Who set Hitler against Stalin?. Nikolay Starikov

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      England’s desire is and remains the prevention of the immoderate rise of any continental power to world political importance; that is, the maintenance of a fixed balance of power relation among European States; for this seems to be the premise of British world hegemony.

      Here the author comes to another conclusion – the crucial one in his book, the one it was written for.

      Whoever undertakes, from the above viewpoint, an estimate of the present possibilities of an alliance for Germany must reach the conviction that the last practicable tie remaining is only English support.

      Hitler wants to let bygones be bygones, without looking back at Britain’s old sins. The 1918 defeat, the revolution, the sunken German fleet, the exorbitant reparations – all that he was prepared to forgive and forget. For the British hadn’t done all that out of spite; nothing personal, only business.

      Now, alliance policies are not advanced from considerations of backward-looking discords, but rather fructified by a knowledge of past experiences. Experience, however, should now have taught us that alliances for the achievement of negative goals suffer from internal weaknesses.

      Think positive, that’s what he is basically saying! No need to bear a grudge against the British, no need to expect them to pat you on the shoulder. One can’t expect them to turn suddenly pro-German, a well. Such politicians have never existed in England.

      Every Englishman as a statesman is, of course, first of all an Englishman, every American an American, and no Italian will be found prepared to play any other politics than pro-Italian politics. Whoever, then, thinks of succeeding in concluding alliances with foreign nations on the basis of a pro-German sentiment of their leading statesmen is either a jackass or a fraud. The premise for the linking of national fates never lies in mutual respect or even congeniality, but in a perspective of mutual expediency for both contracting parties. That is, let us say, however invariably an English statesman pursues pro-English policies and never pro-German, quite definite interests of these pro-English policies can, for the most diverse reasons, duplicate pro-German interests.

      The notion of “duplicate interests” is that launch-pad that can propel Germany into the bright future and Hitler to the political Olympus in his country.

      England desires no German world power, but France desires no power at all called Germany: a really quite essential difference. Today, however, we are not fighting for position as a world power, but we must struggle for the existence of our fatherland, our national unity, and for daily bread for our children. If, with this viewpoint, we want to keep our eyes open for European allies, then there remain practically two States: England and Italy.

      It is curious that both Soviet and Western historians and politicians never investigate Hitler’s devoted affection for Britain. It is hardly mentioned at all, or but in a few words, for example, those of Winston Churchill: “England and Italy are the only two possible allies for Germany”[41].

      Hitler next expounds that a strong France would be the bane of the existence of England and Italy, out of all other countries. The Führer’s logic is plain as daylight. Since these two countries would hate to see the strengthening of France developing its hegemony in Europe thanks to the weakness of Germany rather than its own intrinsic power, these countries become Germany’s friends, if not on purpose. My enemy’s enemy is my friend. Well, maybe not exactly a friend, but certainly not an enemy!

      On the soberest and coldest reflection, it is today primarily these two States, England and Italy, whose most natural self-interests, at least in all essentials, do not oppose the conditions of existence of the German nation, indeed, to a certain degree are identical with them.

      The very word “England” is repeated in the quoted chapter with surprising frequency. Hitler keeps driving home the same idea, under various sauces.

      For Germany, however, the French danger means an obligation to subordinate all considerations of sentiment, and to reach out the hand to those who, threatened as much as we are, will not tolerate and bear France’s drive toward dominion.

      What is Hitler talking about? Could he be trying to make friends with Britain? And that almost a decade before his establishment in power? Exactly. And no buts about it.

      In Europe there can be for Germany in the predictable future only two allies: England and Italy.

      The key to success and proliferation for a weak and beaten Germany is a union with the defeaters that have no more interest in weakening the already weak Germany.

      And then it occurred to me – it is not for German burghers and Hausfraus that Hitler wrote his book. Not for the lads in the Hitlerjugend, not for the burly storm troopers, nor for the “men in black”, the SS. For Hitler, Mein Kampf was a splendid opportunity to address the rulers of the world of that time – England, and bring home his message, which was plain enough. A powerful movement is being born in Germany headed by Hitler. It has not yet gained its full swing, so it asks for help. Like a green sprout reaching for light, the Nazi party is making its way through the political “soil” of Germany. The party needs only two things: money and once more money. And there should be no fears about the party – the Nazi are “good guys”, they pose no threat to the British. The ambitious German politician Adolf Hitler sets up a forceful Anglophile movement and tries to bring it up to political power. The British could as well consider supporting him; for when he mounts the German political Olympus, he is going to enforce politics favoured by the United Kingdom; for there are no discrepancies between his political programme and that of Britain. Hitler needs no other allies.

      …How every one of these points <of the peace treaty of Versailles> could have been burned into the brain and feeling of this nation until, finally, in the heads of sixty million men and women the same sense of shame and the same hate would have become a single fiery sea of flames, out of whose glow a steely will would have risen and a cry forced itself <…>

      The treaty of Versailles indeed drove Germany to the very brink of destruction. The huge reparations due to be paid, famine, cold, poverty, unemployment, suicides… What kind of “cry” did Hitler expect to “force itself” from the souls of the Germans? “Feed us”? “Make us warm”? “Give us jobs”? “Cancel our reparations”? “Rescind the treaty of Versailles”?

      Not at all. Mein Kampf suggests something completely different, being intended for quite a different audience than scholars are inclined to think.

      We want arms once more!

      That is the exact phrase in the book that ends the previous one.

      Will Germany ask for arms from its defeaters to turn them against those who have devastated their Vaterland? Will it attempt to recover its lost territories and overseas colonies? But who will arm Germans against themselves? No need to worry. Hitler gives a ready answer СКАЧАТЬ