A Christian Directory, Part 4: Christian Politics. Richard Baxter
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СКАЧАТЬ have a call and opportunity, (as their pastors,) to tell them wisely and submissively of those sins which are the greatest enemies to their souls; and not the smallest enemies to their government, and the public peace.82 All christians will confess, that sin is the only forfeiture of God's protection, and the cause of his displeasure, and consequently the only danger to the soul, and the greatest enemy to the land. And that the sins of rulers, whether personal, or in their government, have a far more dangerous influence upon the public state, than the sins of other men. Yea, the very sins which upon true repentance may be pardoned as to the everlasting punishment, may yet be unpardoned as to the public ruin of a state: as the sad instance of Manasseh showeth. 2 Kings xxiii. 26, "Notwithstanding the Lord turned not from the fierceness of his great wrath, wherewith his anger was kindled against Judah, because of all the provocations that Manasseh had provoked him withal." Chap. xxiv. 3, 4, "Surely at the commandment of the Lord came this upon Judah, to remove them out of his sight for the sins of Manasseh according to all that he did; and also for the innocent blood that he shed, (for he filled Jerusalem with innocent blood,) which the Lord would not pardon." And yet this was after Josiah had reformed. So Solomon's sin did cause the rending of the ten tribes from his son's kingdom: yea, the bearing with the high places, was a provoking sin in kings, that otherwise were upright. Therefore sin being the fire in the thatch, the quenching of it must needs be an act of duty and fidelity to governors; and those that tempt them to it, or soothe and flatter them in it, are the greatest enemies they have. But yet it is not every man that must reprove a governor, but those that have a call and opportunity; nor must it be done by them imperiously, or reproachfully, or publicly to their dishonour, but privately, humbly, and with love, honour, reverence, and submissiveness.

      Object. But great men have great spirits, and are impatient of reproof, and I am not bound to that which will do no good, but ruin me.

      Answ. 1. It is an abuse of your superiors, to censure them to be so proud and brutish, as not to consider that they are the subjects of God, and have souls to save or lose, as well as others: will you judge so hardly of them before trial, as if they were far worse and foolisher than the poor, and take this abuse of them to be an excuse for your other sin? No doubt there are good rulers in the world, that will say to Christ's ministers, as the Prince Elector Palatine did to Pitiscus, charging him to tell him plainly of his faults, when he chose him to be the Pastor Aulicus.83

      2. How know you beforehand what success your words will have? Hath the word of God well managed no power? yea, to make even bad men good? Can you love your rulers, and yet give up their souls in despair, and all for fear of suffering by them?

      3. What if you do suffer in the doing of your duty? Have you not learned to serve God upon such terms as those? Or do you think it will prove it to be no duty, because it will bring suffering on you? These reasons savour not of faith.

      Direct. XXXV. Think not that it is unlawful to obey in every thing which is unlawfully commanded. It may in many cases be the subject's duty, to obey the magistrate who sinfully commandeth him. For all the magistrate's sins in commanding, do not enter into the matter or substance of the thing commanded: if a prince command me to do the greatest duty, in an ill design, to some selfish end, it is his sin so to command; but yet that command must be obeyed (to better ends). Nay, the matter of the command may be sinful in the commander, and not in the obeyer. If I be commanded without any just reason to hunt a feather, it is his sin that causelessly commandeth me so to lose my time; and yet it may be my sin to disobey it, while the thing is lawful; else servants and children must prove all to be needful, as well as lawful, which is commanded them before they must obey. Or the command may at the same time be evil by accident, and the obedience good by accident, and per se. Very good accidents, consequence, or effects, may belong to our obedience, when the accidents of the command itself are evil. I could give you abundance of instances of these things.

      Direct. XXXVI. Yet is not all to be obeyed that is evil but by accident, nor all to be disobeyed that is so: but the accidents must be compared; and if the obedience will do more good than harm, we must obey; if it will evidently do more harm than good, we must not do it. Most of the sins in the world are evil by accident only, and not in the simple act denuded of its accidents, circumstances, or consequents. You may not sell poison to him that you know would poison himself with it, though to sell poison of itself be lawful. Though it be lawful simply to lend a sword, yet not to a traitor that you know would kill the king with it, no nor to one that would kill his father, his neighbour, or himself. A command would not excuse such an act from sin.84 He was slain by David, that killed Saul at his own command, and if he had but lent him his sword to do it, it had been his sin. Yet some evil accidents may be weighed down by greater evils, which would evidently follow upon the not doing of the thing commanded.

      Direct. XXXVII. In the question, whether human laws bind conscience, the doubt is not of that nature, as to have necessary influence upon your practice. For all agree, that they bind the subject to obedience, and that God's law bindeth us to obey them. And if God's law bind us to obey man's law, and so to disobey them be materially a sin against God's law, this is as much as is needful to resolve you in respect of practice: no doubt, man's law hath no primitive obliging power at all, but a derivative from God, and under him; and what is it to bind the conscience (an improper speech) but to bind the person to judge it his duty, (conscire,) and so to do it. And no doubt but he is bound to judge it his duty, that that is immediately by human law, and remotely by divine law, and so the contrary to be a sin proximately against man, and ultimately against God. This is plain, and the rest is but logomachy.

      Direct. XXXVIII. The question is much harder, whether the violation of every human penal law be a sin against God, though a man submit to the penalty. (And the desert of every sin is death.) Master Richard Hooker's last book unhappily ended, before he gave us the full reason of his judgment in this case, these being the last words: "Howbeit, too rigorous it were, that the breach of every human law should be a deadly sin: a mean there is between those extremities, if so be we can find it out – ."85 Amesius hath diligently discussed it, and many others. The reason for the affirmative is, because God bindeth us to obey all the lawful commands of our governors; and suffering the penalty, is not obeying; the penalty being not the primary intention of the lawgiver, but the duty; and the penalty only to enforce the duty: and though the suffering of it satisfy man, it satisfieth not God, whose law we break by disobeying. Those that are for the negative, say, That God binding us but to obey the magistrate, and his law binding but aut ad obedientiam, aut ad pœnam, I fulfil his will, if I either do or suffer: if I obey not, I please him by satisfying for my disobedience. And it is none of his will, that my choosing the penalty should be my sin or damnation. To this it is replied, That the law bindeth ad pœnam, but on supposition of disobedience; and that disobedience is forbidden of God: and the penalty satisfieth not God, though it satisfy man. The other rejoins, That it satisfieth God, in that it satisfieth man; because God's law is but to give force to man's, according to the nature of it. If this hold, then no disobedience at all is a sin in him that suffereth the penalty. In so hard a case, because more distinction is necessary to the explication, than most readers are willing to be troubled with, I shall now give you but this brief decision.86 There are some penalties which fulfil the magistrate's own will as much as obedience, which indeed have more of the nature of a commutation, than of penalty: (as he that watcheth not or mendeth not the highways, shall pay so much to hire another to do it: he that shooteth not so oft in a year, shall pay so much: he that eateth flesh in Lent, shall pay so much to the poor: he that repaireth not his hedges, shall pay so much:) and so in most amercements, and divers penal laws; in which we have reason to judge, that the penalty satisfieth the lawgiver fully, and that he leaveth it to our choice. In these cases I think we need not afflict ourselves with the conscience or fear of sinning against God. But there are other penal laws, in which the penalty is not desired for itself, and is supposed to be but an imperfect satisfaction to the lawgiver's will, and that he doth not freely leave us to our choice, СКАЧАТЬ



<p>82</p>

Vetus est verumque dictum, Miser est imperator cui vera reticentur. Grotius de Imp. p. 245. Principi consule non dulciora, sed optima; is one of Solon's sentences in Laert. de Solon. Therefore it is a horrid villany of the Jesuits, which is expressed in Secret. Instruct. in Arcanis Jesuit. p. 5-8, 11. To indulge great men and princes in those opinions and sins which please them, and to be on that side that their liberty requireth to keep their favour to the society. So Maffæinus, 1. iii. c. 11. in vita ipsius Loyolæ. Alexander Severus so greatly hated flatterers, that Lampridius saith, Siquis caput flexisset aut blandius aliquid dixisset, uti adulator, vel abjiciebatur, si loci ejus qualitas pateretur; vel ridebatur ingeuti cachinno, si ejus dignitas graviori subjacere non posset injuriæ Venit ad Attilam post victoriam Marullus poeta ejus temporis egregius, compositumque in adulationem carmen recitavit: in quo ubi Attila per interpretem cognovit se Deum et Divina stirpe ortum vanissime prædicari, aspernatus sacrilegæ adulationis impudentiam, cum autore carmen exuri jusserat. A qua severitate subinde temperavit, ne scriptores cæteri a laudibus ipsius celebrandis terrerentur. Callimach. Exp. in Attila, p. 353.

<p>83</p>

Melch. Adam. in vit. Barth. Pitisci.

<p>84</p>

It was one of the Roman laws of the twelve tables, Justa imperia sunto, iisque cives modeste ac sine recusatione parento.

<p>85</p>

Eccl. Polit. lib. viii. p. 224.

<p>86</p>

On second thoughts this case is fullier opened afterward.