Plato: The Complete Works (31 Books). Plato

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      ‘God is ever drawing like towards like, and making them acquainted.’

      I dare say that you have heard those words.

      Yes, he said; I have.

      And have you not also met with the treatises of philosophers who say that like must love like? they are the people who argue and write about nature and the universe.

      Very true, he replied.

      And are they right in saying this?

      They may be.

      Perhaps, I said, about half, or possibly, altogether, right, if their meaning were rightly apprehended by us. For the more a bad man has to do with a bad man, and the more nearly he is brought into contact with him, the more he will be likely to hate him, for he injures him; and injurer and injured cannot be friends. Is not that true?

      Yes, he said.

      Then one half of the saying is untrue, if the wicked are like one another?

      That is true.

      But the real meaning of the saying, as I imagine, is, that the good are like one another, and friends to one another; and that the bad, as is often said of them, are never at unity with one another or with themselves; for they are passionate and restless, and anything which is at variance and enmity with itself is not likely to be in union or harmony with any other thing. Do you not agree?

      Yes, I do.

      Then, my friend, those who say that the like is friendly to the like mean to intimate, if I rightly apprehend them, that the good only is the friend of the good, and of him only; but that the evil never attains to any real friendship, either with good or evil. Do you agree?

      He nodded assent.

      Then now we know how to answer the question ‘Who are friends?’ for the argument declares ‘That the good are friends.’

      Yes, he said, that is true.

      Yes, I replied; and yet I am not quite satisfied with this answer. By heaven, and shall I tell you what I suspect? I will. Assuming that like, inasmuch as he is like, is the friend of like, and useful to him—or rather let me try another way of putting the matter: Can like do any good or harm to like which he could not do to himself, or suffer anything from his like which he would not suffer from himself? And if neither can be of any use to the other, how can they be loved by one another? Can they now?

      They cannot.

      And can he who is not loved be a friend?

      Certainly not.

      But say that the like is not the friend of the like in so far as he is like; still the good may be the friend of the good in so far as he is good?

      True.

      But then again, will not the good, in so far as he is good, be sufficient for himself? Certainly he will. And he who is sufficient wants nothing— that is implied in the word sufficient.

      Of course not.

      And he who wants nothing will desire nothing?

      He will not.

      Neither can he love that which he does not desire?

      He cannot.

      And he who loves not is not a lover or friend?

      Clearly not.

      What place then is there for friendship, if, when absent, good men have no need of one another (for even when alone they are sufficient for themselves), and when present have no use of one another? How can such persons ever be induced to value one another?

      They cannot.

      And friends they cannot be, unless they value one another?

      Very true.

      But see now, Lysis, whether we are not being deceived in all this—are we not indeed entirely wrong?

      How so? he replied.

      Have I not heard some one say, as I just now recollect, that the like is the greatest enemy of the like, the good of the good?—Yes, and he quoted the authority of Hesiod, who says:

      ‘Potter quarrels with potter, bard with bard, Beggar with beggar;’

      and of all other things he affirmed, in like manner, ‘That of necessity the most like are most full of envy, strife, and hatred of one another, and the most unlike, of friendship. For the poor man is compelled to be the friend of the rich, and the weak requires the aid of the strong, and the sick man of the physician; and every one who is ignorant, has to love and court him who knows.’ And indeed he went on to say in grandiloquent language, that the idea of friendship existing between similars is not the truth, but the very reverse of the truth, and that the most opposed are the most friendly; for that everything desires not like but that which is most unlike: for example, the dry desires the moist, the cold the hot, the bitter the sweet, the sharp the blunt, the void the full, the full the void, and so of all other things; for the opposite is the food of the opposite, whereas like receives nothing from like. And I thought that he who said this was a charming man, and that he spoke well. What do the rest of you say?

      I should say, at first hearing, that he is right, said Menexenus.

      Then we are to say that the greatest friendship is of opposites?

      Exactly.

      Yes, Menexenus; but will not that be a monstrous answer? and will not the all-wise eristics be down upon us in triumph, and ask, fairly enough, whether love is not the very opposite of hate; and what answer shall we make to them—must we not admit that they speak the truth?

      We must.

      They will then proceed to ask whether the enemy is the friend of the friend, or the friend the friend of the enemy?

      Neither, he replied.

      Well, but is a just man the friend of the unjust, or the temperate of the intemperate, or the good of the bad?

      I do not see how that is possible.

      And yet, I said, if friendship goes by contraries, the contraries must be friends.

      They must.

      Then neither like and like nor unlike and unlike are friends.

      I suppose not.

      And yet there is a further consideration: may not all these notions of friendship be erroneous? but may not that which is neither good nor evil still in some cases be the friend of the good?

      How do you mean? he said.

      Why really, I said, the truth is that I do not know; but my head is dizzy with thinking of the argument, and therefore I hazard the conjecture, that ‘the beautiful is the friend,’ as the old proverb says. Beauty is certainly a soft, smooth, slippery thing, and therefore of a nature which easily slips in and permeates our souls. For СКАЧАТЬ