The Works of Sir Thomas Browne, Volume 1. Browne Thomas

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СКАЧАТЬ a Divine substance, by which he meant God, or his Anima mundi: and this he did, to the intent to establish this truth, That no mutation can befal the Divine Majesty, as it doth to things subject to generation and corruption; and that Plato there intended not to define or describe any species of duration: and they say that it is impossible to understand any such species of duration that is (according to the Authors expression) but one permanent point.

      Now that which those that follow Boetius urge against the other definition is, they say, it doth not at all difference Eternity from the nature of Time; for they say if it be composed of many Nunc's, or many instants, by the addition of one more it is still encreased; and by that means Infinity or Eternity is not included, nor ought more than Time. For this, see Mr. White, de dial. mundo, Dial. 3. Nod. 4.

       Indeed he only is, etc. ] This the Author infers from the words of God to Moses, I am that I am; and this to distinguish him from all others, who (he saith) have and shall be: but those that are learned in the Hebrew, do affirm that the words in that place (Exod. 3) do not signifie, Ego sum qui sum, et qui est, etc. but Ero qui ero, et qui erit, etc. vid Gassend. in animad. Epicur. Physiolog.

      Sect. 12. Pag. 20.

       I wonder how Aristotle could conceive the World Eternal, or how he could make two Eternities: ] (that is, that God, and the World both were eternal.) I wonder more at either the ignorance or incogitancy of the Conimbricenses, who in their Comment upon the eighth book of Aristotle's Physicks, treating of the matter of Creation, when they had first said that it was possible to know it, and that actually it was known (for Aristotle knew it) yet for all this they afterwards affirm, That considering onely the light of Nature, there is nothing can be brought to demonstrate Creation: and yet farther, when they had defined Creation to be the production of a thing ex nihilo, and had proved that the World was so created in time, and refused the arguments of the Philosophers to the contrary, they added this, That the World might be created ab æterno: for having propos'd this question [Num aliquid à Deo ex Æternitate procreari potuit?] they defend the affirmative, and assert that not onely incorporeal substances, as Angels; or permanent, as the celestial Bodies; or corruptible as Men, etc. might be produced and made ab æterno, and be conserved by an infinite time, ex utraq; parte; and that this is neither repugnant to God the Creator, the things created, nor to the nature of Creation: for proof whereof, they bring instances of the Sun which if it had been eternal, had illuminated eternally, (and the virtue of God is not less than the virtue of the Sun.) Another instance they bring of the divine Word, which was produced ab æterno: in which discourse, and in the instances brought to maintain it, it is hard to say whether the madness or impiety be greater; and certainly if Christians thus argue, we have the more reason to pardon the poor heathen Aristotle.

       There is in us not three, but a Trinity of Souls. ] The Peripatetiques held that men had three distinct Souls; whom the Heretiques, the Anomæi, and the Jacobites, followed. There arose a great dispute about this matter in Oxford, in the year 1276, and it was then determined against Aristotle, Daneus Christ. Eth. l. 1. c. 4. and Suarez in his Treatise de causa formali, Quest. An dentur plures formæ in uno composito, affirmeth there was a Synod that did anathematize all that held with Aristotle in this point.

      Sect. 14. Pag. 23.

       There is but one first, and four second causes in all things. ] In that he saith there is but one first cause, he speaketh in opposition to the Manichees, who held there were Duo principia; one from whom came all good, and the other from whom came all evil: the reason of Protagoras did it seems impose upon their understandings; he was wont to say, Si Deus non est, unde igitur bona? Si autem est, unde mala? In that he saith there are but four second Causes, he opposeth Plato, who to the four causes, material, efficient, formal, and final, adds for a fifth exemplar or Idæa, sc. Id ad quod respiciens artifex, id quod destinabat efficit; according to whose mind Boetius speaks, lib. 3. met. 9. de cons. Philosoph.

      O qui perpetua mundum ratione gubernas,

      Terrarum Cœliq; sator qui tempus ab ævo

      Ire jubes, stabilisq; manens das cuncta moveri:

      Quem non externæ pepulerunt fingere causæ

      Materiæ fluitantis opus, verum insita summi

      Forma boni livore carens: tu cuncta superno

      Ducis ab exemplo, pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse

      Mundum mente gerens, similique in imagine formans,

      Perfectasq; jubens perfectum absolvere partes.

      And St. Augustine l. 83. quest. 46. where (amongst other) he hath these words, Restat ergo ut omnia Ratione sint condita, nec eadem ratione homo qua equus; hoc enim absurdum est existimare: singula autem propriis sunt creata rationibus. But these ideæ Plato's Scholar Aristotle would not allow to make or constitute a different sort of cause from the formal or efficient, to which purpose he disputes, l. 7. Metaphysic. but he and his Sectators, and the Ramists also, agree (as the Author) that there are but the four remembred Causes: so that the Author, in affirming there are but four, hath no Adversary but the Platonists; but yet in asserting there are four (as his words imply) there are that oppose him, and the Schools of Aristot. and Ramus. I shall bring for instance Mr. Nat Carpenter, who in his Philosophia Libera affirmeth, there is no such cause as that which they call the Final cause: he argueth thus; Every cause hath an influence upon its effect: but so has not the End, therefore it is not a Cause. The major proposition (he saith) is evident, because the influence of a cause upon its effect, is either the causality it self, or something that is necessarily conjoyned to it: and the minor as plain, for either the End hath an influence upon the effect immediately, or mediately, by stirring up the Efficient to operate; not immediately, because so it should enter either the constitution or production, or conservation of the things; but the constitution it cannot enter, because the constitution is only of matter and form; nor the Production, for so it should concur to the production, either as it is simply the end, or as an exciter of the Efficient; but not simply as the end, because the end as end doth not go before, but followeth the thing produced, and therefore doth not concur to its production: if they say it doth so far concur, as it is desired of the agent or efficient cause, it should not so have an immediate influence upon the effect, but should onely first move the efficient. Lastly, saith he, it doth not enter the conservation of a thing, because a thing is often conserved, when it is frustrate of its due end, as when it's converted to a new use and end. Divers other Arguments he hath to prove there is no such cause as the final cause. Nat. Carpenter Philosoph. liber Decad. 3. Exercitat. 5. But for all this, the Author and he differ not in substance: for 'tis not the Author's intention to assert that the end is in nature præexistent to the effect, but only that whatsoever God has made, he hath made to some end or other; which he doth to oppose the Sectators of Epicurus, who maintain the contrary, as is to be seen by this of Lucretius which follows.

      Illud in his rebus vitium vehementer et istum,

      Effugere errorem vitareque premeditabor

      Lumina ne facias oculorum clara creata

      Prospicere ut possimus; et, ut proferre viai

      Proceros passus, ideo fastigia posse

      Surarum ac feminum pedibus fundata plicari:

      Brachia tum porro validis ex apta lacertis

      Esse, manusq; datas СКАЧАТЬ