Название: A Methodical System of Universal Law
Автор: Johann Gottlieb Heineccius
Издательство: Ingram
Жанр: Философия
Серия: Natural Law and Enlightenment Classics
isbn: 9781614871910
isbn:
SECTION CXLVII
Of the particular culture to which particulars are obliged.
From which last proposition (§146), it follows, that whereas all persons are equally obliged to the <103> duties hitherto mentioned; every one is for himself in particular obliged to that special culture of his understanding, which is suitable to his particular talents and genius, and to his rank and condition in life; and therefore every one ought to know his force and genius, and one is hardly excusable if he chooses a way of life to himself for which he is not qualified, or if he forces any in his power,* under his authority, or committed to his direction, so to do.
SECTION CXLVIII
Duties relative to the will.
The perfection of the will consists in the desire and fruition of good. But since we cannot pursue good, unless we have first conceived a just notion of its excellence, nor avoid evil, unless we know it to be such (§30); hence it is manifest, that we ought not to acquiesce in any knowledge of good and evil whatsoever, but exert ourselves with all our power to have a true and lively conception of them; that not every good is to be chosen, but of <104> many goods that which is best and most necessary: yea, that evil ought not to be avoided, if it be necessary to our attaining to a greater good: and finally, that our chief good ought to be desired and pursued above all things; and that we ought to bear the want of other goods with a patient and satisfied mind, if we cannot attain it without being deprived of them.†
SECTION CXLIX
The amendment of the will is chiefly necessary.
Further, since he who is obliged to the end, is likewise obliged to the means, it follows, that none of these means ought to be neglected which right reason shews to be necessary or proper for attaining to our greatest happiness; but that we ought to apply ourselves with uninterrupted care daily to amend and perfect our minds, to obtain the right government of our affections, and to rescue ourselves from every vitious appetite and passion.* <105>
SECTION CL
Our obligation to preserve and perfect our body.
It now remains to speak of our body, the perfection of which consists in the fitness of all its parts to perform their necessary functions; and it is plain that we are obliged to take care of our health, and therefore to direct our eating and drinking, labour, exercise, and every thing to that end; to the preservation of our health, and the increase of our strength and agility;* and, on the other hand, to avoid, as much as lies in our power, whatever tends to maim, hurt, or destroy our bodies, or any of its members, in any degree.
SECTION CLI
How far one is obliged to seek riches.
But all this is enjoined in vain, if one be so distressed by poverty, that he has it not in his power either to live in a wholesome manner, nor to regu-<106>late his labour as his health requires; and therefore it is obvious, that a person must have a right to seek after the things that are necessary to subsistence and decent living. When the provision of these things is abundant, it is called wealth or riches; and every one is obliged to acquire as large a share of them as he can by just means, and to preserve and use prudently what he hath justly acquired.†
SECTION CLII
And therefore to industry.
But because the end cannot be acquired without the means, and there is no other mean of acquiring what is necessary to supply our necessities but labour and industry, it is manifest that every one is bound to go through with the labours of the business <107> in life he hath chosen with a cheerful mind, and to give all diligence to get a comfortable subsistence; and therefore he acts contrary to duty who lives in idleness, and thus brings poverty and misery upon himself; for such distress is ignominious; whereas poverty is not criminal or shameful, when one, who does all in his power, is overwhelmed by some private or public calamity; or when one, without his own fault, can find no occasion of doing for himself.*
SECTION CLIII
And likewise to preserve and increase our good name.
Since a person ought not to neglect any of those things which are necessary to increase or preserve his happiness (§140); and none can doubt but a good name, which consists in the favourable opinion of others with regard to our virtue and accomplishments, is necessary to preserve and increase our happiness. [For one, of whose virtue and accomplishments all think well, all think worthy of happiness, and all are therefore sollicitous to promote his happiness.] For these reasons, every one is obliged to take care of his reputation, as a mean of his happiness; and therefore to act in every affair, private or public, as reason directs, and not only to preserve his good name by worthy actions, but, as much as lies in his power, to increase it.* <108>
SECTION CLIV
And to refute aspersions.
But if it be one’s duty to take care to preserve his good name unblemished (§153); since calumnies, i.e. false reports, may blacken it; the consequence is, that we ought to omit nothing that is necessary to wipe off aspersions cast injuriously upon us, unless they be so groundless and malicious, or the author of them so contemptible, that it is better to overlook them with generous contempt.* <109>
SECTION CLV
Whether in case of necessity our duties to ourselves ought to be prefered before those to God.
Tho’ so far the love of ourselves be most just and lawful; yet, no doubt, it becomes vitious, so soon as it exceeds its due bounds, and gets the ascendant over our love to GOD, the most perfect of Beings (§92); and hence we concluded above, (§140), that all our duties to ourselves keep their due rank and place, if they are performed in proper subordination to the love of God, or do not encroach upon it; whence it is manifest, that the common maxim, “That necessity has no law,” is not universally true.†
SECTION CLVI
Upon what it is founded.
But seeing this rule is not always true; and yet in some cases it ought to be admitted (§155); different cases must be distinguished: now, because in <110> an action imposed upon us by sovereign necessity, no other circumstance can vary the case, but either necessity itself, the nature of the law, or the nature of the duty to be omitted, these circumstances ought therefore to be a little more accurately and distinctly considered, in order to be able to determine how far necessity has the power of a law, and when it has not.
SECTION CLVII
Necessity what it is, and of what kinds.
By necessity we understand such a situation of a person, in which he cannot obey a law without incurring danger. This danger, as often as it extends to life itself, is extreme; and when it does not, it ought to be measured by the greatness СКАЧАТЬ