The Life of John Marshall, Volume 3: Conflict and construction, 1800-1815. Beveridge Albert Jeremiah

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СКАЧАТЬ and was sure that we could not govern, Louisiana, and he actually prepared amendments authorizing the incorporation into the Republic of the purchased territory.406 No such legal mistiness dimmed the eyes of John Marshall who, in time, was to announce as the decision of the Supreme Court that the Republic could acquire territory with as much right as any monarchical government.407

      To add to his perturbations, the high priest of popular rights found himself compelled to abandon his adored phrase, "the consent of the governed," upon which he had so carefully erected the structure of his popularity, and to drive through Congress a form of government over the people of Louisiana without consulting their wishes in the least.408

      The Jeffersonian doctrine had been that the Union was merely a compact between sovereign States, and that new territory and alien peoples could not be added to it without the consent of all the partners. The Federalists now took their stand upon this indefensible ground,409 and openly threatened the secession at which they had hinted when the Federalist Judiciary Act was repealed.

      Jefferson was alive to the danger: "Whatever Congress shall think it necessary to do [about Louisiana]," he cautioned one of the Republican House leaders, "should be done with as little debate as possible."410 A month earlier he wrote: "The Constitution has made no provision for our holding foreign territory, still less for incorporating foreign nations into our Union. The Executive … have done an act beyond the Constitution."411

      Therefore, he declared, "the less we say about constitutional difficulties respecting Louisiana the better … What is necessary for surmounting them must be done sub-silentio."412 The great radical favored publicity in affairs of state only when such a course was helpful to his political plans. On other occasions no autocrat was ever more secretive than Thomas Jefferson.413 Seemingly, however, the President was concerned only with his influence on the destiny of the world.414

      At first the Federalist leaders were too dazed to do more than grumble. "The cession of Louisiana … is like selling us a Ship after she is surrounded by a British Fleet," shrewdly observed George Cabot, when the news was published in Boston.415 Fisher Ames, of course, thought that "the acquiring of territory by money is mean and despicable," especially when done by Republicans. "The less of it [territory] the better… By adding an unmeasured world beyond that river [Mississippi], we rush like a comet into infinite space."416

      Soon, however, their dissatisfaction blew into flame the embers of secession which never had become cold in their bosoms. "I am convinced," wrote Uriah Tracy, "that the accession of Louisiana will accelerate a division of these States; whose whenabouts is uncertain, but somewhen is inevitable."417 Senator Plumer thought that the Eastern States should form a new nation: "Adopt this western world into the Union," he said, "and you destroy at once the weight and importance of the Eastern States, and compel them to establish a separate and independent empire."418 A few days' reflection brought Ames to the conclusion that "our country is too big for union, too sordid for patriotism, too democratic for liberty."419 Tapping Reeve of Connecticut made careful inquiry among the Federalists in his vicinity and informed Tracy that "all … believe that we must separate, and that this is the most favorable moment."420

      Louisiana, however, was not the only motive of the foremost New England Federalists for their scheme of breaking up the Republic. As we have seen, the threat of secession was repeatedly made during the Republican assault on the Judiciary; and now, as a fundamental cause for disunion, the Northern Federalists speedily harked back to Jefferson's purpose of subverting the National courts. The Republicans were ruling the Nation, Virginia was ruling the Republicans, Jefferson was ruling all. Louisiana would permanently turn the balance against the Northern and Eastern States, already outweighed in the National scales; and the conquest of the National Judiciary would remove from that section its last protection against the pillaging hands of the Huns and Vandals of Republicanism. So reasoned the Federalists.

      What could be done to save the rights and the property of "the wise, the rich and the good"? By what pathway could the chosen escape their doom? "The principles of our Revolution point to the remedy," declared the soured and flint-hearted Pickering. "The independence of the judges is now directly assailed… I am not willing to be sacrificed by such popular tyrants… I do not believe in the practicability of a long-continued union."421

      For the same reasons, Roger Griswold of Connecticut avowed that "there can be no safety to the Northern States without a separation from the confederacy."422 The Reverend Jedediah Morse of New Hampshire wrote Senator Plumer that "our empire … must … break in pieces. Some think the sooner the better."423 And the New Hampshire Senator replied: "I hope the time is not far distant when … the sound part will separate from the corrupt."424

      With the exception of John Adams, only one eminent New England Federalist kept his head steady and his patriotism undefiled: George Cabot, while sympathizing with his ancient party friends, frankly opposed their mad project. Holding that secession was impracticable, he declared: "I am not satisfied that the thing itself is to be desired. My habitual opinions have been always strongly against it."425

      But the expressions of such men as Pickering, Ames, and Griswold indicated the current of New England Federalist thought and comment. Their secession sentiment, however, did not appeal to the young men, who hailed with joy the opportunity to occupy these new, strange lands which accident, or Providence, or Jefferson had opened to them. Knowledge of this was indeed one cause of the anger of some Federalist managers who owned immense tracts in New England and in the Ohio Valley and wanted them purchased and settled by those now turning their eyes to the alluring farther western country.426 They saw with something like fury the shifting of political power to the South and West.

      The management of the unwelcome Louisiana windfall, the conduct of the National campaign, the alarming reports from New England, left Jefferson no time to rail at Marshall or to attack that "subtle corps of sappers and miners" who were then beginning "to undermine … our confederated fabric," as Jefferson declared seventeen years later.427 For the present the great public duty of exposing Marshall's decision in Marbury vs. Madison must be deferred.

      But the mills of democracy were grinding, and after he was reëlected certain impeachments would be found in the grist that would make all right. The defiant Marshall would at least be humbled, perhaps – probably – removed from office. But all in good time! For the present Jefferson had other work to do. He himself must now exercise powers which, according to his philosophy and declarations, were far beyond those conferred upon him by the Constitution.

      So it came about that the first of Marshall's great Constitutional opinions received scant notice at the time of its delivery. The newspapers had little to say about it. Even the bench and the bar of the country, at least in the sections remote from Washington, appear not to have heard of it,428 or, if they had, to have forgotten it amid the thrilling events that filled the СКАЧАТЬ