Network Forensics. Messier Ric

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СКАЧАТЬ of Custody

      Sometimes it seems as though TV shows like NCIS, CSI, Bones, and others that portray forensics simultaneously advance and set back the field of forensics. Although some of the technical aspects of forensics, including the language, are ridiculous, these shows do sometimes get things right. This was especially true in the early days of NCIS, as an example, where everything they collected was bagged and tagged. If evidence is handed off from one person to another, it must be documented. This documentation is the chain of custody. Evidence should be kept in a protected and locked location if you are going to be presenting any of it in court. Though this may be less necessary if you are involved in investigating an incident on a corporate network, it's still a good habit. For a start, as noted earlier in this chapter, you never know when the event you are investigating may turn from a localized incident to something where legal proceedings are required. As an example, the very first well-known distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack in February 2000 appeared as a number of separate incidents to the companies involved. However, when it came time to prosecute Michael Calce, known as Mafiaboy, the FBI would have needed evidence and that evidence would have come from the individual companies who were targets of the attacks – Yahoo, Dell, Amazon, and so on.

      Even in the case of investigating a network incident in a business setting, documenting the chain of custody is a good strategy. This ensures that you know who was handling the potential evidence at any given time. It provides for accountability and a history. If anything were to go wrong at any point, including loss of or damage to the evidence, you would have a historical record of who was handling the evidence and why they had it.

      Keeping a record of the date and time for handing off the evidence as well as who is taking responsibility for it and what they intend to do with it is a good chain-of-custody plan. It doesn't take a lot of time and it can be very important. As always, planning can be the key to success, just as lack of planning can be the doorway to failure. The first time you lose a disk drive or have it corrupted and that drive had been handed around to multiple people, you will recognize the importance of audit logs like chain-of-custody documentation. Ideally, you would perform a hash when you first obtain the evidence to ensure that what you are getting is exactly what you expect it to be. You should have a hash value documented so you will have something to compare your hash to in order to demonstrate that no changes have occurred.

      Incident Response

      Incident response may be harder to get your head around if you are a forensic practitioner. If you are a system or network administrator trying to get your hands around the idea of forensics, incident response should be old hat to you. When networks belonging to businesses or other organizations (schools, non-profits, governmental, and so on) are subject to a malware infestation, as an example, that would probably trigger an incident response team to get the incident under control as well as investigate the cause of the incident. Depending on who you talk to you may get different answers, but the process of incident response can be boiled down to four stages: preparation; detection and analysis; containment, eradication, and recovery; and post-incident activity.

      What exactly is an incident? How does an incident differ from an event? This is another area where you may find that you get differing opinions depending on whom you talk to. Rather than getting into a deep discussion here, let's go with simple. An event is a change that has been detected in a system. This could be something as simple as plugging an external drive into a system. That will trigger a log message in most cases. That would be an event. Someone attempting to ping a system behind a firewall where the messages are blocked and logged may be an event. An event may even be updating system software, as in the case with a hot fix or a service pack.

      An incident, on the other hand, is commonly something that is attributable to human interaction and is often malicious. An incident is always an event, because every incident would result in some sort of observable change to the system. If all of your web servers were infected by malware, that malware would be observable on the system. It would result in events on all of the systems and you would have an incident on your hands. A single system being infected with malware would be an event but wouldn't be enough to rise to a level where you would call an incident response team.

      A forensic practitioner would obviously be necessary at the detection and analysis phase but they would typically be involved in the preparation stage as well. Over the course of the book, we will be going over some items that you may want to make sure are in place as an organization goes through preparation stages. Preparation is a very large category of activities, including planning, but from the standpoint of a forensic investigator, it is primarily when you make sure you will have what you need when it comes to doing an analysis. There may also be activity when it comes to eradication, to ensure that the source of the incident has been completely removed. Finally, a forensic investigator would be involved in post-incident activities for lessons learned and process improvement.

      In most cases, you would have an incident response team, even if it is small and ad hoc, to deal with incidents because handling incidents is a process. The larger the organization and the more systems involved, the larger the incident response team would likely be. Creating a team up front would be another important activity when it comes to planning. Your organization, as part of the creation of security policies, standards, and processes, should create an incident response team or at least have documentation for how to handle an incident, should one occur. Considering that it's widely believed that a significant proportion of companies in the United States have been breached, meaning they have had attackers compromise systems to gain unauthorized access, “should one occur” is a bit euphemistic. In reality, I should say when an incident occurs. If you haven't had to deal with an incident, it may simply be a result of lack of appropriate detection capabilities.

      Forensic practitioners are definitely needed as part of the incident response effort. They need not be full-time forensic practitioners, but simply people already employed at the company who happen to have the knowledge and skills necessary to perform a forensic investigation. They can get to the root cause of an incident, and that requires someone who can dig through filesystems and logs and look in other places within the operating system on the affected hosts.

      Without understanding the root cause, it would be difficult to say whether the incident is under control. It would also be difficult to know whether you have found all of the systems that may be impacted because incidents, like unauthorized system access or malware infestations, will commonly impact multiple devices across a network. This is especially true when there is a large commonality in system deployments. In other words, if all systems are created from the same source image, they will all be vulnerable in the same way. Once an attacker finds a way into one, all of the others that have been built using the same image are easy targets.

      The forensic investigator will need to be focused on identifying the source of the attack, whether it's a system compromise or a malware infection, to determine what may need to be addressed to make sure a subsequent, similar attack isn't successful. They will also need to be focused on finding any evidence that the attacker attempted to compromise or infect other hosts on the local network. If there is evidence of attempts against systems not on the organization's network, the incident response team should have the capability to reach out to other organizations, including a computer emergency response team (CERT) that may be able to coordinate attacks across multiple organizations.

      This is where you may run into the need for the collected artifacts in a larger investigation and potential criminal action. Coordinating with law enforcement will help you, as a forensic investigator, determine your best course of action if there is evidence of either substantial damage or evidence that the attack involves multiple organizations. This is another area where planning is helpful – determining points of contact for local and federal law enforcement ahead of time for when an incident occurs.

      The Need for Network Forensic Practitioners

      In early 2016, a task force was assembled СКАЧАТЬ