The Law of Nations Treated According to the Scientific Method. Christian von Wolff

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СКАЧАТЬ be promulgated in the state by a superior such as nations do not have, and certainly do not recognize. For since the law of nature governs the will of the ruler in making laws, and since laws ought to prescribe the means by which the good of the state is maintained, by virtue of the present proposition, then, it is evident enough of what sort those laws ought to be that nations ought to agree to, consequently may be presumed to have agreed to. No difficulty will appear in establishing a law of nations which does not depart altogether from the necessary law of nations, nor in all respects observe it, as will appear in what follows.

      § 12. How individual nations are bound to the whole and the whole to the individuals

      § 28, part 8, Jus Nat.

      §§ 9 and fol., part 8, Jus Nat.

      Inasmuch as nations are understood to have combined in a supreme state, the individual nations are understood to have bound themselves to the whole, because they wish to promote the common good, but the whole to the individuals, because it wishes to provide for the especial good of the individuals. For if a state is established, individuals bind themselves to the whole, because they wish to promote the common good, and the whole binds itself to the individuals, because it wishes to provide for adequate life, for peace and security, consequently for the especial good of the individuals. Inasmuch then as nations are understood to have combined in a supreme state, individual nations also are understood to have bound themselves to the whole, because they wish to promote the common good, and the whole to the individuals, because it wishes to provide for the especial good of the individuals.

      § 7, 9.

      Note, § 635, part 7, Jus Nat.

      Nature herself has brought nations together in the supreme state, and therefore has imposed upon them the obligation which the present

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      proposition urges, that because they ought to agree, they may be presumed to have agreed, or it may rightly be assumed that they have agreed, just as something similar exists in patriarchal society, which we have said is valid as a natural quasi-agreement. But if all nations had been equipped with such power of discernment as to know how effort might be made for the advantage of themselves, and what losses might be avoided by them, if the individual nations performed the duty of a good citizen, and their leaders did not allow themselves to be led astray by some impulse of passion, certainly there would be no doubt that in general all would expressly agree to that to which nature leads them, which produces and maintains harmony even among the ignorant and unwilling. But this must be shown by us, how nature provides for the happiness of the human race in accordance with the human lot. For humans ought not to be imagined to be what they are not, however much they ought to be so. And for this reason it will be plain from what follows, that laws which spring from the concept of the supreme state, depart from the necessary law of nations, since on account of the human factor in the supreme state things which are illicit in themselves have to be, not indeed allowed, but endured, because they cannot be changed by human power.

      § 13. Of the law of nations as a whole in regard to individual nations

      § 29, part 8, Jus Nat.

      § 9.

      § 12.

      § 23, part 1, Jus Nat.

      In the supreme state the nations as a whole have a right to coerce the individual nations, if they should be unwilling to perform their obligation, or should show themselves negligent in it. For in a state the right belongs to the whole of coercing the individuals to perform their obligation, if they should either be unwilling to perform it or should show themselves negligent in it. Therefore since all nations are understood to have combined into a state, of which the individual nations are members, and inasmuch as they are understood to have combined in the supreme state, the individual members of this are understood to have bound themselves to the whole, because they wish to promote the common good, since moreover from the passive obligation of one party the right of the other arises; therefore the right belongs to the nations as a whole in the supreme state also of coercing the individual nations, if they are unwilling to perform their obligation or show themselves negligent in it.

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      This will seem paradoxical to those who do not discern the connexion of truths and who judge laws from facts. But it will be evident in what follows that we need the present proposition as a basis of demonstration of others which must be admitted without hesitation. And in general it must be observed that our question is one of law, for which men are fitted in their present state, and not at all of facts, by which the law is either defied or broken. For there would be no purpose in the supreme state, into which nature has united nations, unless from it some law should arise for the whole in regard to the individuals. Of what sort this is will be shown in what follows.

      § 14. How this is to be measured

      § 30, part 8, Jus Nat.

      § 13.

      The law of nations as a whole with reference to individual nations in the supreme state must be measured by the purpose of the supreme state. For the law of the whole with reference to individuals in a state must be measured by the purpose of the state. Therefore, since in the supreme state too a certain right belongs to nations as a whole with reference to the individual nations, this right also must be measured by the purpose of the supreme state.

      Note, § 30, part 8, Jus Nat.

      Since in any state the right of the whole over the individuals must not be extended beyond the purpose of the state, so also the right of nations as a whole over individual nations cannot be extended beyond the purpose of the supreme state into which nature herself has combined them, so that forthwith individual nations may be known to have assigned a right of this sort to the whole.

      § 15. Of what sort this is

      § 31, part 8, Jus Nat.

      § 14.

      Some sovereignty over individual nations belongs to nations as a whole. For a certain sovereignty over individuals belongs to the whole in a state. Therefore, as is previously shown, some sovereignty over individual nations belongs also to nations as a whole.

      § 32, part 8, Jus Nat.

      That sovereignty will seem paradoxical to some. But these will be such as do not have a clear notion of the supreme state, nor recognize the benefit which nature provides, when she establishes a certain civil

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      society among nations. Moreover, it will be evident in its own place that nothing at all results from this, except those things which all willingly recognize as in accordance with the law of nations, or what it is readily understood they ought to recognize. Nor is it less plain that this sovereignty has a certain resemblance to civil sovereignty.

      § 16. Of the moral equality of nations

      § 2.

      § 81, part 1, Jus Nat.

      By nature all nations are equal the one to the other. For nations are considered as individual free persons living in a state of nature. Therefore, since by nature all humans are equal, all nations too are by nature equal the one to the other.

      It is not the number of humans coming together into a state that makes a nation, but the bond by which the individuals are united, and this is nothing else than the obligation by which they СКАЧАТЬ