Bow-Tie Industrial Risk Management Across Sectors. Luca Fiorentini

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СКАЧАТЬ href="#ulink_e1054a15-0e55-50df-9459-f95279b9474a">Figure 33 Documenting the risk management process.

      Figure 34 Skills and knowledge for a risk manager.

      Figure 35 Resources to be allocated for an effective RM.

      Figure 36 Understand the mission, objectives, values, and strategies.

      Figure 37 Risk control hierarchy and in practice.

      Figure 38 Thinking‐Behavior‐Result model. Source: Adapted from Fiorentini and Marmo (2018).

      Figure 39 Stimulus‐Response model. Source: Adapted from Fiorentini and Marmo (2018).

      Figure 40 Two‐pointed model. Source: Adapted from Fiorentini and Marmo (2018).

      Figure 41 Inverted two‐pointed model. Source: Adapted from Fiorentini and Marmo (2018).

      Figure 42 Human factors in process plant operation. Source: Adapted from Strobhar (2013).

      Figure 43 The principles of RM according to ISO 31000.

      Figure 44 Main types of business risks.

      Figure 45 Most common enterprise risks.

      Figure 46 Culture maturity level in an organization.

      Figure 47 Safety culture levels.

      Figure 48 Quality of risk management approach.

      Figure 49 The pathological condition.

      Figure 50 The reactive condition.

      Figure 51 The bureaucratic condition.

      Figure 52 The proactive condition.

      Figure 53 The generative condition.

      Figure 54 The Deming Cycle PDCA.

      Figure 55 Swiss Cheese Model applied to a major industrial event.

      Figure 56 Maturity model. Source: Courtesy of EXIDA L.C.C. (USA).

      Figure 57 Feed line propane‐butane separation column. Source: Adapted from Assael and Kakosimos (2010).

      Figure 58 Basic structure of a fault tree (horizontal).

      Figure 59 Basic structure of a fault tree (vertical).

      Figure 60 Basic Events.

      Figure 61 Example of the fault tree, taking inspiration from the Åsta railway incident. Source: Sklet, S., 2002.

      Figure 62 Gates.

      Figure 63 Fire triangle using FTA.

      Figure 64 Flammable liquid storage system. Source: Modified from Assael, M. and Kakosimos, K., 2010.

Figure 65 Example of FTA for a flammable liquid storage system.

      Figure 66 Fault tree example.

      Figure 67 The structure of a typical ETA diagram.

      Figure 68 Event tree analysis for the Åsta railway accident.

      Figure 69 Pipe connected to a vessel.

      Figure 70 Example of event tree for the pipe rupture.

      Figure 71 Bow‐Tie diagram structure.

      Figure 72 F‐N Curve.

      Figure 73 Example of a risk matrix with acceptability regions.

      Figure 74 Calibrated risk graph.

      Figure 75 A typical Bow‐Tie.

      Figure 76 Bow‐Tie as the combination of an FTA and an ETA.

      Figure 77 The Swiss Cheese Model by James Reason.

      Figure 78 Bow‐Tie project risk assessment.

      Figure 79 Bow‐Tie diagram – transfer of a data center.

      Figure 80 Bow‐Tie diagram on virtual classroom training.

      Figure 81 Level of abstraction.

      Figure 82 Zoom level and point in time.

      Figure 83 Example of point in time.

      Figure 84 Basic elements of a Bow‐Tie diagram.

      Figure 85 Determining the threshold level to cause the top event.

      Figure 86 Barrier functions.

      Figure 87 Location of elimination and prevention barriers.

      Figure 88 Location of control and mitigation barriers.

      Figure 89 Barrier systems.

      Figure 90 Using the same barrier on either side of the Bow‐Tie diagram.

      Figure 91 Classification of safety barriers. Source: Sklet, S., 2006.

      Figure 92 Barrier classification promoted by the AIChE CCPS Guidelines.

      Figure 93 The energy model. Source: Haddon, W., 1980.

      Figure 94 Generic safety functions related to a process model. Sources: Hollnagel, E., 2004. Barrier And Accident Prevention. Hampshire, IK: Ashgate; Duijm et al., 2004.

      Figure 95 Layers of defence against a possible industrial accident.

      Figure 96 A comparison between ETA and LOPA’s methodology.

      Figure 97 Actions of a barrier.

      Figure 98 Misuse of escalation factors, with nested structure.

      Figure 99 Defining “activities” for a barrier.

      Figure 100 Quantifying a simplified Bow‐Tie.

      Figure 101 Scale of the effectiveness of a barrier and the relationship between effectiveness and PFD (correct).

      Figure 102 Relationship between effectiveness and PFD (correct).

      Figure 103 Bow‐Tie concatenation example.

      Figure 104 Difference between accident, near‐accident and unintended circumstance.

      Figure 105 Principles of incident analysis.

Figure 106 The importance of accident investigations.

      Figure 107 Steps in the analysis of the operational experience of organizations.

      Figure 108 Steps in accident investigations.

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