The Russian Totalitarianism. Freedom here and now. Dmitrii Shusharin

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СКАЧАТЬ agenda. In other words, for each wave of activity of oppositional-minded citizens, there appeared their own pro-governmental or patriotic social movements ready to respond to it with violence. In 2012, many attacks were aimed against those dissatisfied over conviction of Pussy Riot, a group who performed a “punk prayer” in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior. Those who expressed support for the LGBT community in connection with the adoption of the homophobic law banning the promotion of homosexuality were attacked in 2013 by the Orthodox activists.

      The authors of the CEPR study attributed the increase in the number of attacks on oppositionists in 2014 to the aggravation of the domestic political situation amid the events in Ukraine and protests in this regard.

      It was the time when the organizations that support “Novorossia” with their anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western rhetoric became more active. Finally, during the entire period under review, outbreaks of aggression, especially in the regions, were observed during election campaigns.

      Many cases of violence are associated with specific political actions. Among them was a series of attacks on activists in the framework of the Peace March against the Russian policy towards Ukraine in the spring and autumn of 2014. Similar bursts of violence occurred on the eve of the anti-crisis “Spring” march in February 2015, amidst the commemorative actions in 2015 and 2016 with reference to Boris Nemtsov assassination, as well as the anniversary of the May 6 Bolotnaya Square protest rally.

      Approximately 25% of attacks are related to the electoral process. In the period of election campaigns there are attacks on candidates, observers, agitators, campaign headquarters, as well as participants in the pre-election meetings. For example, in September 2015, an attack was carried out on the Communist party candidate for the governors of the Irkutsk region Sergei Levchenko and Olga Antyukhina, the Just Russia candidate for deputies of the Kaluga legislative assembly. In November 2014 unknown people beat up Arkady Chaplygin, the leader of the Progress Party St. Petersburg branch.

      Another 25% of attacks are associated with specific problems of the local agenda. Most often, these are incidents involving environmental or urban preservation initiatives. Journalists are attacked over their local anti-corruption investigations.

      In 2012—2015, only 5—10% of attacks were committed against oppositionists and public figures with a federal level of prominence. In 2016, this share rose to almost 20%. The authors of the CEPR report attribute this to the activities of Alexei Navalny and Mikhail Kasyanov, who announced the nomination of the Democratic Alliance to the State Duma.

      Nevertheless, until now most of the attacks have been carried out against ordinary protesters, candidates for elections, members of the party and regional movements, urban preservationists, human rights defenders, environmentalists, etc. Representatives of systemic opposition parties are attacked mostly only in connection with the elections.

      Another 15% of incidents are attacks on journalists, with the largest share of such cases recorded in 2014. So, in May 2016, Oleg Kunitsyn, deputy editor of Vologda newspaper Minuta Istiny was wounded with a pistol shot by unknown assailants. In March 2016 in Kaliningrad, Igor Rudnikov, the editor of Noviye Kolesa and the deputy of the Duma was assaulted by unknown people with knives.

      In approximately 80% of the cases the attackers are unidentified persons or people without a clear connection with a particular agency. Much of the attacks (especially violent ones) are carried out by unknown persons in building entrances or on the street near the victim’s house. In such cases, one can only make assumptions about political motives and the mastermind. Sometimes employees of private security companies involved in the attacks (about 5—6% of cases for the period under investigation). These people usually attack environmental or urban preservation activists, if their protests affect someone’s commercial interests.

      However, in recent years, the percentage of attacks on oppositionists by activists openly acting on behalf of their organizations has been growing. Since 2012, this share has almost doubled, to 22% in 2016.

      These organizations represent different kind of “protective” movements of diehard conservatives. The CEPR report mentions National Liberation Movement, Yevgeny Fedorov, the United Russia deputy, Cossack associations, Orthodox organizations (Union of Orthodox Citizens, People’s Council, Sorok Sorokov), and the SERB organization.

      CEPR experts note that the era of confrontation between Nashi (“Our Guys”) movement or similar pro-Kremlin youth organizations and the opposition is a thing of the past. Nashi was replaced by new organizations: less centralized, not so obviously connected with the authorities, but acting with its tacit approval. The pro-government attackers “Nascists” (in the oppositionists’ lingo) have been replaced with Nodovtsy (National Liberation Movement) and the “anti-Maidan” crowd.

      According to the CEPR report, almost two-thirds of cases of violence against the opposition are carried out by direct physical impact. Attackers often use weapons that not only can cause severe damage to health, but also kill: knives, brass knuckles, clubs, iron bars, pipes, etc. Sometimes they resort to firearms and traumatic weapons.

      In addition to the murder of Boris Nemtsov in 2012—2016, there were several more attacks on the opposition with letal outcome.

      Igor Sapatov, who fought against abuse of protected environmental zones, was shot dead in July 2013 in the Kamsk-Ustinsky district of Tatarstan. In November 2013, in Nizhny Novgorod, the oppositionist Nikolai Savinov was beaten to death. On February 9, 2012, the anti-fascist Nikita Kalin, a member of the Fair Elections movement, was killed in Samara.

      Victims of violence are often seriously injured. For example, in April 2015, during the elections in Balashikha, Stanislav Pozdnyakov and Dmitry Nesterov the Golos (Russian word both for Vote and Voice) observers were beaten by eight unknown persons. The attack occurred after the ballot stuffing was found out by the observers. Folowing the attack, Pozdnyakov had his spleen surgically removed. In June 2015, in Magadan, unidentified men attacked Navalny’s supporter Dmitri Taralov and knocked his teeth out. Approximately 10—15% of cases of attack entail damage and destruction of property: burned cars, broken windows, etc. Another 20% of cases are associated with intimidation, insults, and lesser physical effects.

      About 35% of all recorded attacks on the opposition occurred in Moscow or St. Petersburg, the rest in the regions. In St. Petersburg, two peaks of violence were identified: in 2014 and 2016. In 2014 it was due to the election and aggravated situation in Ukraine; and in 2016 following the publication of a blacklist of Whoiswho social network users.

      Since most of the attacks are carried out by unknown persons and outside of public places, the police cannot prevent these incidents for objective reasons. However, when an attack occurs in public places or directly under police supervision (for example, in protest actions), law enforcement officers often turn a blind eye to the actions of obvious provocateurs.

      CEPR experts note that often in the event of conflicts at public events, the police detain representatives of both sides of the conflict. And sometimes, as a result, the attackers who provoked the conflict are quickly released, but it is the victims of the attack who are accused of wrongdoing.

      As noted in the CEPR report, cases of attacks on oppositionists are usually qualified as hooliganism or as violence with no specific motive of hatred, even when the facts indicate it. In most cases, if the legal proceedings are initiated, the investigation is delayed, and the responsibility for the attack shifted entirely on the executors, but not the organizers.

      When prosecuting oppositionists themselves, investigators, in their turn, often bring cases under extremist СКАЧАТЬ