The Life of John Marshall, Volume 1: Frontiersman, soldier, lawmaker, 1755-1788. Albert J. Beveridge
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Название: The Life of John Marshall, Volume 1: Frontiersman, soldier, lawmaker, 1755-1788

Автор: Albert J. Beveridge

Издательство: Public Domain

Жанр: Биографии и Мемуары

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isbn: http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/40388

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СКАЧАТЬ at Brandywine was most unequal in stanchness, discipline, and, courage. John Marshall himself wrote: "As must ever be the case in new-raised armies, unused to danger and from which undeserving officers have not been expelled, their conduct was not uniform. Some regiments, especially those which had served the preceding campaign, maintained their ground with the firmness and intrepidity of veterans, while others gave way as soon as they were pressed."318

      But the inefficiency of the American equipment gave some excuse for the fright that seized upon so many of them. For, testifies Marshall, "many of their muskets were scarcely fit for service; and being of unequal caliber, their cartridges could not be so well fitted, and consequently, their fire could not do as much execution as that of the enemy. This radical defect was felt in all the operations of the army."319

      So ended the battle of the Brandywine, the third formal armed conflict in which John Marshall took part. He had been in skirmish after skirmish, and in all of them had shown the characteristic Marshall coolness and courage, which both father and son exhibited in such striking fashion on this September day on the field where Lafayette fell wounded, and where the patriot forces reeled back under the all but fatal blows of the well-directed British regiments.320

      It is small wonder that the Americans were beaten in the battle of the Brandywine; indeed, the wonder is that the British did not follow up their victory and entirely wipe out the opposing patriots. But it is astonishing that the American army kept up heart. They were even "in good spirits" as Washington got them in hand and directed their retreat.321

      They were pretty well scattered, however, and many small parties and numerous stragglers were left behind. Maxwell's men, among whom was John Marshall, were stationed at Chester as "a rallying point" for the fragments which otherwise would disperse or be captured. Much maneuvering followed by both British and Americans. At sight of a detachment of the enemy approaching Wilmington, the Delaware militia "dispersed themselves," says Marshall.322 Soon the two armies again faced one another. Marshall thus describes the situation: "The advanced parties had met, and were beginning to skirmish, when they were separated by a heavy rain, which, becoming more and more violent, rendered the retreat of the Americans a measure of absolute necessity."323

      Through a cold and blinding downpour, over roads deep with mud, Captain-Lieutenant Marshall marched with his retreating comrades. All day they struggled forward, and nearly all night. They had no time to eat and little or no food, even if they had had the time. Before the break of a gray, cold, rainy September dawn, a halt was called, and an examination made of arms and ammunition. "Scarcely a musket in a regiment could be discharged," Marshall records, "and scarcely one cartridge in a box was fit for use," although "forty rounds per man had just been drawn" – this because the cartridge boxes had been ill-made and of improper material.

      Gun locks were loose, declares Marshall, because flimsily put on; the muskets were scarcely better than clubs. Hardly any of the soldiers had bayonets.324 "Never" had the patriot army been "in such imminent peril," he asserts – and all because of the inefficiency or worse of the method of supplies. Well might Washington's dilapidated troops thank Providence for the bitter weather that drenched through and through both officers and men and soaked their ammunition, for "the extreme severity of the weather had entirely stopped the British army."325

      Yet Washington was determined to block the British march on Philadelphia. He made shift to secure some fresh ammunition326 and twice moved his army to get in front of the enemy or, failing in that, "to keep pace with them."327 To check their too rapid advance Washington detached the troops under Wayne, among whom was John Marshall.328 They found the "country was so extensively disaffected that Sir William Howe received accurate accounts of his [Wayne's] position and of his force. Major-General Grey was detached to surprise him [Wayne] and effectually accomplished his purpose." At eleven o'clock at night Grey drove in Wayne's pickets with charged bayonets, and in a desperate midnight encounter killed and wounded one hundred and fifty of his men.329 General Smallwood, who was to have supported Wayne, was less than a mile away, but his militia, who, writes Marshall, "thought only of their own safety, having fallen in with a party returning from the pursuit of Wayne, fled in confusion with the loss of only one man."330

      Another example, this, before John Marshall's eyes, of the unreliability of State-controlled troops;331 one more paragraph in the chapter of fatal inefficiency of the so-called Government of the so-called United States. Day by day, week by week, month by month, year by year, these object lessons were witnessed by the young Virginia officer. They made a lifelong impression upon him and had an immediate effect. More and more he came to depend on Washington, as indeed the whole army did also, for all things which should have come from the Government itself.

      Once again the American commander sought to intercept the British, but they escaped "by a variety of perplexing maneuvers," writes Washington, "thro' a Country from which I could not derive the least intelligence (being to a man disaffected)" and "marched immediately toward Philadelphia."332 For the moment Washington could not follow, although, declares Marshall, "public opinion" was demanding and Congress insisting that one more blow be struck to save Philadelphia.333 His forces were not yet united; his troops utterly exhausted.

      Marching through heavy mud, wading streams, drenched by torrential rains, sleeping on the sodden ground "without tents … without shoes or … clothes … without fire … without food,"334 to use Marshall's striking language, the Americans were in no condition to fight the superior forces of the well-found British. "At least one thousand men are bare-footed and have performed the marches in that condition," Washington informed the impatient Congress.335 He did his utmost; that brilliant officer, Alexander Hamilton, was never so efficient; but nearly all that could be accomplished was to remove the military stores at Philadelphia up the Delaware farther from the approaching British, but also farther from the American army. Philadelphia itself "seemed asleep, or dead, and the whole State scarce alive. Maryland and Delaware the same," wrote John Adams in his diary.336

      So the British occupied the Capital, placing most of their forces about Germantown. Congress, frightened and complaining, fled to York. The members of that august body, even before the British drove them from their cozy quarters, felt that "the prospect is chilling on every side; gloomy, dark, melancholy and dispiriting."337 Would Washington never strike? Their impatience was to be relieved. The American commander had, by some miracle, procured munitions and put the muskets of his troops in a sort of serviceable order; and he felt that a surprise upon Germantown might succeed. He planned his attack admirably, as the British afterwards conceded.338 In the twilight of a chilling October day, Washington gave orders to begin the advance.

      Throughout the night the army marched, and in the early morning339 the three divisions into which the American force was divided threw themselves upon the British within brief intervals of time. All went well at first. Within about half an hour after Sullivan and Wayne had engaged the British left wing, the American left wing, to which John Marshall was now attached,СКАЧАТЬ



<p>318</p>

Ib.; and see Irving, iii, 200-09.

<p>319</p>

Marshall, i, 158-59.

<p>320</p>

Four years afterward Chastellux found that "most of the trees bear the mark of bullets or cannon shot." (Chastellux, 118.)

<p>321</p>

Washington to President of Congress, Sept. 11, 1777; Writings: Ford, vi, 70.

<p>322</p>

Marshall (1st ed.), iii, 141, and see Washington to President of Congress, Sept. 23, 1777; Writings: Ford, vi, 81.

<p>323</p>

Marshall, i, 160.

<p>324</p>

Marshall, i, 160. When their enlistments expired, the soldiers took the Government's muskets and bayonets home with them. Thus thousands of muskets and bayonets continually disappeared. (See Kapp, 117.)

<p>325</p>

Marshall, i, 160-61.

<p>326</p>

Ib.

<p>327</p>

Washington to President of Congress, Sept. 23, 1777; Writings: Ford, vi, 81-82.

<p>328</p>

This is an inference, but a fair one. Maxwell was under Wayne; and Marshall was one of Maxwell's light infantry of picked men. (Supra.)

<p>329</p>

Marshall, i, 161. "The British accounts represent the American loss to have been much larger. It probably amounted to at least three hundred men." (Ib., footnote.)

<p>330</p>

Ib., and see Pa. Mag. Hist. and Biog., i, 305.

<p>331</p>

Marshall repeatedly expresses this thought in his entire account of the war.

<p>332</p>

Washington to President of Congress, Sept. 23, 1777; Writings: Ford, vi, 80.

<p>333</p>

Marshall, i, 162.

<p>334</p>

Ib.

<p>335</p>

Washington to President of Congress, Sept. 23, 1777; Writings: Ford, vi, 82.

<p>336</p>

Works: Adams, ii, 437.

<p>337</p>

Ib.

<p>338</p>

Pa. Mag. Hist. and Biog., xvi, 197 et seq.

<p>339</p>

American officer's description of the battle. (Ib., xi, 330.)