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СКАЧАТЬ predicated of the individual, the genus both of the species and of the individual. Similarly, differentiae too are predicated both of the species and of the individuals.) And the primary substances admit the definition of the species and of the genera, and the species admits that of the genus; for everything said of what is predicated will be said of the subject also. Similarly, both the species and the individuals admit the definition of the differentiae. But synonymous things were precisely those with both the name in common and the same definition. Hence all the things called from substances and differentiae are so called synonymously.

      Every substance seems to signify a certain ‘this’. As regards the primary substances, it is indisputably true that each of them signifies a certain ‘this’; for the thing revealed is individual and numerically one. But as regards the secondary substances, though it appears from the form of the name – when one speaks of man or animal – that a secondary substance likewise signifies a certain ‘this’, this is not really true; rather, it signifies a certain qualification, for the subject is not, as the primary substance is, one, but man and animal are said of many things.

      However, it does not signify simply a certain qualification, as white does. White signifies nothing but a qualification, whereas the species and the genus mark off the qualification of substance – they signify substance of a certain qualification. (One draws a wider boundary with the genus than with the species, for in speaking of animal one takes in more than in speaking of man.)

Another characteristic of substances is that there is nothing contrary to them. For what would be contrary to a primary substance? For example, there is nothing contrary to an individual man, nor yet is there anything contrary to man or to animal. This, however, is not peculiar to substance but holds of many other things also, for example, of quantity. For there is nothing contrary to four foot or to ten or to anything of this kind – unless someone were to say that many is contrary to few or large to small; but still there is nothing contrary to any definite quantity.

      Substance, it seems, does not admit of a more and a less. I do not mean that one substance is not more a substance than another (we have said that it is), but that any given substance is not called more, or less, that which it is. For example, if this substance is a man, it will not be more a man or less a man either than itself or than another man. For one man is not more a man than another, as one pale thing is more pale than another and one beautiful thing more beautiful than another. Again, a thing is called more, or less, such-and-such than itself; for example, the body that is pale is called more pale now than before, and the one that is hot is called more, or less, hot. Substance, however, is not spoken of thus. For a man is not called more a man now than before, nor is anything else that is a substance. Thus substance does not admit of a more and a less.

      It seems most distinctive of substance that what is numerically one and the same is able to receive contraries. In no other case could one bring forward anything, numerically one, which is able to receive contraries. For example, a colour which is numerically one and the same will not be black and white, nor will numerically one and the same action be bad and good; and similarly with everything else that is not substance. A substance, however, numerically one and the same, is able to receive contraries. For example, an individual man – one and the same – becomes pale at one time and dark at another, and hot and cold, and bad and good. Nothing like this is to be seen in any other case.

      But perhaps someone might object and say that statements and beliefs are like this. For the same statement seems to be both true and false. Suppose, for example, that the statement that somebody is sitting is true; after he has got up this same statement will be false. Similarly with beliefs. Suppose you believe truly that somebody is sitting; after he has got up you will believe falsely if you hold the same belief about him. However, even if we were to grant this, there is still a difference in the way contraries are received. For in the case of substances it is by themselves changing that they are able to receive contraries. For what has become cold instead of hot, or dark instead of pale, or good instead of bad, has changed (has altered); similarly in other cases too it is by itself undergoing change that each thing is able to receive contraries. Statements and beliefs, on the other hand, themselves remain completely unchangeable in every way; it is because the actual thing changes that the contrary comes to belong to them. For the statement that somebody is sitting remains the same; it is because of a change in the actual thing that it comes to be true at one time and false at another. Similarly with beliefs. Hence at least the way in which it is able to receive contraries – through a change in itself – would be distinctive of substance, even if we were to grant that beliefs and statements are able to receive contraries. However, this is not true. For it is not because they themselves receive anything that statements and beliefs are said to be able to receive contraries, but because of what has happened to something else. For it is because the actual thing exists or does not exist that the statement is said to be true or false, not because it is able itself to receive contraries. No statement or belief is changed at all by anything. So since nothing happens in them, they are not able to receive contraries. A substance, on the other hand, is said to be able to receive contraries, because it itself receives contraries. For it receives sickness and health, and paleness and darkness; and because it itself receives the various things of this kind it is said to be able to receive contraries. It is, therefore, distinctive of substance that what is numerically one and the same is able to receive contraries. This brings to an end our discussion of substance.

Specimen Questions

      1 What does Aristotle mean by ‘substance’? How do his views on reality differ from Plato’s?

      2 ‘It seems most distinctive of substance that what is numerically one and the same is able to receive contraries’ (Aristotle). What is Aristotle trying to establish about substance?

      3 What is the difference Aristotle draws between primary and secondary substances?

      Suggestions for Further Reading (Including Internet Resources)

      1 Aristotle, Categories and De Interpretatione, trans. and ed. J. Ackrill (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963). For general introductory materials on Aristotle, see readings at the end of Part I, section 3. An excellent discussion of Aristotle’s metaphysical views may be found in chapter 3 of J. Barnes (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

      2 For a more detailed study of Aristotle’s metaphysics, see T. H. Irwin, Aristotle’s First Principles (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), and also M. Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). For a more demanding treatment of Aristotelian substance see M. Wedin, Aristotle’s Theory of Substance: the Categories and Metaphysics Zeta (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

      3 See also the collection of articles in J. Barnes, M. Schofield and R. Sorabji (eds.), Articles on Aristotle, Vol. III: Metaphysics (London: Duckworth, 1979).

      4 For helpful online resources see the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entries at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-metaphysics (by M. Cohen) and https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle/#Sub (by C. Shields); and also in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy at https://www.iep.utm.edu/aris-met/ (by J. Sachs).

      5 For an excellent short podcast see P. Adamson, History of Philosophy without Any Gaps, Episode 38 – ‘Down to Earth: Aristotle on Substance’, https://historyofphilosophy.net/aristotle-substance.

      Notes

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