The Life of John Marshall (Volume 2 of 4). Beveridge Albert Jeremiah
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СКАЧАТЬ to make treaties was placed solely on Marshall's shoulders. The Federalists considered his argument a conclusive demonstration. Carrington wrote Washington that "on the point of constitutionality many conversions were acknowledged."383 He was mistaken; the Republicans were not impressed. On the contrary, they thought that the treaty "was much less ably defended than opposed."384

      The Republicans had been very much alarmed over Marshall and especially feared the effect of one clever move. "John Marshall," wrote Jefferson's son-in-law from Richmond to the Republican commander in Monticello, "it was once apprehended would make a great number of converts by an argument which cannot be considered in any other light than an uncandid artifice. To prevent what would be a virtual censure of the President's conduct he maintained that the treaty in all its commercial parts was still under the power of the H.[ouse] of R.[epresentatives]."385

      Marshall, indeed, did make the most of this point. It was better, said he, and "more in the spirit of the constitution" for the National House to refuse support after ratification than to have a treaty "stifled in embryo" by the House passing upon it before ratification. "He compared the relation of the Executive and the Legislative department to that between the states and the Congress under the old confederation. The old Congress might have given up the right of laying discriminating duties in favor of any nation by treaty; it would never have thought of taking beforehand the assent of each state thereto. Yet, no one would have pretended to deny the power of the states to lay such [discriminating duties]."386

      Such is an unfriendly report of this part of Marshall's effort which, wrote Jefferson's informant, "is all that is original in his argument. The sophisms of Camillus, & the nice distinctions of the Examiner made up the rest."387 Marshall's position was that a "treaty is as completely a valid and obligatory contract when negotiated by the President and ratified by him, with the assent and advice of the Senate, as if sanctioned by the House of Representatives also, under a constitution requiring such sanction"; and he admitted only that the powers of the House in reference to a treaty were limited to granting or refusing appropriations to carry it into effect.388

      But as a matter of practical tactics to get votes, Marshall appears to have put this in the form of an assertion – no matter what treaty the President and Senate made, the House held the whip hand, he argued, and in the end, could do what it liked; why then unnecessarily affront and humiliate Washington by applauding the Virginia Senators for their vote against the treaty? This turn of Marshall's, thought the Republicans, "was brought forward for the purpose of gaining over the unwary & wavering. It has never been admitted by the writers in favor of the treaty to the northward."389

      But neither Marshall's unanswerable argument on the treaty-making power, nor his cleverness in holding up the National House of Representatives as the final arbiter, availed anything. The Federalists offered an amendment affirming that the President and Senate "have a right to make" a treaty; that discussion of a treaty in a State Legislature, "except as to its constitutionality," was unnecessary; and that the Legislature could not give "any mature opinion upon the conduct of the Senators from Virginia … without a full investigation of the treaty." They were defeated by a majority of 46 out of a total of 150 members present and voting; John Marshall voting for the amendment.390 On the main resolution proposed by the Republicans the Federalists lost two votes and were crushed by a majority of two to one; Marshall, of course, voting with the minority.391

      Carrington hastily reported to Washington that though "the discussion has been an able one on the side of the Treaty," yet, "such was the apprehension that a vote in its favor would be unpopular, that argument was lost"; and that, notwithstanding many members were convinced by Marshall's constitutional argument, "obligations of expediency" held them in line against the Administration. The sanguine Carrington assured the President, however, that "during the discussion there has been preserved a decided respect for & confidence in you."392

      But alas again for the expectations of sanguinity! The Republican resolution was, as Jefferson's son-in-law had reported to the Republican headquarters at Monticello, "a virtual censure of the President's conduct." This was the situation at the close of the day's debate. Realizing it, as the night wore on, Washington's friends determined to relieve the President of this implied rebuke by the Legislature of his own State. The Republicans had carried their point; and surely, thought Washington's supporters, the Legislature of Virginia would not openly affront the greatest of all Americans, the pride of the State, and the President of the Nation.

      Infatuated imagination! The next morning the friends of the Administration offered a resolution that Washington's "motives" in approving the treaty met "the entire approbation of this House"; and that Washington, "for his great abilities, wisdom and integrity merits and possesses the undiminished confidence of his country." The resolution came near passing. But some lynx-eyed Republican discovered in the nick of time the word "wisdom."393 That would never do. The Republicans, therefore, offered an amendment "that this House do entertain the highest sense of the integrity and patriotism of the President of the United States; and that while they approve of the vote of the Senators of this State" on the treaty, "they in no wise censure the motives which influenced him in his [Washington's] conduct thereupon."394

      The word "wisdom" was carefully left out. Marshall, Lee, and the other Federalists struggled hard to defeat this obnoxious amendment; but the Republicans overwhelmed them by a majority of 33 out of a total of 145 voting, Marshall, of course, casting his vote against it.395

      In worse plight than ever, Washington's friends moved to amend the Republican amendment by resolving: "That the President of the United States, for his great abilities, wisdom, and integrity, merits and possesses the undiminished confidence of this House." But even this, which omitted all reference to the treaty and merely expressed confidence in Washington's "abilities, wisdom, and integrity," was beaten by a majority of 20 out of a total of 138 voting.396

      As soon as Jefferson got word of Marshall's support of Washington's Administration in the Legislature, he poured out his dislike which had long been distilling: —

      "Though Marshall will be able to embarras [sic] the republican party in the assembly a good deal," wrote Jefferson to Madison, "yet upon the whole his having gone into it will be of service. He has been, hitherto, able to do more mischief acting under the mask of Republicanism than he will be able to do after throwing it plainly off. His lax lounging manners have made him popular with the bulk of the people of Richmond; & a profound hypocrisy, with many thinking men of our country. But having come forth in the plenitude of his English principles the latter will see that it is high time to make him known."397

      Such was Jefferson's inability to brook any opposition, and his readiness to ascribe improper motives to any one having views different from his own. So far from Marshall's having cloaked his opinions, he had been and was imprudently outspoken in avowing them. Frankness was as much a part of Marshall's mental make-up as his "lax, lounging manners" were a part of his physical characteristics. Of all the men of the period, not one was cleaner of hypocrisy than he. From Patrick Henry in his early life onward to his associates on the bench at the end of his days the testimony as to Marshall's open-mindedness is uniform and unbroken.

      With the possible exception of Giles and Roane, Jefferson appears to have been the only СКАЧАТЬ



<p>383</p>

Carrington to Washington, Nov. 20, 1795; MS., Lib. Cong.

<p>384</p>

Randolph to Jefferson, Nov. 22, 1795; Works: Ford, viii, footnote to 197.

<p>385</p>

Randolph to Jefferson, Nov. 22, 1795; Works: Ford, viii, footnote to 197.

<p>386</p>

Ib.

<p>387</p>

Ib. See Hamilton's dissertation on the treaty-making power in numbers 36, 37, 38, of his "Camillus"; Works: Lodge, vi, 160-97.

<p>388</p>

Marshall to Hamilton, April 25, 1796; Works: Hamilton, vi, 109.

<p>389</p>

Randolph to Jefferson, Nov. 22, 1795; Works: Ford, viii, 198.

<p>390</p>

Journal, H.D. (Nov. 20, 1795), 27-28.

<p>391</p>

Journal, H.D. (Nov. 20, 1795), 28.

<p>392</p>

Carrington to Washington, Nov. 20, 1795; MS., Lib. Cong.

<p>393</p>

The italics are mine. "The word 'wisdom' in expressing the confidence of the House in the P.[resident] was so artfully introduced that if the fraudulent design had not been detected in time the vote of the House, as to its effect upon the P. would have been entirely done away… A resolution so worded as to acquit the P. of all evil intention, but at the same time silently censuring his error, was passed by a majority of 33." (Letter of Jefferson's son-in-law, enclosed by Jefferson to Madison; Works: Ford, viii, footnote to 198.)

<p>394</p>

Journal, H.D. (Nov. 21, 1795), 29.

<p>395</p>

Ib.

<p>396</p>

Journal, H.D. (Nov. 21, 1795), 29.

<p>397</p>

Jefferson to Madison, Nov. 26, 1795; Works: Ford, viii, 197-98.