood and the presidency institution.

      And the last, significant changes in the external positioning of the country. Here, by the way, it’s not so simple with the thaw. Khrushchev’s doctrine of peaceful coexistence was in fact a form of expansion, especially in the third world. But expansion can also be interpreted as a way out of isolation. Let’s just say that unlike Stalin’s extra watchful attitude and Brezhnev’s detente, designed to consolidate borders in Europe and a certain level of armaments, the Khrushchev and Gorbachev periods in foreign policy were marked by increased dynamism.

      However, unlike the “thaw” and perestroika, the successes of diplomacy were and continue to be evaluated not by the ability to turn enemies into friends, but, on the contrary, by the ability to acquire enemies. Especially in the post-Soviet space. What kind of a “thaw” happened under Medvedev, whose presidency was marked by the Golden-Horde style raid on Georgia, with subsequent occupation of part of its territory and recognition of the separatist formations as states.

      There were no observable prerequisites either for the “thaw” or for perestroika. Neither external nor internal. The external circumstances of both phenomena make both of these terms out of date and inapplicable to Medvedev’s rule.

      The impact of the 1956 anti-Stalin report was due to its congruence with the mood that already existed in society after the war. Or rather – with the realization that the actor and mover of history is not only the leader, not only the power. A change of perception has occurred not only in culture, but also in the mass consciousness, bringing to a focus man as the subject of history. This shift in thinking made the thaw possible to occur so sudden and explains the bright flash in culture, literature, art, which marked that era.

      In this respect, the Khrushchev thaw is the direct opposite to the technological fetishism of Medvedev’s few years of presidency, which were the years of deliberate depersonalization of social activity, that is, a thaw in reverse. And there is a simple explanation to it.

      Gradually it became clear that the “medvedians” are those who are going to milk the modernization budgets, take superior position in innovative agencies, and control foreign contacts in the field of high-tech and possible foreign investments in this sphere. Pretty soon it became apparent that they are not interested in any political modernization, and even see it harmful for them. As described by Vladislav Surkov in February 2010, the separate development of innovative industries50 meant further atomization of society, isolation of those engaged in these industries, creating a super elite as opposed to what was formed in previous years on the basis of the raw material economy and the military-industrial complex. This particular elites from the very beginning were taking root abroad, and not only and not so much within the country.

      But the former elite did not allow anything like this, the innovative captains did not get to sail free. Such a forecast was made already then, and it has fully come true51. More precisely, this is about capitals, not the captains. Putin did not let go. His priorities have been defined long before, no doubt about it. Indeed, the model of a separate development of innovative industries, in essence, was anti-modernization. This is just a scheme for rent-seeking behavior accessing budgetary and prospective private investments, including foreign ones. All the activities of the state were aimed at blocking the private initiative.

      Both the thaw and perestroika were accompanied by true soul-searching and a reassessment of values. During the years of Medvedev’s rule, nothing close to it was detected. Meanwhile, it has become increasingly clear what needs to be done to change the vector of the country’s evolution. I took the trouble СКАЧАТЬ