The XXth Century Political History of Russia: lecture materials. Gennady Bordyugov

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СКАЧАТЬ the order that confirms this information after a demonstration of Kazan workers in September 1918: «In case of the slightest attempt to disturb the peace on the part of any social group, and particularly workers, in any district where it happens, we will open fire.» And indeed, working districts in Kazan were shelled. In October 1918, leaving Samara, the Committee of the Constituent Assembly sent a punitive detachment to the factory center Ivaschenkovo.

      Eighteen rebellions, civil disturbances and manifestations of disobedience, which took place from August 1918 until August 1919, indicate what means the Interim Government of the North areas resorted to. In January 1919, General Miller arrived in Arkhangelsk. Extraordinary measures and Terror, including economic extraordinary measures directed against the local bourgeoisie, became his governing methods.

      Admiral Kolchak frankly spoke about his first months in power. He said: «Dissatisfaction with the internal administration is caused by the illegal activity of the lowest government agents, both military and civil. The activity of the heads of local police departments as well as of special purpose units is openly criminal.» Local Cossack organizations, which were taking part in liberating Siberia in the autumn 1918, turned out to be virtually useless as a support for the authorities. Kolchak admitted that atamans Kalmykov, Semenov, Unguern-Shtenberg, Gamov, Annenkov’s detachments «easily assumed functions of the political police and created special counterintelligence bodies.»

      These agencies did not have any link with prosecutor’s office. The land council of Primorie complained about the fact that Cossack detachments organized private extrajudicial killings of political opponents – that is, everybody they met on their way. The Semipalatinsk cooperative union formally protested against ataman Annenkov’s activity several times, giving a warning note that his actions could destroy the reputation of the Omsk government and threaten the common mission of reconstituting the Russian state.

      Admiral Kolchak also complained about the fact that counterintelligence offices were formed on the pattern of those which acted in Siberia under the Soviet regime, though counterintelligence should be presented only to Kolchak’s headquarters. They did not manage to control and oppress outposts, barrier troops on the railroads, or commissars authorized to represent the commanders at the front.

      With the help of a whole range of decrees Kolchak tried to put an end to numerous cases of illegal confiscations, abuse of authority and the existence of police torture chambers. However, six months after coming to power he had to admit that the «malicious evil that has been killing our state and military forces since 1914 has re-appeared and is spreading.»

      Sensing imminent defeat, military leaders left no stone unturned. In many places, manifestations of the extreme emergency regime appeared in the rear of Kolchak’s army, initiated from the top. It is sufficient to cite General Matkovsky’s brief order concerning the slaughter of insurgents in the villages near Omsk revolting against Kolchak’s soldiers:

      «I. To scrupulously search every armed inhabitant of villages in rebellion; shoot them at the scene as enemies and traitors.

      II. On the basis of evidence obtained from the inhabitants, to arrest all propagandists, members of the Soviet of Deputies who helped to organize riots, deserters, sympathizers, and those who conceal rebels and to take them to the military field court.

      III. To deport unreliable and depraved persons to the Berezovsky and Nerchensky regions, sending them to the police.

      IV. To bring to court, impose harsh sentences, and apply death-penalties to local authorities who did not show adequate resistance to bandits, who executed their orders and did not take steps for the liquidation of the Reds using their own means and capabilities.

      V. To demolish villages where repetitive rebellions have been organized with redoubled severity, up to their complete liquidation.»

      «White» armies acquired deplorable habits under General Denikin. Robberies, brigandism and other crimes against property were not prosecuted, so they became an ordinary phenomenon. An honest soldier became a prowler. Mean motives and rough arbitrariness replaced political correctness and mere human decency.

      The negative influence of these battlefield morals on the rear was particularly felt in the Crimea after the retaking of Novorossiysk. Here are prince Obolensky’s reminiscences: «One morning on their way to school, children saw dead people with protruded tongues who had been hung from lamp posts in the streets of Simferopol. Never before had Simferopol seen anything like that. Even the Bolsheviks tempered their bloody business without such demonstrations.» It turned out that it was General Kutepov’s order, his way of terrorizing Simferopol Bolsheviks. The local Duma passed an official objection, and the Mayor went to Kutepov to persuade him to immediately remove the corpses from the street lamps. Kutepov gave the following answer to the the petition to cease public executions: «I have never abused public executions, but the current situation forced me to fall back upon such measures.»

      In his memoirs Denikin called this and other similar incidents «black chapters» in the history of his Army. He did not hide the fact that most of the counterintelligence offices, particularly in Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa and Rostov, represented hotbeds of provocation and organized plundering. A two-way struggle was organized against this kind of offence; on the one hand they fought the agencies themselves, and on the other hand they fought individuals. In the long run the General had to admit the inefficiency and tardiness of the struggle.

      Baron Wrangell tried as well to put an end to the ills of the epoch of «voluntarism.» This is demonstrated by his orders from April 1920 to June 1920, which mandated the end to violence against people. On April 27, the Department of Justice was detached from the civil government to fight against criminality. A peculiar judicial measure was Wrangell’s decree dated May 11, which ordered administrative deportation to Soviet Russia. Governors and fortress commandants were authorized to resort to such measures under a prosecutor’s supervision. The counterintelligence agencies, which were brought under control, almost stopped brigandage and acts of outrage. Criminals were subject to harsh sentencing. In his order of September 14, 1920 Wrangell expressed the following opinion about the military court commissions formed for civil protection against robbery and plunder: «The whole population living on the territories occupied by the troops of the Russian Army respects and trusts these commissions and their activity; in the immediate battle area, where a civil governing machinery is not yet properly formed, people believe these commissions to be their only protectors and address them with all their complains and problems.»

      However, there was another opinion. Ivan Kalinin, former chairman of the Don Army military court commission, related that «Wrangell’s commissions never did any good,» that «the leader’s intention to establish a kind of «White Cheka» for the eradication of the lawlessness went down in flames». Later on, Wrangell himself had to admit the inadequacy of the counterintelligence agencies’ activities and criminal investigation actions, whose operations, in his opinion, were lagging. He wrote that «the population was tired of the Bolsheviks; at first, people waiting for peace greeted and welcomed enthusiastically the progress of the Army, but toward November 1919, little by little they began to feel again the atrocities of robberies, violence and arbitrariness. As a result the front collapsed and the rear rose in revolt.»

      Thus, the Civil War has added new chapters to the history of the emergency regime that plagued Russia for long decades of the 19th and 20th centuries. An estimated 8 to 13 million people died on the battlefield, and of diseases, starvation, and terror. By the end of the war, about 2 million people had left the country. The damage to the national economy amounted to about 50 billion gold imperial rubles, industrial production dropped to between 4 and 20 percent of its 1913 level, and agricultural productivity decreased by almost fifty percent.

      Despite the assurances of the Bolsheviks and the Provisional Government and its allies to permanently eliminate a system of governance based on the tsarist Statute on Measures to Protect State Order and Public Peace, their regimes added new dimensions СКАЧАТЬ