A Methodical System of Universal Law. Johann Gottlieb Heineccius

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СКАЧАТЬ out that to another which we are neither perfectly nor imperfectly obliged to discover to him (§200); that all lying is unjust (§199), but not all false speaking (§200); that all deception is unjust (§199); but not all ingenious or feigned discourse (§200). And therefore all these must be carefully distinguished, if we would not deceive ourselves, and make a false judgment concerning them.^* <143>

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      What truth and veracity mean.

      The same holds with respect to truth and veracity. For since one is said to be a person of veracity, who speaks the truth without dissimulation, whenever one has a perfect or imperfect right to know the truth from us; the consequence is, that veracity always means a commendable quality. On the other hand, speaking truth may be good, bad, or indifferent; because it consists in the agreement of words and external signs with our thoughts, and one does not always do his duty who lays open his thoughts.^†

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      What is meant by an asseveration, what by an oath, what by benediction, and what by imprecation.

      Words, by which we seriously assert that we are speaking truth, and not falsly, are called asseverations. An asseveration made by invoking God as our judge, is called an oath. Words by which we wish good things to a person, or pray to God for his prosperity, are called benedictions. Words by which we, in the heat of our wrath, wish ill to our neighbour, are commonly called malediction or cursing. When we imprecate calamities upon our own heads, it is called execration. <144>

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      When it is allowable to use asseverations.

      From the definition of an asseveration (§203), it is plain that no good man will use it rashly or unnecessarily, but then only, when a person, without any cause, calls what he says into doubt, and he cannot otherwise convince him of the truth whose interest it is to believe it; whence we may conclude, that he acts greatly against duty, who employs asseverations to hurt and deceive any one.^*

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      When it is allowable to use benedictions, and when imprecations.

      Since we desire happiness no less to those we love, and in whose felicity we delight, than to ourselves, it cannot be evil to wish well to another, and pray for all blessings upon him, provided it be done seriously and from love, and not customarily and in mere compliment.^† But all maledictions breathe hatred, and are therefore unjust, unless when one with commiseration only represents to wicked persons the curses God hath already threatened against their practices. Finally, execrations, being contrary to the love we owe to ourselves, and the effects of immoderate anger and despair, are never excusable; but here, while we are examining matters by reason, certain heroic examples do not come into the consideration, they belong to another chair. <145>

      SECTION CCVI

      What is the use of an oath?

      As to an oath, which is an asseveration by which God is invoked as a witness or avenger (§203), since we ought not to use a simple asseveration rashly or unnecessarily (§204); much less certainly ought we to have recourse rashly or unnecessarily to an oath; but then only when it is required by a superior as judge; or by a private person, in a case where love obliges us to satisfy one fully of the truth, and to remove all suspicion and fear of deception and falsity. And this takes place with regard to every oath, and therefore there is no need of so many divisions of oaths into promissory and affirmatory, and the latter into an oath for bearing witness, and an oath decisive of a controversy: for the same rules and conditions obtain with respect to them all.^* <146>

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      Who and how.

      Since by those who swear God is invoked as a witness and avenger (§203), the consequence is, that atheists must make light of an oath, and that it is no small crime to tender an oath to such persons; that an oath ought to be suited to the forms and rites of every one’s religion;^* and therefore asseverations by things not reckoned sacred, cannot be called oaths; that he is justly punished for perjury, who perjures himself by invoking false gods; nay, that even an atheist is justly punished for perjury, who concealing or dissembling his atheistical opinions, swears falsly by God, seeing he thereby deceives others.

      SECTION CCVIII

      How an oath ought to be administred.

      Moreover, since one ought not to swear rashly, or without being called to it (§206); hence it follows, that an oath is made for the sake, not of the swearer, but of him who puts it to the swearer; and therefore it ought to be understood and explained by his mind and intention, and not according to that of the person sworn; for which reason <147> all those equivocations and mental reservations, as they are called, by which wicked men endeavour to elude the obligation of an oath, are most absurd. Those interpretations of oaths are likewise absurd, which require base or unreasonable things of one, who of his own accord had sworn to another not to refuse him any thing he should ask of him.^*

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      The obligation and effects of an oath.

      Again, an oath being an invocation of God, (§203), it follows that it ought to be religiously fulfilled; that it cannot be eluded by quibles and equivocations, but that the obligation of an oath must yield to that of law: and therefore that it can produce no obligation, if one swears to do any thing that is base and forbidden by law; tho’ if it be not directly contrary to law, it be absolutely binding, provided it was neither extorted by unjust violence, nor obtained by deceit (§107 & 109): whence is manifest what ought to be said of the maxim of the canonists, “That every oath ought <148> to be performed which can be so without any detriment to our eternal happiness.”^†

      SECTION CCX

      He who does an injury, is obliged to make re-paration.

      We have sufficiently proved that it is unlawful to hurt any one by word or deed, nay even in thought. Now, since whosoever renders another more unhappy, injures him; but he renders one most unhappy, who, having injured him, does not repair the damage; the consequence is, that he who does a person any injury, is obliged to make reparation to him; and that he who refuses to do it, does a fresh injury, and may be truly said to hurt him again; and that if many persons have a share <149> in the injury, the same rule ought to be observed with regard to making satisfaction and reparation, which we laid down concerning the imputation of an action in which several persons concur (§112 & seq.).^*

      SECTION CCXI

      What is satisfaction?

      By satisfaction we here understand doing that which the law requires of one who has done an injury. Now, every perfect law requires two things, 1. That the injury be repaired,^* because a person is hurt or wronged. 2. That the injurious person should suffer for having transgressed the law by doing an injury, because the legislator is leased by his disobedience or transgression. And for this reason satisfaction comprehends both reparation and punishment, (Grotius of the rights of war and peace, 2. 17. 22. & 120.). The one doth not take off the other, because the guilt of the action for which punishment is inflicted, and the damage that is to be repaired, are conjunct in every delinquency. But of punishment in another place. <150>

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